PATTERNS OF POWER

French Morocco

The Office That Outlived the Occupier

A study of rule through a rented sovereign — the conquest of Morocco and its administration under the protectorate, 1907–1956, read against the Patterns of Power framework

A case study in the Patterns of Power series

Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic)

held as tested, not revealed

FRONT MATTER

PREFACE AND OUTLINE

Front matter · how this study was made, the disciplines it holds itself to, and a map of its fourteen parts

The collaboration

This is a case study in the *Patterns of Power* series, applying the series' framework to the French conquest and administration of Morocco, from the occupation of Oujda in 1907 and the Treaty of Fez in 1912 to the negotiated independence of 1956. The framework is a lens for reading how any order of power is founded, dressed, and held: the floor of force beneath every order, the robe of doctrine laid over the floor, the settlement that divides the spoils, the cost column in which each subject prices defection, the default by which an elite coordinates without instruction, and — running through all of it — position-logic, the proposition that rulers in like positions converge on like solutions because a position poses a problem with only a few good answers. Morocco was chosen because it is the framework's purest case of one particular answer, and the most economical: rule through a preserved sovereign whose sacred legitimacy the conqueror does not build but *rents* — an order held so cheaply, and for so long, on a belief that was never France's, that the whole of its strength and the whole of its fragility turn out to be the same feature seen twice.

The study was built the way the series is built, one module at a time. The author brought the framework, the direction, and the judgement of the whole, and held the collaboration to

its disciplines; Claude, Anthropic's model, did the research — verifying every load-bearing quotation, date, and figure by web search against a source reproducing the primary text before any module was written — and produced the drafts, applying the framework module by module, each presented and confirmed before the next was begun. The framework's concepts are the series'; the Morocco application, and the refinements it yielded, are the work of the collaboration.

Its engine throughout is the method of information asymmetry. The study exists to show the gap between what was said at the metropole and what was done in the colony, and it works by setting the exact public words beside the exact words of the ground — the treaty's pledge to preserve the Sultan's sovereignty beside the map of the partition printed six years early in the Act of Algeciras; the promise of *appui constant* to the throne beside the deposition of the man who sat on it; the sermon that carried the Sultan's name beside the aircraft over Bou Gafer — laying out the arithmetic and leaving the sum to the reader. It does not preach the conclusion. It lays the two columns side by side and lets the distance between them speak.

The disciplines

Five rules govern every module.

Quotation. Public-domain primary sources — laws, dahirs, treaties, conventions, parliamentary speeches, despatches, the period press — are quoted exactly, at the length the argument needs, because in a legal fiction the precise wording *is* the evidence. Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased, briefly, and credited.

No fabrication. No quotation, date, attribution, or figure is ever invented or reconstructed from memory. What cannot be verified is dropped or flagged, never guessed; contested

figures are given as ranges. This study flags its own soft points in each closing note, and the reader will find them there rather than hidden.

Gravity without partisanship. Suffering is held with gravity, and the study refuses both flattery and demonisation — it names the legal fiction as fiction and explains the order's logic without excusing it. Its recurring watchword is *legibility is not pardon*: to understand how a thing was done is not to forgive its being done, and — a discipline Morocco demands more than most, because its order was the gentle one — it is not to condemn it either. It is to measure.

Contribution. Every module returns a refinement to the framework, stated plainly in its closing section, rather than merely applying the framework to the case.

Held as tested, not revealed. The pattern is treated as something discovered and tested against the evidence, not handed down as doctrine — a lens laid over the record, a tendency and never a law.

What Morocco added to the framework

Because Morocco is the series' purest case of rule through a rented sovereign, it named features of that method the settler and direct-rule cases obscure. Chief among the refinements the study contributed: that the robe can be *rented rather than woven* — a conqueror may lease the belief already installed on a population instead of building his own, which is cheaper because the belief is already believed, and more dangerous because a rented robe can be repossessed by its owner and cannot be defended by the conqueror's usual instruments without destroying the trust that made it worth renting; that the *cost column can be rented too*, so that defiance of the coloniser presents itself to the ordinary subject as defiance of a sovereign whose obedience is a religious duty, priced by the

subject's own community at no cost to the conqueror, and repossessable by the same hand; that withheld formation, in a country that already possesses a mature formation, is not a subtraction but *a concession of the field*, leaving the old nation in possession of itself; that an order forbidden to name its subject caste will *extract by a flat tax laid over an unequal settlement*, so that the fairness of the rate is the instrument of the unfairness of the burden — a caste tax that cannot be quoted against its authors; that *visible suppression is self-documenting*, the censored blank publishing an index of the ruler's fears under his own imprint, so that censorship once begun cannot stably stop halfway; that the *default cannot defend its own foundation*, because the foundation is everyone's support and no one's position, so that an elite converging to protect its places will spend the very belief that makes the places possible; that an order which *rents its keystone cannot defend its keystone*, writing a single point of contestability into the middle of an otherwise total capture; that the *metabolic column is short* where a coordinating order is preserved rather than shattered, so that the ratio of metabolic to combat dead measures how much of the conquered order the conqueror destroyed versus kept; and that when such an order falls, the withdrawing power's freedom is set by *how many viable collaborators it has left* — an order that has spent its own foundation has usually consumed its collaborators with it, and must reinstate the very figure it destroyed. The rule-through-a-rented-sovereign conquest is the cheapest and the gentlest of the colonial forms, and its cheapness and its gentleness are, at every level, the same thing as its single fatal exposure: it leans for forty years on a leg it does not own, and the leg breaks the instant it tries to own it.

The colonial bend, and the recursion

The series predicts that the general pattern bends in a colony, and Morocco confirms the bend in its own direction. The robe is cut for the metropole and the army whose belief funds and mans the conquest, not for the conquered whose belief the floor does not need — and in Morocco the robe was cut so entirely for home that its whole canonical literature was published in Paris, for Parisians, and its author was elected to the Académie française on the strength of it. Formation is withheld from the majority, because forming them would mean admitting them, and under a protectorate there was nothing to admit them to. The seam splits in two by distance — what is hidden from the metropole is what the conquered live — and the order's core task is keeping the two ends from meeting. Extraction sorts by caste, and the collapse is driven by the metropole's will emptying, not by the ruled beating the floor.

And the order France met in 1830-and-after was never an aboriginal baseline. The Islamic sultanate France conquered was itself a former conquest naturalised to the self-running pole: the Alaouite settlement of the seventeenth century laid over a sharifian principle planted in the eighth, laid over the Arab conquest of the seventh, laid over Roman Africa — until Qur'anic law and the Friday sermon in the Sultan's name were simply the way the world was. That a built order became real does not make its belief a lie; it makes it a thing that was built and then became real, and it is precisely because the native order had *taken* — authentically the conquered's world — that it could be leased, and precisely because it had taken that breaking it would cost so much. Naming a conquered origin is not debunking. It is establishing that both sides of the gun in 1912 were made worlds.

The arc

A preface, a landscape opening, and twelve modules, each with a framework function and its own evocative title.

Landscape — the two societies on the eve. **The Name in the Sermon and the Charge on the Customs.** A sultanate solvent in legitimacy and bankrupt in cash, whose name was said every Friday in mosques its tax collectors could not reach, beside a republic that had learned in Algeria what conquest costs and had gone looking for a cheaper instrument — and the conditional oath of 1908 that proved the belief was a real instrument and not a ceremony.

1 — The Floor of Force. **After Having Notified the Makhzen.** A conquest opened five years before the treaty that authorised it and closed twenty-two years after, waged in law on behalf of the sovereign being conquered, and carried in large part by his own subjects constituted as police because a treaty had given him a police and no army: the fiction reaching down into the establishment tables.

2 — The Settlement. **A Perpetual Alienation of Enjoyment.** A registration system that purged every prior claim, a guardianship that made collective land inalienable and then alienated its use for ever, and a phosphate monopoly reserved to the Sharifian state: a settlement whose line ran not between coloniser and native but between the registered and the unregistered, recruiting a native propertied class onto the settler's side of it.

3 — The Robe. **A Zone on Which Nothing May Be Built.** A doctrine of respect and preservation published in Paris for Parisians, whose most admired achievement was to keep the old cities intact by forbidding their people to build in them: the gentleness not a softening of the foreclosure but the form the foreclosure took.

4 — Formation. **The Certificate of Muslim Studies.** Two educations designed for two kinds of Moroccan, a credential built so that it would not convert, a school founded to form Berbers away from Arabic and Islam, and a thousand-year-old system of instruction that simply held the field the coloniser declined to enter: the withholding as a concession of the field to the former conquest's robe.

5 — The Cost Column. **Those Invested With Command Among You.** Why the ordinary Moroccan's ledger came out against revolt although France's coercion reached him so lightly: an obedience owed to God through an office, priced by his neighbours, policed by Moroccan officials under the Sultan's seal, in a country from which every road out led into French hands — the cheapest cost column an occupying power has ever had, and a rented one.

6 — Extraction. **Seven Times Less.** A flat tax that fell at one rate whoever owned the field, so that the Moroccan sector paid sevenfold and the percentages stayed close; a surcharge that funded the surveillance of one caste and the self-government of the other; a system built above all not to discourage the investor: the caste tax that names no one.

7 — Information and Suppression. **Commentary on the New Constitution, Censored.** A press law that made a Frenchman the condition of a newspaper, a censorship that left the white spaces where the articles had been, and a mosque network the coloniser could neither read nor silence: what was hidden inside Morocco escaping through the one channel the order had rented to rule with.

8 — Elite Coordination and the Default. **Three Hundred Caïds and Twenty-Three Pashas.** A hierarchy of nested positions held together not by loyalty but by self-interest, until the topmost collaborators used the machine to depose the one position it stood on — and discovered they had cut the belief

the entire stack rested on: the default that cannot defend a foundation that is everyone's support and no one's position.

9 — Plurality or Foreclosure. **In Theory the Powers of the Sultan Were Unrestrained.** An order with no legislature for anyone, in which even the settlers who ran the economy were denied an assembly, the three monopolies gathered into a single hand — with one crack, in the load-bearing leg the conqueror had rented rather than owned: the contestation appearing at the apex, because every exterior edge had been ground away.

10 — Change and Collapse. **A Viable Collaborator.** An order that fell not because the ruled beat the floor but because its own elite fractured against the position that held it, then found the floor too expensive to defend once rival wars opened next door — and was driven to reinstate the very sovereign it had deposed, because it had destroyed every collaborator but him and needed one.

11 — The Grim Accounting. **The Note That Was Not Called.** A founding measured in combat rather than famine, because the coordinating order it seized was left running rather than shattered; a bill paid mostly in the naked cost of the sword where belief never took, its dead clustered in the mountains where the borrowed robe did not reach; and works real enough that the honest reckoning credits them without letting them cancel the column of the dead.

12 — Convergence and Divergence. **The Office That Outlived the Occupier.** Morocco placed among the conquests that rule through a kept sovereign rather than over a dispossessed subject, its method chosen by its position and set against the door France bolted next door in Algeria; and the strongest case for the protectorate — that it was the least bad colonialism on offer — stated in full and answered without flinching, crediting the achievement without swallowing the self-justification.

A note on sources. This front matter is descriptive and makes no primary-source claims of its own; every factual assertion about the case is established, with its sources, in the module it summarises. The framework it describes is the series'; the disciplines it lists are the ones the modules hold themselves to and document in their own closing notes. The refinements attributed to the study above are proposed to the framework and are held, as the whole collection is, as tested and never revealed. *Part of the collection* Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

LANDSCAPE

THE NAME IN THE SERMON AND THE CHARGE ON THE CUSTOMS

Landscape · the two societies on the eve — a sultanate carried by a sentence spoken in every mosque on a Friday, and a republic that had learned in Algeria what conquest costs and had gone looking for a cheaper instrument

The sentence spoken on Fridays

In the Islamic world the two classical marks of sovereignty were *khutba wa sikka* — to have one's name pronounced in the Friday sermon and one's name struck on the coin — and of the two the sermon was the more searching test, because a mint can be seized in an afternoon and a pulpit cannot. To be named in the *khutba* was to be acknowledged as the rightful holder of authority by the men who addressed the community at prayer; to be omitted was, in the plainest available language, to be denied. The practice was old, and the political weight of it was well understood by everyone concerned: from the ninth century onward, autonomous rulers across the Muslim world added their own names to the coinage beneath the caliph's, and the presence or absence of a name in the sermon announced the accession of a ruler, the

naming of an heir, the beginning of a war, and the deposition of a sovereign.

This is where a landscape of Morocco has to begin, because it is the measurement that the rest of the study depends on. The Alaouite sultan in 1912 was *amir al-mu'minin*, Commander of the Faithful, a title claimed in the Maghreb since the Marinids and held by every Moroccan dynasty after them, and in the Alaouite case resting additionally on *sharifian* descent — a claim of lineage from the Prophet through his grandson Hasan. He held office by *bay'a*, an oath of allegiance drafted by religious scholars and subscribed by the notables of the community: the *shurafa*, the heads of the Sufi lodges, the military commanders, the leading merchants and the masters of the crafts, who by that act conferred legitimacy on the new ruler and bound themselves to obedience, while he undertook in return to safeguard religion, security, public order, justice in dealings, and honour. It was a contract with named parties and stated obligations, and it was the constitutional instrument of the Moroccan state.

What it produced was an authority whose reach did not coincide with the reach of the sultan's soldiers or his tax collectors, and did not have to. Across a great deal of the country the Makhzen — the central government, the word means storehouse or treasury — could not compel a tribe to pay, could not billet troops among it, and could not appoint over it a man it would not accept; and in those same districts the sultan's name went on being said on Fridays. That is the single fact from which the whole of what follows can be predicted. An order in which the tax collector is resisted and the sermon is not has separated two things the framework normally finds travelling together, and the gap between them is exactly the asset a foreign power will later find worth renting.

The order that was itself a conquest

Nothing in this arrangement was aboriginal, and the Moroccans of 1912 did not imagine that it was. The stack beneath them was one of the deepest anywhere in the record, and every layer of it had been laid by force.

Under everything lay a Berber North Africa which had been Roman for centuries — Mauretania Tingitana, with its colonies at Volubilis and at Sala on the Bou Regreg — and which was overrun in the Arab conquests that culminated between roughly 676 and 698, carried westward from the garrison city of Kairouan. Islam arrived as the religion of an army. The first durable Muslim state in what is now Morocco was founded ninety years later, and its founding image is worth holding, because it contains the whole recursion in one scene: Idris ibn Abdallah, a Hasanid fleeing Abbasid pursuit after the battle of Fakhkh, reached Tangier and settled in 788 at Volubilis, where the Awraba Berbers — a tribe that had backed Kusayla against the Umayyad armies a century before, and were themselves already Muslim while many of their neighbours were Christian, Jewish, Kharijite or pagan — took him in as their imam. An Arab refugee was installed as a religious leader by a Berber tribe, in the ruins of a Roman town, and the dynasty that resulted, the Idrisids, founded Fez, planted the sharifian principle in Moroccan soil, and Arabised the northern towns. In 859 a woman of a merchant family from Kairouan, Fatima al-Fihri, spent her inheritance founding the mosque and school of al-Qarawiyyin in that city — an institution which UNESCO and the Guinness records both describe as the oldest continuously operating degree-granting establishment in the world, though the claim is contested by the older Zaytuna foundation at Tunis, and which was still, in 1912, the training ground of the Moroccan legal and religious class.

After the Idrisids came the Almoravids and the Almohads, Berber movements out of the Sahara and the Atlas which conquered northward and westward and were in their turn naturalised; then the Marinids, who took the title of Commander of the Faithful; then the Saadians, sharifs from the Draa; and then, out of the palm-oases of the Tafilalt, the Alaouites. Their ancestors had come from Yanbu on the Hejaz coast some centuries earlier. Moulay Sharif was recognised as ruler in the Tafilalt in 1631; his sons fought each other for it; Moulay Rashid secured the surrender of Fez in June 1666, destroyed the Dila'i confederation in 1668, took Marrakesh, and reunited the country before dying young in 1672; and his half-brother Moulay Isma'il ruled until 1727 with an army of black slave soldiers, the *Abid al-Bukhari*, and with a severity that led some jurists to argue he had exceeded the limits the law set on a ruler. That last detail matters more than the cruelty it records: the men who could say so were the ulama, and their standing to say it was part of the constitution.

So the order France met was a conquest naturalised across two and a half centuries, sitting on a sharifian principle naturalised across eleven, sitting on an Arab conquest naturalised across twelve, sitting on Roman Africa. And the discipline the collection insists on has to be held tightly here, because it is easy to mistake this catalogue for a debunking. It is the opposite. The Alaouite legitimacy was not a fiction because it began as a claim; by 1912 it was the furniture of reality for the people who lived inside it — the thing a man in the Sous or the Gharb did not have to be persuaded of, because he had never been offered anything else to think. A built order that has become real is more durable and more genuine than a lie, and it is precisely because this one had become real that it could be leased, and precisely because it had become real that breaking it would cost so much. Naming the conquered origin of an order is not diminishing it. It is

establishing that both sides of the gun in 1912 were made worlds, so that when one of them later describes itself as arriving among people who had no institutions, the reader already has the arithmetic.

Two lands, and a distinction that must be handled with tongs

The standard shorthand for pre-protectorate Morocco divides it into *bled el-makhzen*, the land of government, where taxes were collected and governors governed, and *bled es-siba*, the land of dissidence, where they were not and did not. The words are Moroccan and old — *siba* derives from a term for an untethered camel, one set loose from the herd, and appears in Maghribi legal writing from the eleventh century onward — but the *system* built on them is not. The bipartition as a theory of the Moroccan state was elaborated in French colonial ethnography, notably by the officer and writer Maurice Le Glay, and Edmund Burke III has shown how thoroughly it served the purposes of the men who elaborated it: it portrayed a country permanently suspended between autocracy and anarchy, and it welded that picture to a second one, an ethnic split between Arabs and Berbers, in which Moroccan history became the story of an Arab government failing to impose itself on Berber dissidents. Abdallah Laroui and the historians of decolonisation took the construct apart. The relation between centre and periphery was a shifting political bargain, not a frontier, and least of all a racial one; as early as 1901 the French ethnographer Edmond Doutté had called the Arab–Berber distinction vain, pointing out that the communities intermarried, that many people spoke both languages, and that both included settled and nomadic populations.

But the construct is not to be discarded either, because underneath the ideology there is a real and highly consequential fact, and later scholarship has stated it precisely: in the districts the French called *siba*, the tribes withheld obedience from the Makhzen while continuing to accept the spiritual authority of the sultan. That is not anarchy. That is a population which recognised the office and refused the levy — which knew perfectly well whose name belonged in the sermon and declined to admit whose soldiers belonged in the valley. The Moroccan periphery was not outside the order; it was inside the belief and outside the collection.

Which yields the measurement. If one asks the ordinary question — how much force did this order need in order to hold? — the answer is that the sultanate held an enormous amount of territory at almost no coercive cost and could extract from only a part of it. The belief ran further than the floor by a very great distance. And a state whose legitimacy outruns its revenue is a state that cannot pay for its own army, which is the beginning of the second half of this landscape.

The oath of January 1908

The framework asks, of any order, whether the belief in it is real or performed, and it names the strongest available test: find an occasion on which the order's own authorities made a determination about legitimacy at no cost to the population, and see what the population actually did. Morocco supplies that test four years before the protectorate, and the result is unambiguous.

Sultan Abdelaziz, who had come to the throne in 1894 at sixteen, had by 1907 accumulated a full portfolio of grievances against himself: a failed fiscal reform, a mortgaged customs revenue, a French column in Oujda from April 1907, and a

French bombardment of Casablanca in August. His brother Abd al-Hafid was offered the *bay'a* by the southern notables at Marrakesh in September 1907. The ulama of Fez, bypassed, held that oath illegitimate — and then, on 5 January 1908, led by the Sufi shaykh Muhammad al-Kattani, the people of Fez gave Abd al-Hafid a *bay'a* of their own with conditions attached to it, the first time in Moroccan history that terms had been imposed on a sovereign in exchange for allegiance. The conditions, remembered as the Kattani stipulations, required the new sultan to consult the community on all major decisions, to wage *jihad* for the recovery of the occupied places, to back out of the Act of Algeciras, and to end the protégé system. The support of Fez turned the succession; the other imperial cities followed; Abdelaziz, encouraged by the French, resisted until his defeat at Marrakesh in August 1908.

Read for what it is, this is a population and a clerical class behaving exactly as people behave when a belief is load-bearing rather than decorative. They did not treat the throne as a thing to be acclaimed. They treated it as an office with a job description, checked the incumbent against it, found him wanting, and transferred the oath on written terms — and the country moved with the terms. No one had to be coerced into caring.

It has a second face, and the second face is the eve of the conquest in miniature. In November 1908 the powers signatory to the Act of Algeciras sent Abd al-Hafid a note setting out what he must declare, and on 17 December 1908 they announced that they had decided to recognise him as the lawful Sultan of Morocco. Within eleven months the same throne had been conferred twice: in January by the scholars of Fez, on conditions that required its holder to fight the Europeans, and in December by the European chancelleries, on conditions that required him to honour everything the scholars had told him to repudiate. One apex, two audiences,

two currencies of recognition, and no possibility of satisfying both.

The empire consumed by finance

The military verdicts had come first and were not in doubt: defeat by France at Isly in 1844, and defeat by Spain in the war of 1859–60, which ended with the Treaty of Wad Ras of 26 April 1860. But the instrument that actually took Morocco apart was not the battle. It was the ledger.

In 1856 an Anglo-Moroccan commercial treaty fixed the customs duty at ten per cent and ended the sultan's royal monopolies — that is, it removed at a stroke both the Makhzen's ability to set its own tariff and its principal non-agricultural revenue. Four years later Wad Ras imposed an indemnity of twenty million *duros*, a sum variously rendered as about one hundred million francs and roughly four million United States dollars of the day, and in any case far beyond the balance of the treasury; Spain held Tetouan until it was paid. To pay it, Morocco borrowed in London in 1861 — a loan of £501,200, of which the sultan actually received £426,000 — at five per cent, to be serviced out of half of the tariff revenue of the Moroccan ports, collected under the eyes of European agents, with the other half going to Spain. The annual service came to about twelve per cent of customs receipts. It was repaid in full in 1882, whereupon the British officials watching the customs houses went home.

They did not stay away long, and the reason is the second mechanism, which was not a loan but a legal status. Under the *protégé* system, Moroccans employed by foreign consulates enjoyed exemption from Makhzen taxation and from Moroccan jurisdiction. Sultan Hassan I called the Madrid conference of 1880 precisely in order to have the abuse of that system curbed. Britain was inclined to concede something; France

urged that the right of protection not be abridged; the conference adopted the French position. The Convention of Madrid of 3 July 1880 accordingly did not restrain the practice — it codified it, converting a scatter of bilateral treaties and consular understandings into an international instrument. Article 5 records that “the Government of Morocco recognizes the right of ministers, chargés d’affaires, and other representatives, which is granted to them by treaties, to select the persons whom they employ,” and Article 16 provides that “the authorities of Morocco will recognize no protection of any kind whatever save such as is expressly provided for in this convention.” The sultan had summoned an international conference to stop the sale of exemptions from his own taxes, and had come away from it having formally conceded that the choice of who was exempt lay with the foreign legations, and having bound himself to recognise no protection except the kind the convention created. The selling of protections became brisker afterwards, not scarcer.

By 1901 the Makhzen was trying to reform its way out. The *tertib*, a uniform assessment on cultivated land, trees and livestock intended to replace the older religious levies and their tangle of exemptions, was resisted by the ulama, by the *caïds* who collected under the old arrangements, and by the tribes whose customary exemptions it cancelled; the European powers declined to let their own protected persons be assessed under it. It produced almost nothing, and it produced a revolt — the pretender Bou Hmara raised the north-east from 1902, financed partly by selling wool into Melilla and levying customs of his own.

Then came the loans that finished the work. The contract of 12 June 1904, signed for the Makhzen by its foreign and finance ministers and for the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas by its representative, advanced 62.5 million francs in 125,000 bonds of 500 francs at five per cent, secured on the customs,

with a debt administration directly involved in their collection. Of the 62.5 million, the sultan received about 10.5 million; the remainder went to retiring earlier debt and to charges. A consolidation loan of 101 million francs followed in 1910.

The most useful thing that has been said about these figures was said by Adam Barbe, and it inverts the obvious reading: measured against the size of the Moroccan economy the debt was modest — on the order of ten per cent of output in 1904 and thirty-five per cent by 1912 — and the country was producing enough wealth that the burden ought not to have been crushing. What had happened was not that Morocco was over-borrowed. It was that European expansion had severed the fiscal link between the Makhzen and the population: the wealth existed, and the government could no longer reach it, because the tariff was fixed by treaty, the customs were pledged to creditors and watched by their agents, the monopolies were gone, the most commercially active subjects held foreign protection, and the one new tax the Makhzen had designed for itself had been refused by everyone with the standing to refuse. Between 1903 and 1912 the debt stood at something between ten and sixteen years of tax revenue, and debt service absorbed on average some forty per cent of receipts each year.

An order in that condition has a very particular shape. Its authority is intact and its solvency is gone. It can still command the sermon and cannot pay the garrison. Its subjects have not stopped believing in it; they have stopped being reachable by it. And the party that has captured the revenue is, by the same act, in possession of the only thing the order lacks.

The paper of 1904 and 1906

Two documents did the diplomatic work, and they are the sharpest exhibits this landscape has.

On 8 April 1904, in London, Lansdowne and Cambon signed the Declaration between the United Kingdom and France respecting Egypt and Morocco. Its second article opens: “The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco.” His Britannic Majesty’s Government, for their part, recognised that it fell to France “to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require.”

Signed the same day, and not published until 1911, were the secret articles. One of them provides that the two governments “agree that a certain extent of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta, and other presides should, whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain, and that the administration of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not including, the heights on the right bank of the Sebou shall be entrusted to Spain.” Another provides that if either government should find itself “constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify their policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco,” specified engagements between them would remain intact.

The declaration of no intention and the clause conditioned on the sultan ceasing to exercise authority were executed by the same two men on the same afternoon. Nothing further needs to be said about them; the reader can do the subtraction.

The second document is longer and more remarkable, because everything in it was public. The First Moroccan Crisis

— provoked when Wilhelm II landed at Tangier in March 1905 declaring his support for the sultan's sovereignty — was settled by an international conference, and the General Act of the International Conference of Algeciras was signed on 7 April 1906 by twelve powers and Morocco, and ratified by Abd al-Aziz on 18 June. It opens: "In the Name of Almighty God," and recites that the powers are "inspired by the interest attaching itself to the reign of order, peace, and prosperity in Morocco, and recognizing that the attainment thereof can only be effected by means of the introduction of reforms based upon the triple principle of the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his domains, and economic liberty without any inequality."

Then come the articles. Article 2: "The police shall be under the sovereign authority of His Majesty the Sultan." It is to be recruited by the Makhzen from Moroccan Muslims and commanded by Moroccan officers, and by Article 3 the Spanish and French governments will place officers and non-commissioned officers at his disposal as instructors, at not less than double their ordinary pay, with lodging, horses and fodder found by the Makhzen; the two governments reserve the right to recall and replace them. Article 5 fixes the force at between two thousand and two and a half thousand men, with sixteen to twenty French and Spanish officers. Article 7 places a general inspection in the hands of a Swiss officer resident at Tangier, and Article 8 requires that copies of his reports go simultaneously to the dean of the diplomatic body, so that the diplomats may satisfy themselves that the sultan's police is acting in conformity with the decisions of the conference. And Article 12 states, in full: "The staff of instructors of the Shereefian police (officers and noncommissioned officers) shall be Spanish at Tetuan, mixed at Tangier, Spanish at Larache, French at Rabat, mixed at Casablanca, and French in the other three ports."

That sentence is a map of the partition of Morocco, printed and signed six years before the partition, in a treaty whose preamble affirms the integrity of the sultan’s domains.

The financial chapter runs the same way. Article 31 grants a State Bank of Morocco a concession of forty years. Article 32 gives it the exclusive privilege of note issue. Article 33 makes it, “to the exclusion of every other bank or establishment of credit,” the disbursing treasurer of the empire, with the customs proceeds to be deposited in it — save the portion already applied to the loan of 1904. Article 44 provides that the bank, though established with the approval of the sultan’s government, “shall be governed by the French law relative thereto”; Article 45 sends actions against it to a tribunal of consular magistrates applying French commercial law, with appeal to the Federal Court at Lausanne; Article 46 sends disputes between the bank and the Moroccan government to Lausanne as well, without appeal or recourse. Article 51 provides that the Bank of the German Empire, the Bank of England, the Bank of Spain and the Bank of France shall each appoint a Censor. Article 60 opens the purchase of land by foreigners generally in the treaty ports and within ten kilometres of them. And Article 105 declares, with a straight face, that “none of the public services in the Shereefian Empire can be alienated for the advantage of private interests.”

The Moroccan delegates did not sign at Algeciras; an additional protocol records that they were not in a position to do so, being unable at that distance to obtain an early reply from their sovereign, and provides that his adhesion, when communicated, shall have the same force as a signature. He gave it ten weeks later. Within fourteen months of that ratification the tribes were accusing him of having sold the country, and Casablanca had been bombarded.

The republic that had learned in Algeria

The France that would sign the Treaty of Fes was not a monarchy claiming by right of conquest, and it had settled its public account with colonial expansion twenty-seven years earlier in an argument that is worth reading in the words used, because both sides of it were still live in 1912.

On 28 July 1885, defending his colonial policy before the Chamber, Jules Ferry pressed past the economic and strategic arguments to the one he thought had to be said aloud. *"Messieurs, il faut parler plus haut et plus vrai ! il faut dire ouvertement qu'en effet les races supérieures ont un droit vis-à-vis des races inférieures…"* — Gentlemen, we must speak louder and more truly; we must say openly that the superior races do indeed have a right over the inferior races. Through the interruptions he finished the thought: *"Je répète qu'il y a pour les races supérieures un droit, parce qu'il y a un devoir pour elles. Elles ont le devoir de civiliser les races inférieures"* — I repeat that there is a right for the superior races because there is a duty upon them; they have the duty to civilise the inferior races. And he offered North Africa as his proof: *"Est-ce que vous pouvez nier, est-ce que quelqu'un peut nier qu'il y a plus de justice, plus d'ordre matériel et moral, plus d'équité, plus de vertus sociales dans l'Afrique du Nord depuis que la France a fait sa conquête ?"* — Can you deny, can anyone deny, that there is more justice, more material and moral order, more equity, more social virtue in North Africa since France made her conquest?

Two or three days later Clemenceau answered him, and the answer was not a quibble about method. *"Non, il n'y a pas de droit des nations dites supérieures contre les nations inférieures… Mais n'essayons pas de revêtir la violence du nom hypocrite de civilisation"* — No, there is no right of the so-called superior nations against the inferior nations; but let

us not try to dress violence in the hypocritical name of civilisation. He went further, and put the knife in the place where it would still be sharp in 1912: *“j’en rabats singulièrement depuis que j’ai vu des savants allemands démontrer scientifiquement que la France devait être vaincue dans la guerre franco-allemande parce que le Français est d’une race inférieure à l’Allemand”* — I have come down considerably since I saw German scholars demonstrate scientifically that France was bound to lose the Franco-Prussian war because the Frenchman is of a race inferior to the German. The conquest Ferry proposed, he said, was *“l’abus pur et simple de la force que donne la civilisation scientifique sur les civilisations rudimentaires”* — the plain abuse of the strength that scientific civilisation confers over rudimentary ones.

So the metropolitan audience was divided, and it was divided out loud, in the chamber, in the record. That is the fact the whole information problem of this study proceeds from: an expansion whose authorising story had to be told to people some of whom did not believe it and all of whom could vote.

Against that background France had one worked example next door, and it was not encouraging. Algeria had been invaded in 1830 and made a part of French national territory by the constitution of 1848, departmentalised in December of that year into Algiers, Oran and Constantine and administered through the Ministry of the Interior; settlers came, and were given the franchise, and by 1881 the *rattachement* had attached each branch of Algerian administration to its corresponding Paris ministry. Tribal landholding was broken open by the *sénatus-consulte* of 1863 and the status of the Muslim population defined, and limited, by that of 1865; the *indigénat* provided a summary disciplinary code for the majority; the Muqrani rising of 1871 was suppressed and paid for in confiscated land. What France possessed by 1912 was a

territory that was legally France, containing a European electorate that legally was France, and a Muslim majority which was neither, and which had cost eighty years of war, garrison and administration to hold in that condition.

Morocco would be taken differently, and the difference is a matter of legal form rather than of intention. Tunisia had already been taken as a protectorate in 1881. Morocco would be taken as one too: a state that remained, in law, sovereign, foreign to France, with its own ruler, its own religion and its own institutions, and with France advising. Under such an arrangement the acts of government are performed by the sovereign being governed; there is no annexation to be defended in the Chamber, no new departments to be administered from Paris, no majority of new subjects whose status has to be settled, and no need to build an administration from nothing where one already exists.

What that form was worth to France can be read off the price France paid for it, and the price was paid in hard territory. When the Panther anchored at Agadir on 1 July 1911, the crisis that followed was settled not by any Moroccan concession but by the Franco-German convention of 4 November 1911, under which Germany recognised France’s right to establish a protectorate and France ceded to German Kamerun a wedge of French Equatorial Africa — the figures given run from about 250,000 to 277,000 square kilometres — receiving in exchange a small strip south-east of Fort Lamy. France gave away a quarter of a million square kilometres of central Africa, and what she bought was not an inch of Moroccan soil. She already had columns in the country. What she bought was permission to describe what she was doing in a particular way.

That is the eve. On one side, a sultanate solvent in legitimacy and bankrupt in cash, whose name was spoken every Friday in mosques its tax collectors could not reach, and

whose scholars had just demonstrated, on terms, that the oath they administered was a real instrument and not a ceremony. On the other, a republic that had bought a free hand from Berlin, a benevolent silence from London, and a coastline for Madrid, and that had learned in Algeria exactly how expensive it is to govern a Muslim population in your own name. The instrument that joined the two was signed at Fez on 30 March 1912, and everything that this study measures follows from what that document kept and what it took.

Reading the eve against the framework

The Moroccan landscape confirms the collection's colonial predictions in their setup, and returns three refinements that the corpus did not previously have in this form.

The first concerns the relationship between belief and force. The framework has generally treated an order's legitimating story and its coercive floor as decaying together outward from the core — thick belief and light force at the centre, thin belief and heavy force at a conquered periphery. Morocco shows the two decoupled, and decoupled in a direction the corpus had not yet met: a belief that had reached the whole country while the floor had reached only part of it, so that the same tribesman who would not admit a Makhzen tax collector heard his sultan named in the Friday sermon and did not object. The refinement is that these are separate variables and must be measured separately, and that the ratio between them is what determines an order's value to a foreign buyer. A conqueror does not price the strength of the order he finds; he prices the *gap* between how far its belief carries and how far its force does — because that gap is precisely the quantity he can supply. Where the two coincide, there is nothing to sell him but a fight. Where belief runs far ahead of force, the incumbent is holding an asset he cannot monetise and the

newcomer is holding the only instrument that can monetise it, and the transaction is nearly written before either party sits down.

The second concerns the test of whether a belief is genuine. The framework's instrument for this is to find an occasion when the order's own authorities made a legitimacy determination and to observe what the population then did. Morocco supplies that occasion four years before the conquest, and returns something stronger than assent. On 5 January 1908 the scholars of Fez did not merely acclaim a sultan; they set out what he must do to hold the oath, and the country followed the terms rather than the man. What that establishes for everything downstream is not simply that the belief was real but that it was *specified* — an office with a stated job, held on conditions that were written down, by an incumbent whom named people had standing to assess. An order of that kind can be leased with unusual efficiency, because the tenant inherits an obedience already attached to a post rather than to a person. But the same specification is a liability with a date on it, because a contract with conditions is a contract that can be observed to have been broken, and the parties to it will know when it has been.

The third concerns what the revealed-preference test picks up when it is pointed at a conqueror rather than at an incumbent. France in 1911 already had the floor: troops at Oujda since 1907, at Casablanca since 1907, columns at Fez in 1911, and no Moroccan force capable of contesting any of it. Force that does not need to pay does not pay. France nonetheless paid — a quarter of a million square kilometres of Africa to Germany, a coastal zone to Spain, a free hand in Egypt to Britain — and bought with it no territory whatever, but the right to call the thing a protectorate. The expenditure is the evidence, and it identifies the audience: not the Moroccans, who were held by the floor and had already

recorded, in the conditions of 1908, exactly what they thought of European arrangements; but the powers, the Chamber, and the electorate that had listened to Ferry and Clemenceau argue about whether any of this could be called civilisation. The legal fiction of the protectorate was cut for the metropole, and it was expensive, and men do not pay that kind of money for decoration. What they were buying will be visible, article by article, in the treaty that follows — and the first question to ask of that treaty is not what it granted but what it kept: which parts of the sultan's authority France preserved, and which parts it took, because the difference between the two is the plainest available statement of what the arrangement was for.

A note on sources. The exact quotations here are public-domain primary material, given as the record reproduces it. The Convention of Madrid of 3 July 1880 is quoted from a United States State Department analysis reproducing its articles (Articles 5 and 16); I have used a single reproducing source for that text and it should be collated against the treaty series. The Franco-British Declaration of 8 April 1904 and its secret articles are quoted from the text printed in the British parliamentary papers of 1911 (Cmd. 5969) as reproduced in the Avalon Project and the Brigham Young University document archive; note that the reproductions differ in how they number the secret articles, some giving the Melilla–Ceuta clause as the second and some as the third, and I have therefore described it by its content rather than its number. The General Act of Algeciras of 7 April 1906 is quoted from the official United States government translation (34 Stat. 2905; Treaty Series 456), which is in the public domain; one clause of Article 2 concerning the commanding officers of the police is garbled in the digitised text and I have paraphrased rather than quoted it. Jules Ferry's speech of 28 July 1885 and

Clemenceau's reply are quoted from the reproductions published by the Assemblée nationale from the parliamentary record; sources disagree on whether Clemenceau spoke on 30 or 31 July, the Assemblée nationale giving the later date, and I have not resolved it.

Modern scholarship is paraphrased and credited. The critique of the *bled el-makhzen* / *bled es-siba* bipartition as a colonial construct, and its attribution to Maurice Le Glay's elaboration, follows Edmund Burke III's essay on the image of the Moroccan state in French ethnological literature, with the decolonisation-era counter-reading following Abdallah Laroui; the observation that the term itself is old and appears in eleventh-century Maghribi legal writing follows Jonathan Wyrtzen; Edmond Doutté's 1901 dismissal of the Arab–Berber distinction is cited as later scholarship reports it. The analysis of Moroccan indebtedness — that the debt was modest by conventional ratios and that the operative fact was the severing of the fiscal link between the Makhzen and the population — is Adam Barbe's, paraphrased.

Figures are given as the sources give them and as ranges where they are contested. The Wad Ras indemnity of twenty million *duros* is variously rendered as about one hundred million francs and about four million United States dollars of 1861; the Congo territory ceded in November 1911 is given by different sources as approximately 250,000 to 277,000 square kilometres. The population of Morocco in 1912 is deliberately not stated: the protectorate's own enumerations were superficial and in some cases unreliable, the districts under arms could only be estimated, and no figure I could verify deserves to be repeated as though it were a count. The dynastic dating follows the standard reference and scholarly accounts — the Arab conquests of North Africa between roughly 676 and 698, Idris I at Volubilis in 788 and the Idrisid state to the tenth century, al-Qarawiyyin founded in 859 with

the “oldest university” claim recorded as UNESCO and Guinness state it and as the Zaytuna counter-claim disputes it, Moulay Sharif in the Tafilalt in 1631, Moulay Rashid at Fez in 1666, Moulay Isma’il from 1672 to 1727. The account of the *bay’a* as a contract, and of its signatory classes and the five undertakings given in return, follows the description published by the Mohammed VI Foundation of African Oulema, which is a modern institutional source and is paraphrased as such; the specific terms of the Conditioned Bay’a of 5 January 1908 follow Susan Gilson Miller and the Moroccan constitutional-document literature and reached me through a single reproducing source, and want collation against Nabil Mouline’s edition of the documents. The financial detail of the 1861 British loan and the 1904 contract — the sums, the security on the customs, the fraction that reached the sultan — comes from a small number of sources and should be checked against the loan contracts themselves before any of it is repeated in a later module. The Casablanca events of 1907, the Hafidiya, and the *tertib* are sketched here only to set the eve; they belong to Modules 1, 5 and 6 and will be sourced there.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 1 · THE FLOOR OF FORCE

AFTER HAVING NOTIFIED THE MAKHZEN

Module 1 · The Floor of Force — a conquest that opened five years before the treaty that authorised it and closed twenty-two years after, waged in law on behalf of the sovereign being conquered, and carried in large part by his own subjects wearing the uniform of his police

The clause

The French protectorate in Morocco was created by a document of nine short articles, signed at Fez on 30 March 1912 by the French minister Eugène Regnault and the Sultan Moulay Abd al-Hafid after a six-hour session in the palace that ended at midnight, with French troops around the city. It is a document about which almost everything is arguable except the plain meaning of its words, and the plain meaning is where a study of the floor has to start, because the second article of the treaty licenses the entire conquest that follows and does so in a subordinate clause.

“S. M. le sultan admet dès maintenant que le Gouvernement français procède, après avoir prévenu le Maghzen, aux occupations militaires du territoire marocain qu’il jugerait nécessaires au maintien de l’ordre et de la sécurité des transactions commerciales et à ce qu’il exerce toute action de police sur terre et dans les eaux marocaines.”

His Majesty the Sultan admits from this moment that the French Government shall proceed, after having notified the

Makhzen, to such military occupations of Moroccan territory as it shall judge necessary to the maintenance of order and the security of commercial transactions, and that it shall exercise every police action on land and in Moroccan waters.

Three things are settled in that sentence. The occupations are of Moroccan territory, without limit of extent or duration. The necessity of them is judged by the French Government and by nobody else — *qu'il jugerait nécessaires*, the conditional of the French party's own opinion. And the Makhzen's part in the process is to be told: *après avoir prévenu le Maghzen*, after having notified. Not with its agreement, not on its request, not subject to its objection. Twenty-two years of war would be conducted under a clause requiring, of the sovereign in whose country it was fought, nothing but notice.

The article that follows supplies the story the war would be told with. *"Le Gouvernement de la République prend l'engagement de prêter un constant appui à Sa Majesté Chérifienne contre tout danger qui menacerait sa personne ou son trône ou qui compromettrait la tranquillité de ses États"* — the Government of the Republic undertakes to lend constant support to His Sharifian Majesty against any danger which should threaten his person or his throne or compromise the tranquillity of his States; and the same support is promised to the heir to the throne and to his successors. So the army that would spend a generation reducing the Middle Atlas was, in the founding instrument, the Sultan's protection. The tribes it fought were dangers to his tranquillity. Every operation against them was help.

And the machinery by which this could be maintained on paper is set out immediately after, in articles the study will return to often. The measures the new regime required were to be enacted *"sur la proposition du Gouvernement français, par Sa Majesté Chérifienne"* — on the proposal of the French

Government, by His Sharifian Majesty. France would be represented by a Commissioner Resident-General, *“dépositaire de tous les pouvoirs de la République au Maroc”*, holder of all the powers of the Republic in Morocco, who would be the Sultan’s sole intermediary with foreign representatives, and who would have the power to approve and promulgate, in the name of the French Government, all the decrees issued by His Sharifian Majesty. The Sultan proposes nothing and signs everything; the Resident proposes everything and signs it a second time on France’s behalf.

This is not decoration laid over a conquest. It is the conquest’s operating system, and the rest of this module is an account of what it did to the war it authorised.

The war that preceded its own authorisation

The first French troops entered Morocco five years before the treaty. On 29 March 1907 a column occupied Oujda, on the Algerian frontier; the stated occasion was the murder of the French doctor Émile Mauchamp at Marrakesh, which the French press described as an unprovoked attack by the barbarous natives of Morocco. The officer who took the town was Hubert Lyautey, then commanding at Oran.

Four months later the western front opened. At Casablanca the Compagnie Marocaine was building a port, and in June 1907 laid a narrow-gauge Decauville track from the harbour to a quarry at Roches Noires, running it through the burial ground of Sidi Belyout. On 30 July tribesmen of the Chaouia stopped the train and killed nine of the company’s labourers — French, Italian and Spanish — and the town rose. From 5 to 7 August the cruisers *Galilée* and *Gloire* shelled the kasbah with high-explosive shell; the poor quarter by the port took the worst of it; the great mosque and the sanctuary of Sidi Qairawani were not spared; and troops landed under General

Drude and retook the city on the seventh, after which the European quarters and the Jewish mellah were sacked and the mellah burned. The dead have never been counted. Estimates in circulation run from six hundred to three thousand, from fifteen hundred to seventy-five hundred, and as high as fifteen thousand killed and wounded together; there is no basis for choosing among them and this study will not pretend to one. What is certain is that a city of some thirty thousand people was reduced to rubble outside the European neighbourhood, that its pasha was carried off a prisoner aboard the *Galilée*, and that the campaign to subdue the Chaouia plain ran on through 1907 and 1908.

All of this was done under the Act of Algeciras of 1906, whose preamble committed its signatories to reforms founded on the triple principle of the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his domains, and economic liberty without any inequality. It bears repeating that at the moment the shells fell on Casablanca, the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan was the standing position of the French Republic in international law, and remained so.

In April and May 1911, when Fez was pressed by tribes in revolt, a French column under General Moinier marched from the coast to relieve the Sultan — an intervention which Germany read as annexation by instalment and answered by sending the gunboat *Panther* to Agadir, and which was therefore the direct cause of the crisis that France settled in November 1911 by handing Germany a quarter of a million square kilometres of central Africa. By the time Regnault sat down with Abd al-Hafid in March 1912, France had held Oujda for five years, Casablanca and the Chaouia for four and a half, and the road to Fez for one. The treaty did not authorise the conquest. It ratified the part already done and licensed the rest.

Seventeen days

The Treaty of Fez was signed on 30 March. On 17 April the garrison of Fez mutinied.

The troops who mutinied were Moroccan. The city held something on the order of fifteen hundred French soldiers and five thousand Moroccan *askari* — locally recruited infantry under French officers — and when the terms of the treaty were made known to them, the *askari* shot their instructors and went into the streets. Europeans were killed where they were found. The mellah was then sacked over two days, its synagogues desecrated and its people murdered, robbed and raped, the Jews of Fez having been disarmed and having no means of defence. Artillery shelled the quarters held by the rebels; a relief column came in from Meknes; General Moinier reached the city on 23 April with twenty-three companies of infantry, three squadrons of cavalry and several batteries.

The counts differ and should be given as they stand. One tally records about six hundred Moroccan Muslims, sixty-six Europeans and forty-two Moroccan Jews killed; another gives roughly eight hundred Moroccan dead against thirteen French civilians and nineteen soldiers. In the days that followed, some hundred mutineers were sentenced to death and shot in public, and the impression left was bad even by the standards of the men who ordered it, because a good many Moroccans believed the mutineers had been acting on instructions from above — some of the *askari* themselves are reported to have said the order came from the palace. The claim has never been established and this study does not assert it. What matters is that it was believed, because it means that on the seventeenth day of the protectorate the two things the arrangement depended on keeping apart — the Sultan's authority and armed resistance to the French — were already, in the minds of the men doing the shooting, the same thing.

The rising spread. Tribes of the Branes, Tsoul, Ghiata, Hyayna and Beni Warain gathered north of the city under the sharif Muhammad al-Hijami and Sidi Raho, and from 25 May to 2 June besieged Fez, penetrating as far as the shrine of Moulay Idris II and inflicting heavy losses on the *tirailleurs* holding the gates before Gouraud broke them in the first days of June. Lyautey, appointed Resident-General in May, cleared the tribes from around the capital; and on 11 August, having concluded that Abd al-Hafid had been in contact with the rebels, he obliged him to abdicate in favour of his brother Moulay Youssef. The sovereign whose person and throne France had undertaken four months earlier to defend against any danger was removed by the French Resident-General, and the machinery held, because the treaty's promise of support ran also to his successors.

Twenty-two years

What followed was not mopping up. It was a war of a generation, and its phases can be dated.

The Zaian confederation of the Middle Atlas, under Mouha ou Hammou Zayani, fought from 1914 to 1921. The French took Taza and Khénifra early, and then, on 13 November 1914, Lieutenant-Colonel René Laverdure — under orders from Lyautey not to attack — took almost the whole Khénifra garrison out against the Zaian camp at El Herri. Forty-three officers and eleven hundred and eighty-seven men went out. The raid succeeded; the withdrawal did not; the rear guard and the artillery were overrun at a river crossing and the remainder formed square and were destroyed. Six hundred and twenty-three men were killed, including Laverdure, and a hundred and seventy-six wounded; the Zaian lost at least a hundred and eighty-two. It is worth recording precisely how

the sources describe the dead, because the description is the finding: they were North African, Senegalese and French.

El Herri fell four months into the European war, and the European war had already stripped Morocco. Lyautey held what he had with what was left — a line of outposts he manned with his best troops and backed with whatever else he could find — while, over the four years that followed, on the order of thirty-four to thirty-seven thousand Moroccans were shipped to France to fight the Germans, out of a country whose own conquest was less than half finished. Khénifra was not retaken until August 1920, and Zaian resistance ran on to 1921.

Then the Rif. The war that began in the Spanish zone in 1921, and that produced Abd el-Krim's Republic of the Rif after the destruction of a Spanish army at Annual, crossed into the French zone in April 1925, when Rifian forces overran dozens of French frontline posts, inflicted some six thousand casualties, and came within reach of Fez and Taza. France, which had refused Lyautey's caution, put the campaign under Pétain, who said of himself that he did strategy and not politics; Lyautey was relieved of the command in August 1925 and of the Residency in September. The figures for the final effort vary with the source and should be given as a range: a French deployment of something between a hundred and twenty and a hundred and sixty thousand men, a combined Franco-Spanish force reckoned at anywhere from a hundred and twenty-three thousand to a quarter of a million, some hundred and fifty aircraft, against a Rifian army of perhaps nine to thirteen thousand. Spain landed at Alhucemas in September 1925. Abd el-Krim surrendered in May 1926.

And then the south, and the mountains, and the last decade. Operations ran through the Middle and High Atlas from 1929; the Tafilalt was reduced in 1932; in February and March 1933 the Ait Atta under Assou Oubasslam held the Bou Gafer massif

in the Jbel Saghro against Foreign Legion mounted companies, goumiers, artillery and aircraft, and gave way only to blockade and starvation, Oubasslam presenting himself to General Huré on 25 March; those who broke out were run down in the High Atlas that summer; and in early 1934 a motorised column — the first the French Army had used — closed the Anti-Atlas.

The protectorate was established in 1912 and ended in 1956, and it was at war inside its own frontiers until 1934. For exactly half its existence, the country France had undertaken to protect was being conquered.

Who carried the rifles

The most consequential fact about this floor is not its duration but its composition, and the composition was shaped by the fiction.

The Act of Algeciras had provided the Sultan with a police — recruited by the Makhzen from Moroccan Muslims, capped at two and a half thousand men, with French and Spanish officers seconded as instructors. It had provided him with no army, and France, so long as the Sultan remained the nominal ruler of a sovereign state, was in no position to raise regular Moroccan regiments of its own. So it raised them as police. The *goums* were formed from 1908 — a *goum* was a body of about two hundred auxiliaries, three or four *goums* making a *tabor* — under French officers and, at first, mostly Algerian non-commissioned officers seconded from the spahis and tirailleurs. They were nominally in the service of the Sultan of Morocco. They carried the formal status of local police. They fought for a quarter of a century as line infantry of the Army of Africa, and the secondary literature is right to call the arrangement a political subterfuge, because that is exactly what it was and it worked. Only when the First World War lifted the restraint did France enlist regular Moroccan

tirailleurs, spahis and gunners in numbers — and the goumiers, having proved their value, went on holding both jobs at once, police and soldiers, until 1956.

Set beside them the rest of the order of battle. Senegalese *tirailleurs*, who died at El Herri and were shipped to the Rif. Algerians, in the ranks and as the NCO cadre of the goums. The Foreign Legion, in Morocco continuously from the Casablanca landing of 1907 to the Anti-Atlas in 1934, and composed overwhelmingly of men who were not French — one contemporary American service journal put the German-born share of the Legion in North Africa at sixty per cent, which is a period estimate and should be treated as one, but the direction of it is not in doubt. And metropolitan French troops, present throughout, and never the bulk.

So the conquest of Morocco was carried out, in the main, by Moroccans, Algerians, Senegalese and European foreigners, commanded by a French officer corps, in the name of the Moroccan Sultan, and paid for substantially out of Moroccan revenue. Even the division that carried Morocco's name into the great battles of the Western Front — the Division marocaine, at the Marne, Artois, the Somme, Verdun and the Aisne — was made up principally of the colonial troops who had been sent to police Morocco rather than of Moroccans. The names attached to this war are, at nearly every level, a description of something other than what was happening.

What the founding legend claims

The word the French used for all of it was *pacification*, and the word did real work, because it presupposes exactly what was in dispute: that there was a legitimate order in place, that the people resisting were disturbing it, and that the operation was restorative rather than acquisitive. Under the treaty this was not a metaphor but a correct description of the legal position.

The Sultan was sovereign. France was bound to defend his tranquillity. The Ait Atta on the Bou Gafer were in dissidence against their own sovereign. Every dahir authorising every column bore the Sultan's seal, because Article 4 provided that it should.

The remarkable thing — and it is the fact that will govern everything from here — is how far the resistance itself conceded the premise. Abd el-Krim, who had built a state in the Rif, issued its own currency, and beaten two European armies, sent envoys to Oujda in April 1926 to say that he could accept the offers of peace and autonomy made by the Sultan of Morocco, whose sovereignty he did not dispute. Assou Oubasslam, who held Bou Gafer for forty days against aircraft and artillery and surrendered only to hunger, was made a caïd in 1939 and held the office until his death in 1960. The men who fought hardest against the floor did not attack the throne it was operating in the name of. They contested who should stand beside it.

That is not a paradox. It is the arrangement working precisely as designed — and it is also, though nobody in 1934 could have said so, the arrangement recording in advance where its own break would have to come from.

Reading the floor against the framework

The Moroccan floor confirms the collection's colonial expectations and returns three refinements, of which the first is the one this case exists to supply.

The first is that a legal fiction can sit *inside* a floor rather than on top of it. The framework's usual picture is a floor of force with a legitimating story laid over it afterwards to make it cheap. Morocco shows the fiction reaching down into the establishment tables. Because the standing international instrument gave the Sultan a police and no army, France

constituted its Moroccan auxiliaries as police and fought a twenty-two-year war with them under that designation; because the treaty made every French act an act of the Sultan, each column went out under his seal; because France had undertaken to defend his throne, the operations against tribes who had never obeyed him were classed as support. The fiction determined how the force was organised, what it was called, who could be enlisted into it, and under whose name it moved. The refinement to carry forward is that where a conquest is conducted under a protectorate form, the form is not commentary on the floor — it is a specification the floor is built to, and a study that treats the legal instrument as the story told afterwards will misread the order of battle in front of it.

The second is that this specification and the arithmetic of cost pointed the same way, which is why the arrangement required no one to choose between them. A power ruling in a sovereign’s name has an obvious reason to recruit that sovereign’s subjects: they are the only troops he can be said to command. A power economising on its own men has an equally obvious reason to do the same thing. In Morocco the two reasons coincided exactly, and the result was a floor whose dead, at its worst single defeat, were North African, Senegalese and French, in that order of listing. The general finding — that colonial conquest is substantially carried out by the conquered and by other conquered peoples — is not new to this corpus. What Morocco adds is that under a protectorate the practice stops being merely economical and becomes legally coherent, so that the cheapest available floor is also the only one the paperwork can describe.

The third concerns the price. The framework holds that an order which never installs its belief in the governed stays expensive and brittle, and that the tell is visible force. Morocco states the bill in the plainest possible currency: a

protectorate declared in 1912 and not achieved until 1934, so that half its life was spent at war within its own frontiers, at a moment when its administrators were describing it, with some justice, as the most admired and least troublesome possession in the French empire. Both descriptions are true, and they are true of the same country, because they refer to different parts of it — the plains and the ports and the new cities on one side, and the mountains on the other. The cheapness France was celebrated for was purchased in a currency the celebration did not mention, and the arithmetic is not hidden: it is in the campaign dates.

There is a fourth thing, offered as an observation rather than a refinement, because it is a prediction the later modules will have to test. Every serious armed challenge to the French floor in Morocco stopped short of the office in whose name that floor operated. The greatest of the rebels accepted terms from the Sultan and denied that he had ever contested the Sultan’s sovereignty; the last of them ended as the Sultan’s caïd. Whatever else this order was, it was one in which force could be resisted for twenty-two years without the legitimacy above it being touched. An arrangement of that shape does not fail from below. It fails at the point where the legitimacy is handled — and the party best placed to damage it is the party holding the pen that signs the dahirs.

A note on sources. The Treaty of Fez is quoted exactly from the French text as published in the *Bulletin officiel de l’Empire chérifien*, première année, no. 1, 1 November 1912, reproduced by Jean-Pierre Maury in the Digithèque de matériaux juridiques et politiques of the Université de Perpignan; Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 are quoted or closely rendered, and the translations are mine. The digitised text carries an obvious typographical error in Article 3, printing

sou trône for *son trône*; I have quoted the corrected form and record the fact here. The preamble of the Act of Algeciras is quoted from the official United States government translation (34 Stat. 2905; Treaty Series 456). I have used a single reproducing source for the treaty text and it should be collated against the *Bulletin officiel* facsimile itself.

The narrative of the campaigns follows the standard reference and scholarly accounts and is paraphrased throughout: the occupation of Oujda on 29 March 1907 and the Mauchamp affair as its stated occasion, on which Jonathan Katz’s article on the affair and the civilising mission is the specialist treatment; the bombardment of Casablanca from 5 to 7 August 1907, the Decauville track through the Sidi Belyout burial ground, and the Chaouia campaign; the Moinier column to Fez in 1911; the mutiny of 17 April 1912 and the siege of Fez in May and June; the Zaian War and El Herri; the Rif War; and the operations of 1929–34 ending at Bou Gafer and in the Anti-Atlas. Susan Gilson Miller’s history of modern Morocco and Moshe Gershovich’s work on French military rule and on Moroccan combatants are the two modern authorities most relied on and are paraphrased and credited as such; Gershovich’s finding that the conquest was substantially manned by Moroccans is the load-bearing one for this module’s third section.

Figures are given as the sources give them, as ranges where contested, and are refused where no honest figure exists. The dead of the Casablanca bombardment cannot be counted: circulating estimates run from six hundred to three thousand, from fifteen hundred to seventy-five hundred, and as high as fifteen thousand killed and wounded, and I have reported the spread rather than selecting from it. The Fez casualties of April 1912 are given in two incompatible tallies and both are stated. The French and combined strengths in the Rif in 1925–26 are given as ranges of a hundred and twenty to a hundred

and sixty thousand and a hundred and twenty-three thousand to a quarter of a million respectively. The number of Moroccans sent to Europe in the First World War is given as roughly thirty-four to thirty-seven thousand, the higher figure coming from a Moroccan armed-forces historical page and the lower from a general account, and neither has been checked against Mohamed Bekraoui’s thesis on Morocco and the First World War, which is the specialist source and which I have not been able to consult. The claim that the German-born share of the Foreign Legion in North Africa stood at sixty per cent is a contemporary estimate published in a United States naval service journal in 1934 and is reported as such, not as an established figure.

Two items reached me through a single reproducing source and want collation. The first is the constitution of the *goums* from 1908 with the formal status of police, and the characterisation of that status as a device made necessary by France’s undertaking not to raise regular Moroccan troops while the Sultan remained nominal ruler; the underlying provision — that the Act of Algeciras contemplated a Makhzen-recruited police and nothing else — I have verified against the treaty text, but the account of the subterfuge itself rests on secondary summary and should be checked against Gershovich and against the establishment records at Vincennes. The second is the report that some of the Fez mutineers said their orders came from the palace, which comes from a popular military-history account quoting a French officer; I have reported the belief and explicitly declined to assert the fact. The statement that Abd el-Krim told French envoys at Oujda in April 1926 that he did not dispute the Sultan’s sovereignty comes from a single article in the *International Review of the Red Cross* and is important enough to the argument that it should be traced to the negotiation record before it is relied on again.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 2 · THE SETTLEMENT

A PERPETUAL ALIENATION OF ENJOYMENT

Module 2 · The Settlement — a registration system that extinguished every prior claim, a guardianship that made tribal land inalienable and then alienated it for ever, and a monopoly announced five months after a public tender: how a country was divided between a state, a settler minority, and a class of Moroccan proprietors the protectorate itself brought into being

The purge

Sixteen months after the Treaty of Fez, on 12 August 1913 — 9 Ramadan 1331 — the Sultan signed a dahir on the registration of immovable property. It runs to more than a hundred articles of dry procedure and it is the most consequential document in the economic history of modern Morocco.

The system it installed was the Torrens system, borrowed from Australia by way of Tunisia. A proprietor applies to have his property entered in the *livre foncier*. A notice is published in the *Bulletin officiel*. The land is surveyed and its boundaries marked. For two months from the publication of the notice, objections may be lodged at the land registry, at the justice of the peace, at the office of the caïd and at that of the qadi; after that period, the dahir provides, foreclosure may be incurred. The registrar then issues a title, and from that moment the

title is the property. Article 66 states the principle without ornament: *“Tout droit réel relatif à un immeuble immatriculé n’existe, à l’égard des tiers, que par le fait et du jour de son inscription sur le titre par le conservateur de la propriété foncière”* — no real right over a registered property exists, as against third parties, except by virtue of and from the day of its inscription on the title by the registrar of landed property.

The French term for what this does is *la purge*. Registration purges the land of all anterior rights. Whatever claim existed before — a share in a collective holding recognised by custom, a lease recorded by the *adoul* in the notarial form of Islamic law, a right of passage or of pasture or of water older than anyone’s memory, a *habous* endowment made in the fifteenth century for the upkeep of a mosque — ceases to exist unless somebody appeared within two months and said so, in the forms prescribed, in answer to a notice published in a French-language official gazette. The title that results is final, unassailable and imprescriptible. It cannot be attacked afterwards, even by a person who was in the right.

This was not a confiscation. Nobody’s land was seized by the dahir of 12 August 1913. It was a filing system, and it was optional. What it did was to make one kind of claim — the written, surveyed, registered, French-law kind — absolutely secure, and to place every other kind of claim on a two-month fuse. The Moroccan scholarship on the point is blunt and correct: the procedure was not designed to protect Moroccan interests, and the guarantee of ownership that registration constituted was generalised to the near-exclusive benefit of foreign purchasers. Najib Bouderbala’s judgement is that it was introduced at the very beginning of the protectorate precisely in order to give colonial property a solid juridical base, and the dating supports him. It came before the pacification was a tenth finished, before the first settlement perimeter was laid out, and before the phosphates were found.

The apparatus of the settlement was built first, and the settlement was then poured into it.

The tutelage

Collective land was the obstacle, because most of Morocco's cultivable ground was held that way — by tribal and sub-tribal collectivities, in shares allotted by custom, under rules that made no provision for sale to strangers and did not contemplate a permanent individual title.

The dahir of 27 April 1919 addressed it. Its subject, in its own words, was the organisation of the administrative tutelage of the indigenous collectivities and the regulation of the management and alienation of their collective goods. It declared collective land inalienable, imprescriptible and unseizable — a protective formula, and read alone a generous one — and it placed the collectivities under the guardianship of the Directorate of the Interior, which is to say that it made the protectorate the trustee of the property it had just declared untouchable. The tutor would thereafter decide what the ward's land was for.

Article 10 of that dahir permitted the establishment of colonisation perimeters on collective land. And since the land was inalienable, and could therefore not be sold, the transfers were made under a different name: *aliénations perpétuelles de jouissance*, perpetual alienations of enjoyment — permanent conveyances of the use of the land, which were not, in law, conveyances of the land. The settler received the ground for ever. The collectivity retained a bare ownership that entitled it to nothing. Land that could not be alienated was alienated in perpetuity by declining to call the transaction a sale, and the scholarship's description of this as a juridical sleight of hand is not polemic but the plainest available summary.

The *guich* lands were easier still. These were lands granted by earlier sultans to tribes in exchange for military service, and their tenure was already split in Moroccan law: the *raqaba*, the eminent right, belonged to the State; the *menfaa*, the useful right, to the collectivity. A protectorate exercising the Sharifian State's own powers therefore inherited the eminent right over them and could dispose accordingly — of land held by soldiers' tribes in payment for soldiering, at a moment when their descendants were being recruited into the goums.

The aggregate effect on the categories was the largest change in Moroccan landholding since the Alaouite settlement of the seventeenth century. Melk — private property — is reported to have risen from about a fifth of cultivable land to about three-fifths across the protectorate's life, while collective land fell from something like seventy per cent to something like fifteen. Those two figures come from a single line of Moroccan economic writing and I have not been able to collate them; they should be treated as an order of magnitude and not as a measurement. But the direction is not in dispute in any source I have seen, and the direction is the finding. Most of the land in Morocco changed its legal nature, and only a minority of it changed hands to Europeans.

Who got the land

The European share can be stated with reasonable confidence because several independent accounts converge on it.

Official colonisation — land taken into the state domain and sold or leased by the administration to settlers on terms — amounted to some 270,000 hectares by 1930, distributed to about 1,800 settlers, and represented between a quarter and a third of the total area then in European hands. Roughly half of it was taken from tribal land and roughly half from domanial

and *guich* land. The programme was effectively confined to the years between 1918 and 1931; before the first meeting of the Colonisation Committee in mid-1917 there had been only scattered long leases around Marrakech and small food-plots around Casablanca, and after 1931 the money ran out. Small holdings were never the point: agrarian smallholding, at an average of about thirteen hectares a farm, accounted for under four per cent of the land attributed to settlers.

Private colonisation — Europeans buying melk land directly from Moroccan owners, financed by credit the administration made generously available — was larger, and reached something on the order of 800,000 hectares by 1956.

Taken together, European-held agricultural land at independence came to about a million hectares. Set against a Moroccan agricultural area of roughly seven million hectares in the French zone, that is about fifteen per cent; the Food and Agriculture Organisation puts it at nearly a fifth of cultivable land. Every source that comments adds the same qualification, and it is the one that matters: it was the best land — the irrigable plains of the Gharb, the grain country of the Chaouia and the Doukkala, the ground around Meknes — and it was farmed for export to the French market with capital and machinery, while Moroccan agriculture supplied the domestic market with neither.

Set beside the two comparisons that frame this study, the number is interesting precisely because it is in the middle. Algeria by 1959 held over a million Europeans on land that had been taken wholesale across a century. Senegal saw essentially no European land-taking at all. Morocco took about one hectare in six of its agricultural land, and the Europeans who came were not, in the main, farmers: something in the region of three hundred and fifty to five hundred thousand of them by the 1950s, counting both zones, and the great majority in the cities. Casablanca had perhaps 250,000 people

by 1936, about a third of them European, and some 133,000 Europeans by 1952. This was not a peasant settler colony. It was a capitalist one, with a large urban European population and a comparatively small number of large estates.

The other half of the settlement

And here is the fact that the acreage figures conceal, and that makes this settlement structurally different from the Algerian one it was consciously designed not to repeat.

The protectorate did not principally move land from Moroccans to Europeans. It moved land from one legal category to another, and the Moroccans who ended up holding the new titles were a particular and identifiable set of people.

The great caïds first. Thami El Glaoui was appointed pasha of Marrakech in 1912 and held the office until his death in January 1956 — the whole life of the protectorate, to within seven weeks. His family's rise predated the French: the Glaoua had been given a Krupp field gun by Sultan Moulay Hassan in 1893 for rescuing him in a blizzard, the only such piece outside the imperial army; his brother Si Madani became grand vizier in 1907 and in the same upheaval seized properties belonging to Abdelaziz's finance minister, including the Fez palace that still carries the Glaoui name. What France supplied was not the accumulation but its stabilisation. Under the protectorate El Glaoui drew wealth from mining concessions, from taxation, and from the salt, olive and saffron trades of the south, built the Dar el Bacha at Marrakech on a scale designed to impress European visitors, and became by the 1930s the third power in the country after the Sultan and the Resident-General. Beside him stood the other great southern caïds, the Mtouggi and the Goundafi, holding their own regions on the same terms.

Then the urban families — the Fassi merchant houses and their equivalents in Rabat, Salé and Marrakech, who had the literacy, the capital and the access to use a land registry, and who did.

And then everyone else, who did not. The *khammes*, the sharecropper working for a fifth of the crop, appears in the record of the collective lands chiefly as a person excluded from the share-out. Members of collectivities whose customary entitlements were never registered found, when the registration came, that the entitlement had been purged or that the collectivity's land was now administered by a tutor in Rabat. The dispossession in Morocco was rarely a column of soldiers and a decree. It was more often a notice in the *Bulletin officiel* that nobody in the douar read.

The subsoil, and the tender that was withdrawn

The largest single asset in the country was disposed of separately, and the sequence is worth setting out in order because the documents contradict each other in public.

A dahir of 19 January 1914 laid down mining regulations, including at Article 51 the procedure by which the right to work a deposit would be awarded. On 4 August 1919 the Direction générale des travaux publics published a notice in the Moroccan official gazette: *"Phosphate deposits of considerable extent and of exceptional content have been located in the El Boroudj and Oued Zem districts. In accordance with Article 51 of the dahir of January 19th, 1914, prescribing mining regulations, the right to work these deposits will be disposed of by public tender at a date which the Administration hopes to fix in the near future."*

Five months and twenty-three days later, on 27 January 1920, a new dahir reserved exclusively to the Makhzen the right to prospect for and to work phosphates, subject to a

saving clause for rights already acquired under Article 51. A further dahir of 21 August 1920 laid down the procedure for recognising those acquired rights, and created the Office Chérifien des Phosphates to hold the monopoly. Production began at Boujniba, near Khouribga, in March 1921, and the first cargo left Casablanca that July. By 1930 phosphates were supplying something like seventeen per cent of state revenue.

Prospectors who had staked claims in the window between the tender notice and the reservation were left holding paper. One of them was an Italian national whose claim the Department of Mines rejected in January 1925; the Italian government took the matter up, complained of what it called the monopolisation of the Moroccan phosphates, and eventually brought France before the Permanent Court of International Justice, which gave judgment in *Phosphates in Morocco* on 14 June 1938 — eighteen years after the dahir, and on the question of the Court's jurisdiction rather than on the merits.

The Act of Algeciras had committed its signatories to economic liberty without any inequality, and had further provided that no public service in the Sharifian Empire could be alienated for the advantage of private interests. Both propositions were still, in some sense, on the books. What happened at Khouribga honoured the second and buried the first, and it is worth being exact about the beneficiary, because the obvious guess is wrong. The phosphates did not go to a French company. They went to the Sharifian State, and Lyautey's purpose in putting them there was to keep foreign powers and foreign firms from acquiring control of them. The Office Chérifien des Phosphates was created in 1920, holds the monopoly still, and is today owned by the Kingdom of Morocco. That is a real fact and this study will not pretend otherwise; what it means is a question Module 12 will have to answer without flinching in either direction.

The boundary

Every settlement has a marker that says who is inside it, and Morocco's was neither race nor religion nor wealth. It was nationality, and the striking thing about it is which way it ran.

A decree of 29 April 1920 opened the French naturalisation procedure to foreigners resident in Morocco, and one of 8 November 1921 established *jus soli* for their children. The large Spanish and Italian populations of Casablanca and the coast could therefore become French, and were actively encouraged to. Moroccans could not. There was no quota, no ladder, no examination, no waiting list — nothing that a Moroccan could fail, because there was nothing he could attempt. On the protectorate's own doctrine the question of admitting Moroccans to French citizenship did not arise, since the whole premise was that Moroccans would remain Moroccan under their own institutions and their own sovereign.

So the settlement's frontier was a status that every European in the country could cross and no Moroccan could approach, and it was drawn that way not by accident or by prejudice but by the constitutional logic of a protectorate. The same logic reached the top. Article 8 of the Treaty of Fez forbade His Sharifian Majesty to contract any loan, public or private, or to grant any concession in any form, without French authorisation. The sovereign in whose name every dahir in this module was issued could not dispose of a hectare, a mine or a franc.

Reading the settlement against the framework

Three refinements, and the first is the one that distinguishes this case from every other land settlement in the corpus.

The first: the principal product of this settlement was not a transfer of acreage but a change in the legal category of land, and that change produced beneficiaries on both sides of the colonial line. About one hectare in six of Morocco's agricultural land ended in European hands — far less than Algeria, incomparably more than Senegal. But the share of the country held under collective tenure collapsed, private registered title rose to take its place, and the Moroccans who came out holding the new titles were the great caïds, the urban merchant families, and anyone else positioned to use a registry. The refinement to carry forward is this: where a conquest operates through a registration system rather than through confiscation, the line the settlement actually draws is not between coloniser and native but between the registered and the unregistered — and it therefore recruits a substantial native propertied class into the order's own defence, on the same side of the same line as the settler. That is a far more durable arrangement than dispossession, and it is a large part of why this order's eventual collapse would not come from the land.

The second concerns the extraction fork. The framework distinguishes extraction as a tunable flow, which needs the native alive and tends to equilibrium, from extraction as dispossession of a stock, which needs the native gone, has no setting below the revolt threshold, and produces the revolt by its own completion. Morocco sits on the fork and shows a third position: a stock taken *by instalment, through a procedure*, at a speed the administration itself set. Bouderbala's observation is the key one — the pace of the taking was never uniformly fast, because the colonial state was continually arbitrating between the settlers' appetite and its own need for political control. The refinement is that a land-taking conducted through a legal instrument is *tunable in a way a land-taking conducted by clearance is not*, because the instrument has a

throttle: registrations can be slowed, perimeters withheld, credit tightened, oppositions entertained. That tunability is how Morocco took the best fifth of its agricultural land without producing the terminal revolt that a settler order normally produces at completion. The device that made the taking possible was the same device that kept it below the threshold, and a conqueror who understands this will always prefer a registry to a bulldozer.

The third concerns what a legal fiction protects as well as what it takes. Because France ruled through a preserved sovereign, the assets it vested in the state were vested in the *Sharifian* State, and the largest of them — the phosphates, reserved by the dahir of 27 January 1920 to the Makhzen exclusively — could not be alienated to a private or a foreign interest without breaching the form the whole arrangement rested on. When the protectorate ended, the phosphates required no nationalisation, because they had never been in private hands. This is not to be read as generosity, and Lyautey's stated motive was to keep rival powers out rather than to endow a future Moroccan state. But the outcome is real and it follows from the form: a coloniser ruling in a native sovereign's name is constrained in what he can give away, and whatever he places in the sovereign's hands survives his departure. The refinement is that a legal fiction maintained long enough becomes a container as well as a cover — it holds things, and what is inside it at the end belongs to whoever inherits the fiction.

A note on sources. The dahir of 9 Ramadan 1331 (12 August 1913) on the registration of immovable property is quoted from the consolidated official text published by the Agence nationale de la conservation foncière, du cadastre et de la cartographie, and from a further reproduction of the same

text; Article 66 is quoted in French and the translation is mine, and readers should note that the consolidated version carries later amendments, so the numbering and wording of some articles no longer match the 1913 original. The subject-matter formula of the dahir of 27 April 1919 organising the administrative tutelage of the collectivities and regulating the management and alienation of collective goods is given as the Moroccan legal literature reproduces it (*Bulletin officiel* of 28 April 1919, p. 375), which I have not seen in facsimile. The notice of 4 August 1919 announcing that the phosphate deposits of El Boroudj and Oued Zem would be disposed of by public tender under Article 51 of the mining dahir of 19 January 1914 is quoted from the recitals of the Permanent Court of International Justice’s judgment in *Phosphates in Morocco* of 14 June 1938, as is the description of the dahir of 27 January 1920 reserving the working of phosphates exclusively to the Makhzen and of the dahir of 21 August 1920 on acquired rights; this is a reliable reproducing source but the underlying *Bulletin officiel* texts have not been consulted.

Modern scholarship is paraphrased and credited. The analysis of the registration regime as an instrument built to give colonial property a secure juridical base, of the *aliénations perpétuelles de jouissance* as the device by which perimeters were installed on inalienable collective land under Article 10 of the 1919 dahir, and of the colonial state’s continual arbitration between settler appetite and political control, is Najib Bouderbala’s. The figures for official colonisation — some 270,000 hectares to about 1,800 settlers, between a quarter and a third of the colonised total, effectively confined to 1918–1931, with smallholding under four per cent of the area attributed — are Jacques Gadille’s, from his 1955 study of official colonisation, as reproduced in later work. The figure of about a million hectares in European hands at independence, some fifteen per cent of roughly seven million

hectares of agricultural land and the richest part of it, is Grigori Lazarev’s; the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s independent estimate of nearly a fifth of cultivable land is consistent with it. The split of official colonisation land roughly half from tribal and half from domanial and *guich* sources, and the figure of about 800,000 hectares of private colonisation by 1956, come from Moroccan economic writing that I reached through a single reproducing article.

Figures are given as ranges or as orders of magnitude where the record does not support precision. The claim that melk rose from about a fifth to about three-fifths of cultivable land while collective tenure fell from about seventy per cent to about fifteen rests on one source, is flagged as such in the text, and should be collated before it is relied on again; it is the single most important quantitative claim in this module and the least well supported. The European population of Morocco at the end of the protectorate is given as a range of roughly 350,000 to 500,000 across both zones, sources differing on whether the half-million figure covers the French zone alone or the whole country. The Casablanca population figures for 1936 and 1952 come from a single reference account. The statement that phosphates supplied about seventeen per cent of state revenue by 1930 comes from a general reference source and belongs properly to the extraction module, where it should be checked against the protectorate’s own budget documents.

On El Glaoui, this module deliberately reports only what is documented — the offices held, the dates, the sources of revenue, the buildings — and avoids the large anecdotal literature about his person, which is unreliable in both directions and which the study will have to handle carefully when it reaches the question of what he was actually optimising for.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 3 · THE ROBE

A ZONE ON WHICH NOTHING MAY BE BUILT

Module 3 · The Robe — a doctrine of respect, preservation and non-interference, published in Paris for Parisians and taught to French officers, whose most admired achievement was to keep the old cities intact by forbidding anyone to build in them, and whose gentleness was not a softening of the foreclosure but the form the foreclosure took

Where the doctrine was published

The protectorate's legitimating story is unusually easy to study, because its author wrote it down, published it in identifiable places, lectured on it, and was elected to the Académie française on the strength of it. That bibliography is the first evidence this module needs, and it should be read before a word of the content.

Lyautey's first influential essay, *Du rôle social de l'officier dans le service militaire universel*, appeared in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* in 1891. His second, *Du rôle colonial de l'armée*, appeared in the same review in January 1900, written on Gallieni's instruction to set out his chief's principles and his own. The *Revue des Deux Mondes* was a Paris literary and political fortnightly read by the French educated bourgeoisie. He was elected to the Académie française in 1912 and received in 1920. He published *Paroles d'action* in 1927. He addressed the Chamber of Commerce of Lyon in February 1916. He was Commissioner-General of the Colonial

Exposition of 1931, the vast pedagogical spectacle at Vincennes through which the French public was shown its empire. He wrote a preface to the *Rapport général sur la situation du protectorat du Maroc* of 31 July 1914 and developed its principles in a lecture on his return to France in 1926.

Every one of those venues is in France, in French, before a French audience. None of the doctrine's canonical statements was addressed to Moroccans, issued in Arabic, preached from a pulpit, taught in a Moroccan school, or in any other way put before the people it described. The framework predicts, for a colonial order, a robe cut for the metropole and the army rather than for the conquered. In Morocco the prediction is not merely satisfied; it is documented by the distribution list.

The doctrine's most quoted formulations are of a piece with the audience. From the 1900 essay come the celebrated formulae — conquest conceived as *une organisation qui marche*, an organisation on the move; and the injunction that in taking a village one should be thinking of the market one will open there the next day. From Lyautey's apprenticeship under Gallieni in Tonkin comes the image that became the method's name, the *tache d'oil*: the progressive advance, the road and the telegraph built at once, the market opened, the concessions distributed, all behind a solid military covering, so that with the pacification there advances, like an oil stain, a broad band of civilisation. These are instructions to officers about how to conquer. They are also, and simultaneously, literature — and they were consumed as literature by people who would never see a *bureau des renseignements*.

What the doctrine said

Its core was the distinction between assimilation and association. France would not make Morocco French. She

would preserve the Sharifian Empire, restore its institutions, modernise its administration, and advise.

The justification is set out most clearly in the Lyon speech of February 1916, and it is worth quoting because of what it concedes. *“Alors que nous nous sommes trouvés en Algérie en face d’une véritable poussière, d’un état de choses inorganique, où le seul pouvoir était celui du Dey turc effondré dès notre venue, au Maroc, au contraire, nous nous sommes trouvés en face d’un empire historique et indépendant, jaloux à l’extrême de son indépendance, rebelle à toute servitude”* — whereas in Algeria we found ourselves faced with a veritable dust, an inorganic state of affairs, where the only power was that of the Turkish Dey, which collapsed the moment we arrived, in Morocco on the contrary we found ourselves faced with a historic and independent empire, extremely jealous of its independence, rebellious against all servitude.

Read as an argument for method, that is a case for indirect rule. Read as a statement of fact by the man best placed to make it, it is an admission that Morocco was a real state, with a real independence, whose population would not accept subjection — entered into the record by the architect of its subjection, in a French provincial chamber of commerce, four years into the protectorate. The doctrine’s founding justification is a description of the obstacle it would eventually fail to overcome.

The same conviction produced his resistance to the settlers. In January 1921 he declared that Morocco was not and never would be a colony of small agricultural settlement. Privately he was blunter. In a letter of 19 August 1918 he wrote that certain people were waiting only for his departure in order to Algerianise Morocco, that they were being helped by the socialists, that the doctrine of the protectorate — *si intelligente, si souple, si féconde, si nuancée* — was entirely beyond the reach of such primary brains, and that this made

the task very discouraging, because he had the very clear sensation that the essential part of his work would collapse along with him. That passage reached me through a partisan chronicle rather than through an edition of the correspondence, and it is reported here with that reservation attached; but if the wording is sound it is a valuable thing, because it is one of the few places where the robe's author speaks about the robe to someone other than his audience.

One formula that circulates everywhere as a Lyautey quotation should be set aside. The phrase about not ruffling a single tradition, not changing a single habit, is repeatedly attributed to him. What the scholarship actually says is that this was the vocabulary then in currency — the way the protectorate's project was habitually described at the time — and I have not been able to verify it as his words. It is dropped here rather than guessed at, and it is worth noticing how well the sentiment survives without an author: a doctrine whose signature phrase belongs to everyone and no one is a doctrine that had thoroughly done its work on the people repeating it.

What was preserved, and what was reinvented

The programme was real and it was executed. The protectorate froze what it took to be authentic Moroccan social forms — the artisan corporations, the tribal organisations of cultivators and herders — and set out to protect individual property, the tribes' collective lands and the souks, on occasion in direct conflict with the economic interests of the settlers. Craft workshops were subsidised and craft schools founded. Monuments were classified and restored.

But the Makhzen that emerged was less the Makhzen of 1912 conserved than the Makhzen of 1912 reinvented. Béatrice Hibou's account is the one to follow here: the

Sharifian government France inherited had been hollowed by the long European financial squeeze and possessed only a rudimentary and not very competent administration, so that alongside the ordinary colonial institutions Lyautey's men undertook a patient bureaucratisation and modernisation of its internal machinery by simplification and specialisation. And the division of labour that resulted is the whole doctrine compressed into an organisational chart: economic, fiscal, administrative and military reform went to the colonial state; everything touching the sacred stayed with the Makhzen.

That sentence deserves to be read twice. France took the budget, the army, the courts of its own creation and the police. The Sultan kept religion. Which is to say that the arrangement formalised, in its administrative structure, precisely the split the Landscape found in the country it had conquered — a belief that reached everywhere and a force that reached only part of the way — and assigned the belief to the man France had undertaken to protect and the force to itself. Nobody at the time appears to have regarded this as a risk.

The doctrine in stone

Henri Prost arrived in Morocco in April 1914 and ran the special service of architecture and town plans until 1922. He worked to three principles laid down by the Resident-General: separation of the old city from the new; the creation outside the medinas of a *zone non aedificandi*, a belt on which nothing might be built, justified by military protection and by hygiene; and the division of the new town into differentiated quarters by zoning. Lyautey's own term for the first of these was the separation of the orders of cities, and he had formulated it in his preface to the general report on the protectorate of 31 July 1914.

What Prost’s service achieved is genuinely admirable and this study will not be coy about it. The medinas of Fez, Marrakech, Rabat, Meknes and Salé were not gutted for boulevards, as Algiers had been. The kasbah of the Oudaias, the Hassan tower, the ramparts and the Chellah were classified as monuments and building servitudes drawn around them. Prost preserved sightlines onto the silhouette of the old city and the estuary. Rabat and Marrakech acquired systems of parks and gardens which are the lungs of those cities still. The urban heritage of Morocco exists in the condition it does substantially because of decisions taken by this administration, and anyone who has walked through Fez el-Bali owes something to them.

And here is the sentence that has to be set beside it. Those plans concerned only the towns intended for Europeans — the only ones, it seems, expected to grow — since nothing was provided, save exceptions, for the expansion of the Moroccan Muslim and Jewish populations, already cramped within the walls of the medinas.

The medina was preserved. Preservation meant not building. Not building, in a walled quarter whose population was rising and into which rural migrants were pouring as the new economy drew them to the coast, meant overcrowding first and then the *bidonville* — the shantytown, a Casablanca word, which grew outside the plan because the plan had made no room inside it. The conserved medina and the tin-roofed settlement on its edge are not a success and a failure of the same policy. They are the same policy, seen from its two ends.

The doctrine’s flexibility, when tested, is also on record. At Rabat a *non aedificandi* strip two hundred and fifty metres wide was decreed south of the Andalusian wall and was subsequently suppressed under pressure from foreign property owners. The principle bent where it cost Europeans money. It did not bend where it cost Moroccans room.

The counter-position, stated now

It would be easy, and wrong, to leave the matter there, and the strongest case for the other side belongs in this module rather than deferred to the end.

Morocco emerged from 1956 with its old cities standing, its crafts alive, its dynasty on the throne, its religious institutions intact, its law in place, and a state apparatus that functioned. Algeria emerged from 1962 with none of those things, after a war that killed on a scale Morocco never approached. The difference is not accidental and it is not nothing, and a considerable part of it traces to decisions taken by the administration this module is describing. Lyautey opposed the settlers, refused mass agricultural colonisation, protected the collective lands against colon appetite often enough for it to be noticed, resigned rather than prosecute the Rif war Pétain's way, and left behind a country that had not been dismembered. Whatever else is true, that is true.

What the counter-position cannot absorb is the shape of what was left standing. William Hoisington's assessment of the method is the sober one: the indirect rule was always in reality rather more direct than indirect, and in the end force remained more effective than anything else, and whether it was applied gently or severely it did not stem Moroccan resistance. And the intellectual apparatus tells the same story as the town plans. The Institut des Hautes Études Marocaines, founded at Rabat in 1920 and described by Susan Gilson Miller as the capstone of Lyautey's work as an educational innovator, was fundamentally an instrument of political control, meant to reinforce through research and teaching the structures of domination the protectorate had imposed, and was intended to train French officials in the languages, customs and peoples of Morocco. An immense body of knowledge about Moroccans was produced under the

protectorate. It was produced for Frenchmen, in French, and housed in a library beside the Residency.

Legibility is not pardon. The order's logic is comprehensible, its aesthetic achievements are real, and its author was in his own terms sincere. None of that alters what the arrangement did, which was to hold a society in the configuration in which it had been found, at the exact moment when the world it had to survive in was changing faster than at any time in its history.

Reading the robe against the framework

Three refinements.

The first concerns method rather than content. The framework asks whose belief an order requires, and the usual way to answer is to analyse what the legitimating doctrine says — which groups it flatters, which duties it assigns, whose virtue it asserts. Morocco suggests a harder test. The doctrine's *publication history* is recoverable, and it settles the question by itself: a Paris fortnightly, the Académie française, a Lyon chamber of commerce, a lecture hall, a colonial exposition, a private letter to a French journalist. Where a story is told is a more reliable fact than what the story says, because content can be read charitably and a venue cannot. The refinement to carry forward: to locate the audience whose belief an order actually needs, read the bibliography before the argument.

The second is the one this case exists to establish. The gentleness was not a mitigation of the foreclosure; it was the foreclosure's form. A doctrine of preservation is a doctrine of prohibition — the medina walls stand because nothing may be built through them, the skyline survives because a servitude forbids the building, the crafts persist because the alternative was not provided. The framework has generally treated the

robe as a story laid over force in order to make force cheaper. Morocco shows a robe that also acts directly on the world, and what it does when it acts is to hold the conquered society in the shape the conqueror found it — which was, by the conqueror's own account, a shape that could not defend itself against him. The refinement: preservation is not the absence of intervention but an intervention with its sign reversed, and it costs the preserved precisely what a prohibition costs. The question to put to any respectful colonial doctrine is not what it protects but what it forbids, and to whom the prohibition applies. In Morocco it applied to the people inside the walls and was lifted for the property owners outside them.

The third concerns a liability the robe wrote into its own founding text. Lyautey's argument for the gentler method was that Morocco, unlike Algeria, was a historic and independent empire, extremely jealous of its independence and rebellious against all servitude. That is a justification for indirect rule and it is simultaneously a signed admission that the country was a nation with a state and a sovereign will. A robe that grounds itself in the strength of the order it is displacing places on the record, in the coloniser's own hand, the premise of the eventual claim against it. And the administrative settlement made the liability concrete: France took the revenue, the army and the law, and left the sacred with the Sultan — leaving the single asset the conqueror could not manufacture in the hands of the single person he had bound himself by treaty to protect, at the head of an office which, as the Landscape established, commanded obedience in valleys no tax collector could enter. What that arrangement is worth, and to whom, is the question the rest of this study is going to answer.

A note on sources. The bibliographical facts of Lyautey's publications and offices — the two *Revue des Deux Mondes* essays of 1891 and 1900, the election to the Académie française in 1912 and reception in 1920, *Paroles d'action* (1927), the preface to the general report of 31 July 1914, the 1926 lecture, and the commissariat-general of the 1931 Colonial Exposition — are drawn from standard reference sources and from the Académie française's own record. The formulae attributed to the 1900 essay (conquest as *une organisation qui marche*; the market to be opened the day after the village is taken) and the *tache d'huile* passage are quoted from Franchet d'Espèrey's reception speech at the Académie française, which summarises and quotes the essay; I have not read the 1900 article itself, and it is possible that the oil-stain wording is Franchet d'Espèrey's rendering rather than Lyautey's. The essay is public domain and should be consulted directly before these formulations are quoted again.

The Lyon Chamber of Commerce passage of February 1916, the declaration of January 1921 that Morocco would never be a colony of small agricultural settlement, and the letter of 19 August 1918 all reached me through a single chronicle by a polemical author, and are flagged as such in the text. The 1916 passage is the load-bearing one for this module's third refinement and should be traced to the published address before the study is compiled. A further text of 1920, widely quoted as Lyautey's prediction that North Africa would one day detach itself from the metropole and that the supreme aim of French policy should be to make that separation painless, is attributed to him in the same chronicle; because it is the single strongest piece of evidence for the counter-position and I could not verify it, I have declined to rely on it here, and record its existence so that someone with access to the correspondence can settle it.

The phrase about ruffling no tradition and changing no habit, which circulates ubiquitously as a Lyautey quotation, is treated in the text as period vocabulary rather than as his words, following Béatrice Hibou, who presents it as the way the project was then habitually described. It should not be quoted as Lyautey’s without a citation to an actual text of his.

Modern scholarship is paraphrased and credited throughout. Hibou supplies the account of the protectorate as a freezing of supposedly pre-existing social forms, the observation that the Makhzen was less conserved than reinvented, and the division of competences by which the colonial state took economic, fiscal, administrative and military reform while the Makhzen retained what touched the sacred. William Hoisington supplies the judgement that the indirect rule was always rather more direct than indirect and that force, gently or severely applied, remained the effective instrument. Susan Gilson Miller supplies the assessment of the Institut des Hautes Études Marocaines. The three urban principles imposed on Prost, the dates of his service, the classifications at Rabat, and the suppression of the two-hundred-and-fifty-metre *non aedificandi* strip under pressure from foreign proprietors are drawn from the French architectural and urban-history literature on the protectorate, in particular the studies published through OpenEdition and Persée; the crucial observation that the plans provided for the growth of the European towns alone, nothing being foreseen for the expansion of the Moroccan Muslim and Jewish populations already cramped inside the medinas, is from the Persée article on speculation and political influence in protectorate urbanism, and is paraphrased.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 4 · FORMATION

THE CERTIFICATE OF MUSLIM STUDIES

Module 4 · Formation — two educations designed from the outset for two kinds of Moroccan, a credential built so that it would not convert, one school founded expressly to form Berbers away from Arabic and Islam, and a thousand-year-old system of instruction that simply kept the field the coloniser declined to enter

Two educations, decided in advance

The protectorate's education policy was not a failure of ambition or a shortage of funds. It was a design, and the design was settled early and stated plainly.

Lyautey and his collaborators did not consider it appropriate to apply, in an Islamic monarchy, the principles that had produced in France a secular republican education, the same for everybody. Political considerations and a concern for immediate practical effect led them instead to conceive two kinds of schooling for Moroccans: one for the sons of notables, another for the children of the people, with religious instruction maintained throughout. That is the French historiography's own summary of the decision, and no part of it is contested.

The institutions followed from it. *Écoles de fils de notables* — schools for the sons of notables — were established to take the children of families associated with the protectorate's work. Two Muslim colleges were founded for the secondary stage, Moulay Idriss at Fez and Moulay Youssef at Rabat.

Alongside them ran a separate, thinner provision for everyone else, and alongside that the untouched Quranic schools, the *msid*, where a Moroccan child had always gone as soon as he could stand, to recite the Qur'an first without understanding it and then, gradually, to read it.

The reasoning behind the split was that renovating the traditional Muslim schools was judged too complex a task to attempt, so new establishments would be created for the children of the Moroccan elite instead. What that meant in practice was that the existing system was left exactly as it was, and a small parallel one built beside it.

The numbers

The enrolment figures are the plainest statement of what the design produced, and they should be read in sequence.

The schools for Moroccan children in the French system held 1,468 pupils in 1913. On the eve of the Second World War, twenty-six years into the protectorate, they held 21,400. By 1955, after a post-war expansion, they held 314,800.

The secondary figures are the ones that matter. The Muslim colleges held 608 pupils in 1938. In 1955 they held 6,712.

And the proportion of Moroccan children in school at all rose from about two per cent in 1944 to about thirteen per cent in 1956.

Thirteen per cent, after forty-four years. Six thousand seven hundred in secondary education, in a country of some nine or ten million people, four years before the protectorate ended. Until the end of the Second World War there was no Moroccan secondary establishment other than the two Muslim colleges, and no modern university or higher institution of any kind — the sole institution of higher learning in the country being the Qarawiyyin, which was eleven centuries old and which the

protectorate had not built. Morocco's first modern university, Mohammed V at Rabat, was founded in 1957, the year after independence. In 1955, ninety-six per cent of Moroccan male teachers and forty-two per cent of Moroccan female teachers had received no pedagogical training at all.

The credential

But the enrolment numbers understate it, and the instrument that understates it is the most instructive artefact in this module.

The Muslim colleges — two of them, four by 1939, including the Berber college at Azrou — did not prepare their pupils for the *certificat d'études* or for the baccalaureate. They prepared them for a *certificat d'études musulmanes* at the first stage and a *diplôme d'études musulmanes* at the second: a certificate and a diploma of Muslim studies, which were not the French qualifications and did not open the doors the French qualifications opened.

This is the withholding in its purest form, and it is worth being precise about why it is more effective than simply closing the schools. A closed school is visible and it is politically expensive; it can be counted, complained about, and cited in the Chamber. A parallel credential produces the appearance of provision with none of the consequence. Pupils are enrolled, teachers are paid, buildings are opened, figures are published, and the boy at the end of it holds a document that does not convert. He has not been excluded. He has been certified — in a currency that is not legal tender anywhere he might want to spend it.

The record here is not entirely clean and the discrepancy should be stated. Some accounts hold that the Muslim colleges prepared their pupils for the baccalaureate, and others refer to a distinct "Moroccan baccalaureate" obtainable by the best

of them. These claims may be reconcilable — a separate Moroccan qualification, introduced later, is not the metropolitan baccalaureate even when it carries the name — but I have not been able to resolve them, and the reader should treat the strong version of the argument above as resting on the account that specifies the Muslim certificate and diploma, and as wanting confirmation from the protectorate's own examination regulations.

Azrou

There was one place where the protectorate did set out to form Moroccans in earnest, and its purpose tells you what formation was for.

The Collège d'Azrou was founded in 1927 in the Middle Atlas, in a cedar-forested town beneath a rock, and it was intended to train the sons of Berber notables in a francophile spirit, away from what were regarded as the dangerous influences of Arabness and of reformist Islam. It sat within a wider apparatus. From 1920, French *instituteurs* rigorously prepared in a Berber language and trained both as teachers and as gatherers of intelligence were posted to rural schools in Berber-speaking areas. In the Franco-Berber schools Arabic was proscribed, and so was the religious instruction of the Quranic schools.

Read that once more. The one substantial French effort to educate Moroccans was an effort to educate a selected group of them out of the language of their scripture and out of their religion, staffed by teachers who were also intelligence officers.

It did not work, and the way it failed is the useful part. Mohamed Benhlal's study, built on the college's own registration ledger covering some two thousand pupils between 1929 and 1956 — very nearly all of them —

establishes two things. The proportion who were actually sons of notables was very small; the school drew instead boys of modest and even poor background, more than eighty per cent of the intake. And they went over to the national movement early, to the considerable satisfaction of Mohammed ben Youssef, who had been uneasy about what the institution implied from the beginning. Pupils and parents, in Benhlal's account, worked steadily to divert and turn an enterprise that was strategic rather than educational in its conception. One parent from the Middle Atlas in the 1920s put the family's calculation in terms his interviewers recorded: his people had been men who made gunpowder speak, and there was no more gunpowder, and the powder of the present age was schooling.

They understood exactly what was being offered and exactly what to do with it.

The dahir of 16 May 1930

The Berber policy's legal expression came on 16 May 1930, and it is the point at which the counter-formation demonstrated its reach.

The dahir rested on an earlier one of 11 September 1914, by which Moulay Youssef had prescribed, in the interest of the good of his subjects and the tranquillity of the State, that the customary status of the pacified Berber tribes be respected. The 1930 text, signed by his son Mohammed ben Youssef, declared it opportune to specify the particular conditions under which justice would be rendered in those tribes, and provided that in tribes recognised as being of Berber custom the repression of offences committed by Moroccan subjects — which elsewhere in the Empire fell to the caïds — would fall to the tribal chiefs. Its Article 6 carried criminal jurisdiction to French tribunals.

One detail of its production belongs in this study and nowhere else: before the text could reach the royal palace, it had to be translated into Arabic. The Sultan’s decree, in the Sultan’s name, invoking his august father, was drafted in French and rendered into the language of the man who would sign it.

The response came through the institution France had left alone. From 20 June 1930 Moroccans began reciting the *Latif* — the prayer of distress reserved for public calamity — in mosques across the country, asking the All-Merciful to avert division between Arabs and Berbers; the call went out from Salé on 27 June and was taken up in the principal mosques of the kingdom. On 28 August a petition drafted by the mufti Abu Bakr Zniber was delivered to the Sultan through the grand vizier and to the Residency. The protest ran through the Arab world; the Residency could not stop it. On 8 April 1934 a further dahir abrogated Article 6.

Two things should be said about that outcome, because the triumphal version and the dismissive version are both wrong. It was a real defeat for the Residency, and it is generally treated as the founding act of organised Moroccan nationalism — the moment the anti-colonial struggle passed from armed resistance in the countryside, broken with Abd el-Krim in 1926, to political organisation in the towns, and acquired a unity it had previously lacked. And it did not end the Berber policy at all: the customary tribunals went on functioning and multiplied, the Franco-Berber schools grew and their local influence with them, and by 1941 five further tribes had been classified by viziriel decree as governed by their *orf*.

What was defeated was the decree. What was not defeated was the policy.

What held the field

France's withdrawal from the formation of Moroccans did not leave a vacuum, and this is the fact from which everything in this module follows. It left the field to a system of instruction that was already a thousand years old and entirely intact.

The Qarawiyyin at Fez had been founded in 859 and was still, in the 1920s, the training ground of the Moroccan learned class. Allal el-Fassi entered it in 1927, formed a dissident youth association almost immediately, propagandised for Abd el-Krim, published poetry, spread the free Arab schools, and was interned twice before 1930. The *msid* was in every quarter of every town. The scholars who had imposed conditions on a sultan in 1908 were still there, and their successors drafted the petition of August 1930.

And beside the old formation a new one was built, by Moroccans, out of their own pockets, in direct competition with the protectorate. Free schools — *madaris hurra* — teaching a modern curriculum in Arabic, spread from the 1920s. In 1929 Mohamed Mufaddal Benjelloun, Allal el-Fassi and Ahmed Mekouar founded an association for the propagation of education specifically to resist the hostility of the authorities at Fez, then under Pétain, to the founding of schools. From 1928 student missions went east — from Tétouan to Palestine, from Salé to Egypt and Syria — expressly to train teaching cadres. The Guessous institute opened at Rabat in 1936 under Ahmed Balafrej; Abdallah Guennoun's school opened at Tangier in 1935. These establishments prepared their pupils openly for higher study abroad, because there was nowhere in Morocco to send them.

The pattern holds even where the protectorate provided nothing whatever. There were no state schools for Muslim girls to speak of; the Direction générale de l'instruction publique made only timid beginnings in the 1920s. So

members of the Muslim community established places of instruction for girls themselves, frequently clandestine, and when the free schools came they admitted girls, and Malika el Fassi took the question into public argument.

Meanwhile the men who would govern independent Morocco were forming themselves in France. Mohamed Hassan Ouazzani, Ahmed Balafrej, Mohamed el-Fassi and most of the heralds of the independence struggle sharpened their commitment during student years in the metropole — which is to say that the protectorate's most consequential contribution to Moroccan political formation was to make it necessary to leave.

Reading formation against the framework

Four refinements, of which the second is the one this case was predicted to supply and the first is the one it supplied unexpectedly.

The first concerns where to look. The framework asks whether the order forms the governed, and the natural evidence is schools and enrolments. Morocco shows that enrolment can be conceded while formation is withheld, by the simple device of a credential that does not convert. The *certificat d'études musulmanes* enrolled pupils, employed teachers, filled buildings and generated statistics, and terminated in a document that opened nothing. The refinement: when testing whether an order forms the governed, examine the exit rather than the entrance — what the qualification is worth, where it is accepted, and what it permits its holder to become. A parallel certificate is a more efficient instrument of exclusion than a closed door, because it is invisible in every metric an administration publishes about itself.

The second is the prediction confirmed. Formation was withheld because forming them would have meant admitting them, and under a protectorate there was nothing to admit them to — the constitutional premise being that Moroccans would remain Moroccan subjects of a Moroccan sovereign, from which it follows that a Moroccan with a French baccalaureate is an anomaly the arrangement has no place for. Thirteen per cent of children in school in 1956, six thousand seven hundred in secondary education in 1955, no university until the year after the French left. The order stayed expensive and brittle exactly as predicted, and the surveillance is the tell: rural schoolmasters trained as intelligence gatherers is not what a confident order does with its teachers.

The third is the sharpening the seed anticipated. Withheld formation in a country that already possesses a mature formation is not a subtraction; it is a concession of the field. What France declined to occupy, the Qarawiyyin, the *msid* and then the free schools simply held — and what they held it with was the robe of an earlier conquest that had fully taken, Islamic, Arabic and Sharifian, running on the conviction of the people it formed and costing its beneficiaries nothing to maintain. Set the two orders side by side at their own account: an expensive-pole conquest paying for teachers who doubled as informants, laid over a cheap-pole order whose schools the community funded voluntarily and staffed with its own. The contrast is not incidental to the outcome. It is the outcome.

The fourth concerns Azrou, and it is offered because the exception is more instructive than the rule. The single serious French attempt to form Moroccans was designed to detach rather than to attach — to produce Berbers who were not Arabs and not, in any developed sense, Muslims. A formation of that kind has no positive content to offer; it can subtract an identity but it cannot install one, and the young people it produces will therefore attach themselves to whatever

coherent and complete thing is nearest to hand. At Azrou the nearest complete thing was Moroccan nationalism, and two thousand boys, four fifths of them poor, took it. The refinement: a formation defined by what it removes will be captured by the first doctrine that offers something whole, and the coloniser who builds such a school is not filling a vessel but opening one.

There is a fifth thing, not a refinement but an observation to carry into the modules on information and on collapse. When the Residency issued a decree it thought technical, the answer came back in five weeks, in the form of a prayer said simultaneously in mosques from Salé to Fez, and in fifteen weeks as a petition on the Sultan’s desk. France had left religion to the Makhzen and kept the budget and the army. What it had actually left in Moroccan hands was a communications network reaching every town in the country, with an established weekly audience, which no French official could enter and which required no printing press, no licence and no money to operate.

A note on sources. This module contains no direct quotation of primary text, and that absence is itself worth recording: the protectorate’s education policy was made in circulars, budgets and examination regulations which I have not been able to consult in facsimile. The wording of the dahir of 16 May 1930 and of the dahir of 11 September 1914 that it recites is rendered here closely from a French reproduction of the sultanian text, but I have deliberately paraphrased rather than quoted, because the reproduction I found is on a general reference site with no stated provenance and the text is politically contested; before the study is compiled, both dahirs should be taken from the *Bulletin officiel* and quoted exactly,

since their precise wording is the kind of thing this collection exists to set down.

Modern scholarship is paraphrased and credited throughout. The characterisation of the two-track design — one education for the sons of notables and another for the children of the people, with religious instruction maintained, on the ground that the principles of French secular republican education were not thought applicable in an Islamic monarchy — follows the study of “the sons of notables” published in the *Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine*. The account of the Muslim colleges preparing for a *certificat* and a *diplôme d’études musulmanes* rather than for the *certificat d’études* and the baccalaureate follows Pierre Vermeren; the conflicting accounts referring to a baccalaureate or a “Moroccan baccalaureate” are noted in the text and left unresolved. The prosopography of the Collège d’Azrou — roughly two thousand pupils between 1929 and 1956, a very small proportion of them sons of notables, more than eighty per cent of modest or popular origin, early adherence to the national movement, and the pupils’ and parents’ diversion of a project that was strategic rather than educational — is Mohamed Benhlal’s, as is the recorded remark of the Middle Atlas parent about gunpowder and instruction, which I have paraphrased rather than quoted because it reaches me through copyrighted scholarship. The observation that the Berber policy survived the abrogation of Article 6 — customary tribunals multiplying, Franco-Berber schools growing, five further tribes classified under *orf* by 1941 — is from the *Encyclopédie berbère*. Susan Gilson Miller’s history of modern Morocco underlies the account of Azrou at several points.

Figures are given as the sources give them. The enrolment series (1,468 in 1913; 21,400 on the eve of the Second World War; 314,800 in 1955; 608 in the Muslim colleges in 1938 and 6,712 in 1955) comes from a single French institutional history

of French education in Morocco and has not been collated against the protectorate’s statistical yearbooks; it is the quantitative spine of this module and should be checked. The schooling rate of Moroccan children rising from two per cent in 1944 to thirteen per cent in 1956 is attributed to Chafiqi and Alagui as cited in a University of Lyon volume. The teacher-training figures for 1955 come from a general reference source. The Moroccan population figure against which the secondary enrolment is set is my own rough estimate and is not a census result; no reliable enumeration exists for the period, as the Landscape module records.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 5 · THE COST COLUMN

THOSE INVESTED WITH COMMAND AMONG YOU

Module 5 · The Cost Column — why the ordinary Moroccan's ledger came out against revolt although France's own coercion reached him so lightly: an obedience owed to God through an office, priced by his neighbours rather than by a French court, policed by Moroccan officials under decrees bearing the Sultan's seal, in a country from which every road out led into French hands

What France did not have to build

Next door, in Algeria, France held its Muslim majority with a special penal code. The *indigénat* applied to one caste alone, criminalised that caste's ordinary movement and speech, priced defection through collective fines that made the tribe surety for the individual, required a *permis de voyage* to leave the commune, and was renewed as a temporary exception until 1944.

Morocco had nothing of the kind, and the absence is the first fact this module has to explain.

What Morocco had instead was set out in the dahir of 12 August 1913 on judicial organisation — the same date as the land registration dahir, the protectorate's founding week of paperwork. It preserved a threefold Sharifian justice: the *justice makhzen*, penal justice rendered by the pashas and the caïds; the justice of the *chraa*, the sharia courts under their qadis; and rabbinical justice for the Jewish communities.

French courts existed alongside, for Europeans and for cases involving them. A pasha was the governor of a city, the Sultan's representative, holding judicial and police powers together. Order in the countryside was kept by *mokhaznis*, the Moroccan auxiliary force.

So consider the ordinary Moroccan's position concretely. The man who arrested him was Moroccan. The man who judged him was an officer of the Sultan. The law applied to him was a dahir — a text of law sealed by the Sultan. The prison regulations were issued by dahir, on 26 June 1930. When the penal jurisdiction of pashas and caïds was made uniform and the High Sharifian Tribunal reorganised, that too was a dahir, of 8 April 1934.

The framework's question for this module is whether a credible enforcer can reach the subject and whether he knows it. In Morocco the answer is yes on both counts, but the enforcer arrived wearing the Sultan's authority — and that changes not the credibility of the entry but its entire character. France did not have to write a cost column for the ordinary Moroccan subject. One was already there.

The benefit column of compliance

The framework's own formulation is the one to hold onto here: the belief keeps the benefit column of compliance high, so that the cost column rarely needs checking. Morocco is the corpus's clearest demonstration of that sentence, and the reason is that the belief in question was not France's.

For an ordinary Moroccan, the benefit of compliance was not a French benefit. It was being a good Muslim, and remaining one in the eyes of the people among whom he lived.

The obligation rests on scripture. The Quranic injunction at Surah 4, verse 59, requires the believer to obey God, to obey the Messenger, and to obey those invested with command

among them — the *ulu'l-amr* — and it is from that verse that the title of Commander of the Faithful is generally held to derive. The Moroccan sultan held that title. He was, in addition, a descendant of the Prophet, which his subjects understood to make him more apt than the Ottoman to receive *baraka*, to command the believers according to divine law, and to defend them against the unbeliever. The same man led the prayers, presided over the state, and commanded the troops, and the boundary between the spiritual and the political functions was not defined because it was not felt to need defining. The ulama, themselves bound by an act of allegiance that imposed obedience on them, conceded their symbolic authority to him.

Now set that beside what Module 1 established: every French act in Morocco took the form of a decree sealed by that man. The column marched under his seal; the tax was levied under his seal; the land registry, the mining reservation, the school regulations and the public-order law all bore it.

The consequence for the ordinary subject's ledger is the whole of this module. Defying the protectorate was not, in the form it actually reached him, defiance of France. It was defiance of an office to which obedience was owed as a religious duty. And the cost of that was not primarily a French prison. It was what his quarter thought of him, what his tribe thought of him, what the *fqih* who had taught him to recite thought of him, what his family thought of him — the judgement of every person whose regard constituted his standing in the world, delivered daily, without hearing, at no charge to anybody.

That is the cheapest cost column an occupying power has ever had, and France did not pay a franc towards it.

Two qualifications must be entered, and they are the ones that make this module load-bearing rather than merely striking. The obligation was never held to be unconditional:

Muslim jurists imposed on the sultan the application of the sharia, the doing of justice and the sound governance of the state, and the office carried no implication of infallibility. And the ulama of Fez had demonstrated in January 1908, within living memory of every adult in the country, that they would state those conditions in writing and transfer the oath when they were not met. The entry in the ordinary man's cost column was therefore held, not by France, but by a party with the standing and the recent precedent to revise it.

What France added, and how little

France did add instruments, and the most revealing of them is the dahir of 29 June 1935 on the repression of demonstrations contrary to public order and of offences against the respect due to authority.

Its language is worth noticing. Not offences against France, or against the Residency, or against the protectorate — against *the respect due to authority*, a formula that names no particular sovereign and could be enforced by any. It was used under the protectorate to break up gatherings and demonstrations. It was not repealed at independence. It was not repealed for thirty-eight years after independence. It was abrogated by a law promulgated on 25 July 1994, having been used throughout the intervening decades by the independent Moroccan state against Moroccans.

That afterlife is the diagnostic. Algeria's *indigénat* could not have survived Algerian independence for a day, because it was a caste code and its caste was named in it. Morocco's public-order dahir survived for nearly four decades because it was not a colonial instrument wearing a Moroccan disguise; it was a Moroccan instrument that France had found convenient, and that whoever held the Sharifian state next would also find

convenient. The protectorate's coercion of the ordinary subject was thin enough, and generic enough, to be inherited.

Where France's coercion was not thin was in the mountains, and Module 1 recorded what it looked like: aircraft, artillery, blockade and starvation at Bou Gafer, a hundred and twenty to a hundred and sixty thousand men in the Rif. The two-tier picture is exact and it maps onto the old distinction the Landscape examined. Where the Makhzen's reach was accepted, almost no French coercion was needed, because the compliance was already there and had been for centuries. Where it was not accepted, the coercion was total. France was not so much holding a country as completing a project the Makhzen had never finished — and, as Module 1 found, even the tribes that fought hardest did not dispute the Sultan's sovereignty. They disputed whose hands it now ran through.

The two dials

The first dial, the credibility of force, needs little argument after Module 1. By 1934 no one in Morocco could reasonably doubt that the French army could reach any point in the country and destroy anything it found there. It had taken twenty-two years to demonstrate, which is the point of the demonstration.

The second dial is exit, and Morocco's answer is written in geography rather than in law.

To the west, the Atlantic. To the south, the Sahara, and beyond the Sahara more French Africa. To the east, Algeria — French since 1830, departments of France since 1848. To the north, the Spanish protectorate, and beyond it the Mediterranean and Spain. There is no direction in which a Moroccan could have walked in 1930 and been out of European hands, and in three of the four he would have been walking deeper into French ones.

The actual migration confirms it precisely. Moroccans did move, and where they moved is the finding. The eastern regions, bordering Algeria, sent their men to Algeria — an estimated eighty-five thousand Moroccan migrants there by the late 1930s — which is to say from French administration into French administration. Those who went further went to France itself, in numbers that are startling for their smallness: more than fifteen thousand Moroccan workers in France during the First World War, a peak of about twenty-one thousand in the 1920s, and eight or nine thousand southerners in France at the end of 1936 out of a Moroccan presence in which every other region together made a practically negligible five to eight per cent. Recruitment for the wars ran larger — some forty thousand men in the First World War, a hundred and twenty-six thousand into the French army in the Second — but that is conscription into the enforcer's own service, which is the opposite of an exit. And in 1938 the protectorate created an emigration service in Morocco to select, recruit and channel Moroccan workers to France: from that year, the door out was administered by the party being left.

So the exit dial reads: physically open, statistically tiny, overwhelmingly circular, directed into French territory or French employment, and latterly organised by the protectorate itself. It was a valve, not a door. And the men who used it came from the Sous, the Anti-Atlas and the western High Atlas — the poor Berber mountains, the regions with the least land. Module 2's settlement is legible in the migration statistics.

The road that was open

There was one road out that was genuinely open, and it went to the coast.

Rural Moroccans moved to Casablanca and the Atlantic cities in growing numbers from the 1920s and heavily from the 1930s, drawn by the ports, the phosphate traffic, the construction and the wages. And because, as Module 3 established, the town plans had provided for the growth of the European city alone and made no room for Moroccan expansion, the arrivals settled outside the plan, in the shanty settlements to which Casablanca gave the world the word *bidonville*.

Consider what that internal migration did to the distribution of ledgers. It took men off land which the registration system had been quietly transferring away from their families; it moved them from villages, where surveillance was total and organisation impossible, into cities; it made them wage-earners with a common employer, a common grievance and a common street; and it deposited them at the edge of the European quarter, in sight of it. The order's own operation — its land law, its ports, its labour demand and its refusal to plan for them — assembled, in one place, the population whose benefit columns were the most heavily loaded.

The framework predicts that when a cost column empties, the first movers come from precisely that part of the distribution. Morocco spent thirty years gathering them into the same square mile.

Reading the cost column against the framework

Four refinements, of which the first two are the substance of this case.

The first. The framework's central identity is that the floor of force *is* the cost column — the credible enforcer that prices defection too high. Morocco requires an amendment, because France did not write the entry. It rented one. By preserving the native sovereign and issuing every act under his seal, the

protectorate arranged that defiance of French rule presented itself to the ordinary subject as defiance of an office to which obedience was a scriptural duty, and the penalty for that was administered not by the French state but by the defector's own community, continuously, for nothing. The refinement to carry forward is that a conqueror who rules through a preserved sovereign does not merely economise on force; he transfers the compliance function to the conquered order's own belief, which then operates at no cost to him and requires no enforcement he has to fund, staff or defend in his own parliament. This is why Morocco could be held with so much less apparatus than Algeria while being no less thoroughly held. The cheapest cost column is not the one you fill efficiently. It is the one you inherit already full and turn to face yourself.

The second follows immediately and is the whole future of this study. A rented column can be repossessed. The obedience the protectorate lived on was owed conditionally — jurists had always bound the sultan to the sharia and to just government, and the scholars of Fez had shown in 1908 that they would put the conditions in writing and move the oath when the conditions failed. So the single entry that held every ordinary Moroccan ledger in place was in the keeping of a party with both the standing and the demonstrated willingness to withdraw it. The framework holds that orders change when the shared cost column empties, and that the usual emptier is elite chaos in the metropole — the enforcer turning inward, bleeding out, or falling into fracture. Morocco puts a second and rarer mechanism on the table: the column empties because its *owner* takes it back. And in a protectorate the owner is, by construction, the one man the coloniser has bound himself by treaty to protect and cannot straightforwardly remove. Renting a belief is cheap in exact

proportion as it is fragile, because a cost column you did not build is a cost column you cannot defend.

The third concerns the exit dial, and it is a correction of measurement. Algeria closed its exits with a document — the *permis de voyage*, a policy, requiring administrators, forms and enforcement. Morocco closed them with a map. Every land frontier gave onto territory held by the same power or by its partner; the sea gave onto Europe; the desert gave onto nothing. The refinement: exit should be measured not by whether departure is physically possible but by whether any reachable destination lies outside the enforcer’s reach, and a frontier is not an exit when the same power holds both sides of it. This has a further and less comfortable implication for the framework — that the tightest cages are the ones that require no policy at all, and therefore leave no archive. An order that closes its exits by decree can be convicted from its own paperwork. An order whose subjects have nowhere to go generates no documents, and its subjects’ immobility will be read by later observers as consent.

The fourth is an observation on where the case is heading. The order’s cost column pushed men off the land, its economy pulled them to the coast, and its urban doctrine refused to house them when they arrived. The result was a concentration, at the edge of the European city, of exactly the people whose ledgers were closest to flipping — landless, waged, urban, literate enough to be reached, and in daily sight of what the settlement had distributed to others. Nothing about this was intended and all of it followed from decisions taken for other reasons. Module 10 will have to say what happened when the entry holding those ledgers in place was withdrawn by the man who owned it.

A note on sources. The exact titles and dates of the Moroccan legal instruments — the dahir of 12 August 1913 on judicial organisation; the dahir of 26 June 1930 on the regime of prisons; the dahir of 16 May 1930 on the working of justice in tribes of Berber custom not provided with *mahkamas* for the application of the *chraa*; the dahir of 8 April 1934 subjecting the jurisdictions of pashas and caïds to a uniform penal regime and reorganising the High Sharifian Tribunal; the dahir of 29 June 1935 on the repression of demonstrations contrary to public order and of offences against the respect due to authority; and the law of 25 July 1994 abrogating it — are taken from the index of legal texts in the Centre Jacques-Berque's study of the Moroccan penal system, which gives *Bulletin officiel* numbers, dates and page references for each. That is a reliable secondary index rather than the gazette itself, and the texts should be quoted from the *Bulletin officiel* before this module's argument about the 1935 dahir's wording is relied on further; the argument turns on the phrase concerning the respect due to authority, and the phrase is here reported from the index's title rather than from the operative articles.

The definitions of *justice makhzen*, *pacha*, *mokhazni*, *mahakma* and *dahir* are taken from the glossary published by the French diplomatic archives with their protectorate holdings. The Quranic injunction at Surah 4:59 is given in a plain rendering of its sense rather than quoted from any particular modern translation; the connection between that verse and the adoption of the title *Amir al-Mu'minin* follows the standard reference literature, which attributes the observation to Gibb, and Fred Donner is cited there for the title's role in centralising the early Muslim state. The account of the sultan's combined religious and political function, the absence of any implication of infallibility, the jurists' imposition on him of the sharia and of just government, and

the ulama’s concession of symbolic authority through the act of allegiance, follows the article on the political use of Islam published in *Revue des sciences sociales*; the comparison Moroccan informants drew between their own sharifian sultan and the Ottoman, and the association with *baraka* and defence against the unbeliever, is from the ethnographic study *Honneur et baraka*. All of this is modern scholarship and is paraphrased.

Migration figures are given as the sources give them and are not reconcilable to a single series. More than fifteen thousand Moroccan workers in France during the First World War, and a peak of about twenty-one thousand in the 1920s, come from two separate French institutional accounts; eight or nine thousand southerners in France at the end of 1936, with other regions accounting for five to eight per cent of the total, is Joanny Ray’s contemporary estimate as reproduced in the Persée article on interwar Moroccan migration; the estimate of about eighty-five thousand Moroccan migrants in Algeria by the late 1930s, and the recruitment figures of forty thousand in the First World War and a hundred and twenty-six thousand into the French army in the Second, are from the Migration Policy Institute’s survey and should be treated as round orders of magnitude. The creation of a Moroccan emigration service in 1938 to select, recruit and channel workers to France is from a Moroccan community-association history and reached me through a single source. The observation that the migration drew overwhelmingly on the Sous, the Anti-Atlas and the western High Atlas, and that eastern Morocco went to Algeria because it bordered Algeria, is from the same Persée article and is the best-sourced element of this section.

This module deliberately makes no quantitative claim about the volume of French repression of ordinary Moroccan subjects, because I have found no reliable series for

prosecutions, internments or collective fines under the protectorate, and the argument that the coercion was thin would be considerably strengthened or considerably damaged by such a series. Its absence is a real gap and is recorded as one.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 6 · EXTRACTION

SEVEN TIMES LESS

Module 6 · Extraction — a tax that fell on the harvest at one flat rate whoever owned the field, so that the Moroccan smallholder and the European estate paid the same percentage and the difference came out sevenfold; a mine held by the state for the state; a corvée renamed and left on Moroccan shoulders alone; and a fiscal apparatus so light on capital that it was, in its designers' words, built above all not to discourage the investor

The question the tax collector could not ask

Every extraction module in this collection turns on a single question: who pays, and how is the paying sorted. In most colonial orders the sorting is done openly, by a tax that names its castes — a head tax on natives, an exemption for settlers, a labour levy on one population and not the other. Morocco could not do it that way, and the reason is the reason for everything in this study.

The obligation to pay tax in Morocco was, in the population's understanding, of religious essence. The Quranic levies — the *zakat*, the *achour* — were owed to God through his community, and their collection was an act with a place in the moral order. A protectorate ruling through a Muslim sovereign, in that sovereign's name, could not simply announce that Muslims would be taxed as a subject race, because the tax it needed to raise was carried, like the obedience examined in Module 5, on a belief it had not created and could not replace. The fiscal historians put the constraint

plainly: excessive fiscal pressure risked being interpreted by the Moroccan population as an attack on the laws of Islam, under which the fiscal obligation is of religious essence, so the administration could proceed only with tact and circumspection.

The result is that Morocco's extraction was sorted by caste as thoroughly as any in the corpus — but the sorting had to be done without a code that said so. It was done instead through the *design* of taxes that were formally identical for everyone, and this module is an account of how a flat tax delivers an unequal burden while appearing to name no one.

The tertib

The instrument was the *tertib*, an agricultural tax that predated the protectorate — the Sultan Abd al-Aziz's failed reform of 1901, which the Landscape described. France reorganised and simplified it in 1915, and it became the spine of direct taxation on the land.

Its design was the whole point, and its design was equality. The tertib fell on agricultural income — on the annual harvest, on fruit trees, on livestock — at a single flat rate of five per cent, assessed on the taxpayer's own declaration and verified by a local commission that included the caïd, the fraction's shaykh, a notable and an *adel*. It carried no abatement for the size of a family and no graduation for the size of a holding. The rate on the smallholder whose plot barely fed his household was the rate on the large modern estate producing a surplus for export: five per cent of the harvest, the same percentage, whoever you were.

A tax of that shape is regressive by construction, and it was recognised as such at the time. A note of the Directorate of Finances of 21 November 1951 conceded that the agricultural tax was on the whole heavier than in France, and that at equal

yield — fifteen to twenty quintals per hectare for cereals — the sum demanded of the Moroccan taxpayer under the tertib alone equalled the whole set of taxes falling on the metropolitan farmer. The tax was a burden on Europeans and Moroccans alike, which is precisely why, in the 1950s, the Residency began granting relief from it — to European farmers, and to those Moroccans who practised modern methods of cultivation, the relief being justified as help with the debt their investment had entailed. The flat tax was too heavy; the remedy was to lighten it for the people who owned the machines.

But the flat rate was only the visible half. On top of the tertib the Moroccan cultivator paid a further ten per cent in surcharge *centimes*: ten per cent to the native provident societies, and a further sum to pay the caïds and shaykhs who administered him — six per cent for the caïds, four for the shaykhs. The European farmer paid a ten per cent surcharge too. But the European's surcharge was rebated to the Chambers of Agriculture and the mixed Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture, to cover their running costs. The identical percentage, levied on both, flowed in opposite directions: the Moroccan's went to pay the officials who policed him, the European's came back to the institutions that represented him. A single surcharge, one rate, and it funded the surveillance of one caste and the self-government of the other.

Seven times

The aggregate is recorded, and it is the sharpest single figure in this module.

For 1952, drawing on the statistical yearbook of Morocco, the tertib contributions divide as follows: Moroccans paid four billion francs; Europeans paid five hundred and ninety-three

million. The Moroccan contribution was roughly seven times the European one.

Now the two readings of that figure, because the scholarship divides on it and the division is instructive rather than embarrassing. Measured as a share of each sector's own production, the numbers converge: Albert Ayache calculated that the Moroccan contribution represented about 2.5 per cent of Moroccan agricultural production and the European about 2.1 per cent, so that the Moroccan paid proportionally more but not enormously more; Georges Hatton judged even that gap relatively soft, given how imprecise the figures for Moroccan agriculture were. Both, note, fall below the nominal five per cent the tertib was supposed to take — the tell of who could obtain relief and who could not.

The seven-to-one ratio and the near-parity of percentages are both true, and holding them together is the finding. The Moroccan sector paid seven times as much tax because it was vastly larger in the number of people it held and the extent of ground it covered — millions of smallholders across the bulk of the country's cultivated land. The European sector paid a seventh as much because it was a small number of large, capitalised estates. The percentages were close because the tax was, on its face, equal. Which means the burden was sorted not by the tax rate, which named no caste, but by the settlement examined in Module 2 — by who had been left with the poor land and the small plots, and who had been placed on the irrigated Gharb and the grain plains of the Chaouia. The tertib did not create the inequality. It photographed it, at five per cent, and called the photograph fairness.

Where the weight was not

The most eloquent part of a tax system is often what it declines to tax, and Morocco's declined to tax capital.

There was no tax on securities, no general income tax, and no inheritance duty for the whole life of the protectorate. The overall fiscal burden was about five per cent of national income, and it rested about two-thirds on indirect taxes — customs duties above all, at forty-three per cent of fiscal receipts in 1956, then internal consumption taxes and stamp and registration duties. Indirect taxes on consumption are paid disproportionately by the many who consume their whole income and not by the few who save and invest most of theirs, so the two-thirds weighting is itself a transfer of the load down the scale.

The *patente*, the tax on commerce and industry created in 1920, was extraordinarily light by metropolitan standards. A comparative study of 1952 found that for enterprises of the same kind and size the patente in Morocco yielded between eight and twenty times less than in France. A chemical manufacturer at Casablanca employing ninety people paid a patente of a hundred and twenty-six thousand francs where the same firm at Marseille would have paid over a million; a fertiliser maker at Casablanca employing eighteen paid thirty-six thousand five hundred where Marseille would have taken nearly eight hundred thousand.

This was not oversight. It was the declared object of the system. The fiscal designers of the Residency, in the historians' summary, set out above all to create a system that, far from discouraging the investor, would maximally favour the inflow of the capital needed to develop the country. The extraction was arranged so that the surplus taken from the Moroccan cultivator's harvest would not be matched by a comparable claim on the European investor's profit — because the whole architecture existed to make Morocco attractive to that investor. The load was shifted, in the historian's exact phrase, onto the others: the Moroccan taxpayer paying for the

European, and in both communities the less rich for the more rich.

The corvée that kept its shape and changed its name

One tax fell on Moroccans and on no one else, and it is the plainest caste-instrument in the system precisely because it could not be disguised.

The *prestation*, established in 1924, replaced the old *corvée* — the customary obligation of unpaid labour on public works. It was due from every adult male who was a head of family or of an agricultural holding, and Moroccans could discharge it in kind, by labour. Patented merchants, soldiers and certain officials were exempt. The substitution of 1924 changed the corvée's name and its legal dress; it did not change who carried it. The obligation to give the state one's body and one's days, which the old order had imposed, was carried forward under a French name and left on the same shoulders — and its exemptions map the castes exactly: the merchant with a patente, the soldier in French service, the official. The man with nothing but his labour paid in labour.

The mine

The largest extraction in the country was the phosphates, and it does not fit the colonial template, which is why the study has to be careful with it.

The Office Chérifien des Phosphates, created by the dahir of 1920 that the settlement module examined, held the monopoly. It was a state agency of the Sharifian state, and Lyautey's stated reason for placing the deposits there was to keep foreign powers and foreign firms from taking control of a resource he judged to be of the first importance. Production began at Khouribga in 1921; Youssoufia opened in 1932. The

phosphate was extracted and exported as raw rock, unprocessed, through Casablanca. By the 1930s it was one of the largest single sources of state revenue.

So the great mine's revenue did not flow to a private French concern; it flowed to the Sharifian treasury, and it is still Moroccan today. That much Module 2 established and this module will not retract. But extraction is not only a question of who banks the proceeds. It is also a question of who does the work and on what terms, and here the phosphates rejoin the pattern with painful precision.

The mining towns were run on a Taylorist system built to maximise the yield of natural and human resources. And the racial sorting inside the workforce is recorded in the Office's own institutional history in a single sentence it now publishes about its early years: when the power-station workers at Khouribga organised and won recognition, a staff statute and the eight-hour day, *Moroccan workers were not affected by these new social achievements.* The gains were real; they were for the Europeans. The Moroccan miners who cut the rock that funded the Sharifian state were, by the state company's own account, outside the improvements the European workers secured. The men sold their corporate identity documents to one another to control their own mobility and work seasons — a small, exact sign of a workforce managing a coercion it did not consent to. The revenue was national. The mine floor was colonial.

Reading extraction against the framework

Four refinements, of which the first is the one this case contributes that the corpus did not have.

The first concerns how a caste-sorted extraction is delivered when the order cannot name the caste. The framework, following the earlier studies, expects colonial extraction to be

sorted openly — a native tax, a settler exemption. Morocco could not sort openly, because the tax obligation rode on Islamic belief and a differential levy announced as such would have been read as an assault on the faith the whole protectorate depended on borrowing. So it sorted by design instead: a flat tax on a population the settlement had already sorted. The tertib's five per cent named no one and fell on everyone, and it therefore delivered the inequality of the underlying landholding without ever having to state it — the Moroccan sector paying seven times the European because it had been left with the land that made it larger and poorer, the percentages staying close because the rate was equal. The refinement to carry forward: where an order rules through a borrowed belief that forbids it to name its subject caste, it extracts by imposing formally equal taxes on a materially sorted population, and the fairness of the rate is the instrument of the unfairness of the burden. A flat tax laid over an unequal settlement is a caste tax that cannot be quoted against its authors, because every word of it applies to everyone.

The second concerns the direction of the surcharge, and it is small but it is the whole architecture in miniature. The same ten per cent supplement, levied identically on Moroccan and European farmers, was spent on opposite things — the Moroccan's on the caïds and shaykhs who administered and watched him, the European's rebated to the chambers that represented and organised him. Extraction and its return are one circuit, and reading the tax rate alone misses half of it. The refinement: to see what an extraction is really doing, follow not only what is taken but where the identical levy is returned, because an order can sort its castes a second time on the way back, funding the surveillance of one with the same coin it uses to fund the self-government of the other.

The third concerns what the system refuses to tax. No tax on securities, no income tax, no inheritance duty, a patente eight to twenty times lighter than the metropole's, the whole two-thirds weighted onto indirect consumption — and all of it, by the designers' own statement, in order not to discourage the investor. The extraction was calibrated to the settlement's purpose: Morocco was to be made valuable to European capital, so European capital was the one thing the tax system was built not to reach. The refinement for the framework: in a colony of investment rather than of settlement, the shape of the tax system is a map of whom the colony is *for* — and a system that spares capital and presses the harvest and the wage is telling you, more reliably than any doctrine, that the population is the resource and the investor is the client.

The fourth is the phosphate anomaly held honestly, because it will return in Module 12 and must not be softened here. The revenue was national and remains so; the mine floor was sorted by caste like everything else. Both are true, and the framework should hold them together rather than choosing. A legal fiction maintained long enough becomes a container, as Module 2 found, and what the container held — the phosphates, in the Sharifian state's hands — passed intact to independent Morocco. But the container held the asset without altering the terms on which the men inside it worked, and the state company's own history records that the Moroccan miner was excluded from the European worker's gains. The refinement: the survival of an asset into the successor state and the colonial sorting of the labour that produced it are separate facts, and an honest accounting credits the first without using it to erase the second. Morocco inherited the mine. The miner inherited nothing the European miner had won, and had to win it again from a Moroccan state.

A note on sources. This module's quantitative spine — the tertib's flat five per cent on harvest, trees and livestock; the assessment commissions of caïd, shaykh, notable and *adel*; the ten per cent surcharge split six-and-four to caïds and shaykhs and rebated, for Europeans, to the Chambers of Agriculture; the 1952 division of four billion francs paid by Moroccans against five hundred and ninety-three million by Europeans, roughly seven to one; Ayache's 2.5 per cent against 2.1 per cent of sectoral production and Hatton's caution about it; the Directorate of Finances note of 21 November 1951 on the tertib being heavier than the metropolitan burden; the relief granted in the 1950s to Europeans and to modernising Moroccans; the patente yielding eight to twenty times less than in France with the Casablanca and Marseille worked examples; the absence of taxes on securities, income and inheritance; the roughly five per cent of national income and two-thirds indirect weighting with customs at forty-three per cent of receipts in 1956; and the *prestation* of 1924 replacing the corvée, due from adult male heads of household, dischargeable in kind, with merchants, soldiers and certain officials exempt — is drawn from Mohamed Motea's study of direct taxation under the protectorate in the *Revue des études multidisciplinaires en sciences économiques et sociales* (2017), which draws in turn on Georges Hatton's *Les enjeux financiers et économiques du Protectorat marocain* and Albert Ayache's *Le Maroc : bilan d'une colonisation*. This is modern scholarship and is paraphrased throughout; the figures within it are as it reports them from the 1952 statistical yearbook and from Hatton, and the seven-to-one and 2.5-versus-2.1 readings are both given because the sources genuinely differ on how to read the same data. The declared aim of the fiscal designers — to build a system that would not discourage but maximally favour the investor — and the framing question of whether the Moroccan taxpayer paid for the European and the less rich for

the more rich, are Motea's, and I have quoted the sense of the designers' aim rather than any words, since the phrasing reaches me only in the historian's French summary.

The two attitudes of admiration quoted in that study — François Pietri's 1917 praise of the renovated tertib as a fiscal monument, and Jacques Berque's description of the tax in *Le Maroc entre deux guerres* — I have deliberately not reproduced, because both are twentieth-century copyrighted texts reaching me at second hand; Pietri's remark is noted here only as evidence that the tax's designers were proud of it, and Berque's judgement that its assessment was as equitable as the country and period allowed is paraphrased as the counter-view it is.

On the phosphates, the OCP's public status and monopoly and Lyautey's stated motive follow the sources given in Module 2, supplemented by the Office's own published history and by the mining-history literature on the Khouribga company town (the Taylorist labour regime, the autonomous mining centres). The single most damaging detail — that when the Khouribga power-station workers won recognition, a staff statute and the eight-hour day, Moroccan workers were not affected by these achievements — is quoted in sense from the OCP Group's own official history timeline; because it is the company's self-description of its early labour practice it is unusually reliable as an admission, but it is a modern corporate text and I have rendered its substance rather than its exact words. The detail of miners selling on their corporate identity documents to control their own mobility is from the Birmingham "modern and contemporary" research note on North African phosphate and is paraphrased. Production dates (Khouribga 1921, Youssoufia 1932) are from the OCP corporate record and the Oxford handbook chapter on the industry; I have made no claim about interwar tonnages or the phosphates' precise share of state revenue beyond "one of the

largest single sources," because the figures I found for the 1930s were not consistent enough to state, and the seventeen-per-cent figure cited loosely in Module 2 should be verified against the protectorate budgets before it is repeated.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 7 · INFORMATION & SUPPRESSION

COMMENTARY ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION, CENSORED

Module 7 · Information and Suppression — a press law that made a Frenchman the condition of a newspaper, a censorship that left the white spaces where the articles had been so that the reader learned exactly where the news had been taken from him, and a mosque network the coloniser could neither read nor silence, so that what was hidden inside Morocco escaped through the one channel he had left in Moroccan hands

The seam, and where distance cuts it

The framework's information problem, in a colony, is the seam split in two by distance: what is hidden from the metropole is what the conquered live, and the order's core task is keeping the two ends from meeting. Morocco makes the seam unusually legible, because it ran along the Mediterranean, and because the party best placed to carry information across it was the party the coloniser had bound himself to preserve.

There were, in fact, two seams to keep shut. The first was the ordinary colonial one, between what happened in Morocco and what was believed in France. The second was internal, between what the Residency knew and what Moroccans were permitted to know about their own country. This module is the account of both, and of the single channel that defeated them

— a channel the earlier modules have already named without drawing the conclusion.

The condition of a newspaper

The instrument at the metropolitan seam was the press dahir of 1914, and its central provision is the one to hold onto, because it is the whole colonial theory of information compressed into a nationality requirement.

The dahir required that the director of any publication be of French nationality. Not that the paper be licensed, or its content approved, or its printer registered — those came too — but that the human being legally responsible for it be French. The consequence was exact and intended: a Moroccan could not, in his own country, be the responsible head of a newspaper. The nationalists, when they arrived, had two options and only two: find a Frenchman sympathetic to their cause to stand as sponsor, or go underground. There was no third path, because the third path — a Moroccan running a Moroccan paper for Moroccan readers — was the one the law existed to close.

Recall Module 2’s boundary. A European in Morocco could become French by the naturalisation decrees of 1920 and 1921; a Moroccan could not become anything but a Moroccan subject. The press law took that boundary and made it the frontier of public speech: the qualification to address the public in print was a nationality that every settler could acquire and no Moroccan could approach. The same line that sorted the land and the tax sorted the right to be heard.

So the young Saïd Hajji, sixteen years old, chose the second path in 1929 and produced *Al-Widad*, a handwritten weekly in Arabic, passed through the alleys of the medinas by hand. A newspaper reduced to a manuscript circulated in the dark is the press law working as designed — and it is also the first

sign that the design would fail, because a text that cannot be printed can still be copied, and a channel that cannot be licensed cannot be closed by refusing a licence.

The white spaces

The instrument at the internal seam was censorship, and Morocco produced from it one of the most self-defeating artefacts in the whole colonial record.

The legal ground was the state of siege, applied almost without interruption from the beginning of the protectorate, under which there was no more freedom of the press than there was freedom of assembly or freedom of movement — the three closures of Module 5 extended to speech. Under it the nationalist papers, when they were allowed to appear at all, were submitted systematically to prior censorship. And the censor did his work by excision, cutting the forbidden articles out before the paper went to press.

But he left the holes. A French observer described the result: beneath the masthead the page stood almost blank, with only brief inscriptions in small type where the articles should have been — *commentary on the new Constitution, censored; commentary on the new dahirs, censored* — censored, censored, down the column, and the same strange layout in the Arabic-language sister paper.

Consider what that page does. It was meant to suppress information, and it suppressed the articles. But it published, in their place, a precise index of the suppression: it told every reader exactly how many things he was not being allowed to know, on exactly which subjects, on exactly which days. The humiliating censorship had ended, in the observer’s own judgement, by signalling in negative to Moroccans the existence of important information concerning them; the blanks were not explicit, but they were at least signals. A

reader who saw “commentary on the new dahirs, censored” learned three things at once — that there were new dahirs, that there was a commentary on them, and that the Residency was afraid of it. The censor had built, at his own expense, a reliable weekly bulletin of where the news was.

This is the seam failing in the act of being defended. An order that hides its information can leave the citizen ignorant; an order that visibly *removes* information leaves him informed of the removal, which is often the more mobilising fact. After 1952, when the nationalist papers were simply banned outright, the French observer noted the ban’s one advantage: it removed the ambiguity. The white spaces had been worse for the Residency than either speech or silence, because they were a confession printed under the paper’s own masthead.

The apparatus that read the country

Behind the press law and the censor stood the machinery that made them enforceable, and its shape is recoverable from the archives it left.

The protectorate’s control apparatus — the *contrôle*, the network of regional and local control officers with their *bureaux des renseignements*, their *mokhaznis*, their *chaouchs* — kept the population under a surveillance whose categories are preserved in the inventory of its own files: control of the population, censorship of the press, the struggle against propaganda, regulation of movement, confidential correspondence at departure and arrival, nominal dossiers on Moroccan chiefs, surveillance of former Moroccan soldiers, intelligence bulletins on the Istiqlal party. That is not the filing of a state confident of its subjects’ consent. It is the filing of an occupation, and the framework’s reading of it is the one Module 4 already reached: surveillance is the tell of a belief that never took. The order that had rented the ordinary

Moroccan's obedience through the Sultan's seal still found it necessary to keep nominal dossiers on his chiefs and to open his confidential mail, because the belief it was borrowing was not its own and it knew the loan could be recalled.

And the reach of the apparatus is measured, precisely, by what it could not read.

The channel it could not read

Every earlier module in this study has deposited a piece of the same fact, and this is where they are added up.

Module 3 found that France published its own doctrine exclusively in French, for a French audience, and left the pulpit alone. Module 4 found that France withdrew from the formation of Moroccans and left the field to the Qarawiyyin, the *msid* and the free schools — and that when the Berber Dahir was promulgated in 1930, the answer came back in five weeks as the *Latif* recited simultaneously in mosques from Salé to Fez, a communications network reaching every town in the country, with a guaranteed weekly audience, requiring no printing press, no licence and no money. Module 5 found that France kept the budget and the army and left religion to the Makhzen. Add them: the one medium in Morocco that could reach the whole population, every week, in a language and setting the Residency could neither license nor censor nor staff with informers, was the one the coloniser had deliberately declined to touch.

The press law could make a Frenchman the condition of a newspaper. It could do nothing about a sermon. The censor could leave white spaces in *L'Action du Peuple*. He could not leave white spaces in the Friday *khutba*, because there was no page to cut and no French official in the room. The state of siege could forbid assembly. It could not forbid the assembly that five daily prayers and one weekly sermon required of

every Muslim as a religious duty, because forbidding *that* would have been the assault on Islam that the whole protectorate was constructed to avoid appearing to commit.

So the order had, running through the middle of it, a national information network that was immune to every instrument it possessed, for the exact reason that made the order cheap in the first place. France held Morocco so inexpensively because it borrowed the Sultan's religious authority to carry its commands. The same religious authority carried, on the same wires, everything said against it — and France could not cut the wires without destroying the thing that made the borrowing possible. The cheapness and the leak were the same feature seen twice.

When the seams were tested: 1930, 1934, 1937

The dates line up, and read together they show the information system failing in a particular direction — outward and upward, from mosque to street to metropole to the wider Arab world.

In 1930 the Berber Dahir was answered through the mosque network, as Module 4 recorded, and the protest ran through the whole Arab world; the Residency could not stop it. That is the first demonstration that information hidden inside Morocco could escape through a channel France did not control, and escape internationally.

In December 1934 the Comité d'Action Marocaine — the urban, educated, French-formed nationalists whose making Module 4 traced — came out of clandestinity and presented a *Plan de Réformes marocaines*. Its demands are worth noticing for what they were not: not independence, but a return to the indirect rule the Treaty of Fez had promised, the admission of Moroccans to government posts, representative councils, fiscal equality between colon and fellah, the French labour code for

Moroccan workers. The plan was drafted in Arabic and translated into French by its own authors — the mirror image of the Berber Dahir, which had been drafted in French and translated into Arabic for the Sultan to sign. The party that had to translate its demands into the rulers' language was demanding to be governed by the treaty the rulers had signed. There was no response.

By early 1937 the CAM had perhaps six thousand five hundred members and thirty-two sections, and was drawing in urban workers, artisans and the rural migrants Module 5 watched pile up at the edge of the European cities. The Residency dissolved it on 18 March 1937. It reconstituted itself within a month as the Parti National. And then, in September 1937, the flashpoint came at Meknès — over water. The colons of the Meknès plain had diverted water from the Oued Boufekrane to irrigate settler farms, and the Moroccan quarter rose. The disturbances spread; the repression followed; and Resident-General Noguès ordered the arrest and exile of the two principal leaders, Allal al-Fassi to Gabon for nine years, Mohamed Hassan Ouazzani to the Moroccan south.

Hold the Meknès detail against the whole study, because it is the seam made physical. The settlement of Module 2 had transferred the land; the extraction of Module 6 had been built around not discouraging the investor; and here the mechanism reached the one resource a farmer cannot do without and cannot be made to share by a flat tax. The water that had run to Moroccan fields ran to European ones, and the population that had absorbed the land law and the tax code without a general rising rose over the river. What could be hidden in a registry could not be hidden in a dry irrigation ditch. Some information the order could censor. This kind wrote itself on the ground.

Reading information against the framework

Four refinements, of which the second is the one this case exists to add.

The first concerns the boundary of speech. The press dahir of 1914 did not censor content in the first instance; it fixed a nationality as the precondition of publishing, and thereby closed public print to the entire native population by the same device that Module 2 used to close citizenship. The refinement: where an order has already drawn a status line that no native can cross, it need not build a separate apparatus to control native speech — it can simply make the uncrossable status the qualification for speaking, and the existing caste boundary does the censorship for free. Look, in any such order, for the point where the right to be heard is pinned to the one status the subject population cannot attain; that pin, not the censor's pencil, is the primary control.

The second is the white-space finding, and it generalises. Censorship by visible excision converts suppression into signal. The order that cuts an article but leaves the gap has told the reader that something existed, mattered, and frightened the authority — three pieces of information that the article itself might not have conveyed so sharply. The refinement for the framework: suppression has two failure modes, not one. It fails by being evaded, which every order expects; but it also fails by being *seen*, and visible suppression is self-documenting, publishing an index of the ruler's fears under the ruler's own imprimatur. An order that must censor is therefore driven toward total prohibition — the 1952 outright ban — precisely because partial, visible censorship informs against it. The white space is more dangerous than the article, and this is why censorship, once begun, cannot stably stop halfway.

The third is the central structural finding, and it is the one every prior module was depositing material toward. The feature that made the Moroccan order cheap — its rule through a preserved religious sovereign, its deliberate abstention from the pulpit — was identically the feature that made it leak. The mosque network was immune to the press law, the censor, the state of siege and the informer, not despite being religious but because it was, and because the whole apparatus of cheap rule depended on not appearing to attack the religion that ran through it. The refinement: in an order that rules by borrowing a belief, the borrowed belief's own communications infrastructure is uncontrollable in exact proportion to the order's dependence on it, because the instruments that could close it are the instruments that would dissolve the borrowing. A conqueror who rents a faith to rule cheaply thereby grants that faith a broadcast channel he cannot jam, and the discount and the vulnerability are one and the same thing, priced once and paid twice.

The fourth is an observation for the modules ahead. The information that escaped Morocco escaped upward and outward — into the Arab world in 1930, into a formal reform document addressed to Paris in 1934, into international attention repeatedly. The seam France most needed to hold was not the internal one, between the Residency and the Moroccan street, which the mosque had already defeated; it was the metropolitan one, between Morocco and a French public that had been arguing since Ferry and Clemenceau about whether any of this could be called civilisation. Module 10 will find that when that upper seam finally tore — when what Moroccans lived became what the metropole was forced to see, and the Sultan himself became the courier — the order had nothing left to close it with, because it had spent forty years censoring the wrong end of the wire.

A note on sources. The core provision of the press dahir of 1914 — that the director or responsible head of a publication be of French nationality, leaving nationalists the alternatives of a sympathetic French sponsor or clandestinity — is drawn from two Moroccan press-history accounts, the Centre Mohamed Hassan Ouazzani's history of the Moroccan press and a university course reproduction, which agree on the substance; the exact wording of the dahir should be taken from the *Bulletin officiel* before it is quoted as law, since both my sources paraphrase it. The story of Saïd Hajji and the handwritten *Al-Widad* of 1929, including the paper's opening declaration of purpose, is from the same accounts; I have paraphrased the declaration rather than quoted it, because the versions I found differ verbally and I could not establish the original wording, and a founding manifesto is exactly the kind of text this collection must quote exactly or not at all.

The account of censorship by visible excision — the near-blank pages under the masthead, the small-type notices "commentary on the new Constitution, censored" and "commentary on the new dahirs, censored," the identical layout in the Arabic sister paper, the state of siege as the legal ground, and the observer's judgement that the blanks signalled in negative the existence of suppressed information — is from an article in *Horizons Maghrébins* reproduced on Persée, written by a French contemporary; the phrasing there is a first-hand recollection and I have rendered its substance in my own words, quoting no more than the two censor's-notice labels, which are themselves the printed words on the page rather than the author's prose. The categories of the control apparatus (control of population, press censorship, struggle against propaganda, regulation of movement, confidential correspondence, nominal dossiers on chiefs, surveillance of former soldiers, Istiqlal intelligence bulletins) are taken verbatim as headings from the French diplomatic

archives' published inventories of the protectorate control-region fonds, which are finding aids rather than the documents themselves.

The nationalist chronology is drawn from standard reference and scholarly sources and paraphrased throughout: the Comité d'Action Marocaine founded and presenting the *Plan de Réformes* on 1 December 1934; the plan drafted in Arabic and translated into French by its authors; its content (return to indirect rule under the Treaty of Fez, admission of Moroccans to posts, representative councils, fiscal equality between colon and fellah, the French labour code for Moroccan workers); the membership of about 6,500 and thirty-two sections by early 1937; the dissolution of 18 March 1937 and the reconstitution as the Parti National; the split between al-Fassi's and Ouazzani's factions; and the arrests and exiles ordered by Noguès after the disturbances of September 1937, al-Fassi to Gabon for nine years and Ouazzani to the Moroccan south. The Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East entry on the CAM, the Cairn article on al-Fassi and Ouazzani in exile, and the standard country histories are the sources; where they differ on the membership figure and the precise sequence of the 1936–37 arrests I have followed the fullest account and flagged nothing as certain that they dispute.

The Meknès disturbances of September 1937 and their origin in the diversion of water from the Oued Boufekrane to settler farms are reported here from the country-history literature and the biographical accounts of al-Fassi; this is the single load-bearing factual claim of the module's penultimate section and it reached me through secondary summary rather than through a contemporary source, so the specific cause — the water diversion — should be confirmed against a detailed account of the 1937 events before the "seam made physical" reading is relied on further. The framing of al-Fassi's role at

Meknès varies sharply by source between political leadership and incitement to violence, and I have deliberately reported only the uncontested facts (disturbances, repression, arrest, exile) and left the characterisation out.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 8 · ELITE COORDINATION & THE DEFAULT

THREE HUNDRED CAÏDS AND TWENTY-THREE PASHAS

Module 8 · Elite Coordination and the Default — a hierarchy of nested positions in which each man defending his own place defended the whole arrangement without intending to, held together not by loyalty or belief but by the plainest self-interest, until the day the topmost collaborators used the machine to reach the one position it could not touch — and discovered that in doing so they had cut the belief the entire stack stood on

The question this module answers

The ordinary Moroccan's compliance was settled in Module 5: it ran on a religious obligation the protectorate had rented through the Sultan's seal, priced by his own community at no cost to France. But the ordinary Moroccan was the bottom of a hierarchy, and a hierarchy does not hold because its base is quiet. It holds because the men above the base — the ones with power, land, office and armed followers, the ones who could actually have broken the arrangement — did not.

This module is about them, and about why they didn't. The framework's answer is that a settled order needs no conspiracy, because it is built so that each position-holder,

defending his own place for the most ordinary reason there is, defends the whole arrangement by default. The value of Morocco to that framework is that its hierarchy was unusually explicit — a visible stack of named offices, each holding the one below and held by the one above — so that the default can be watched working, and then watched breaking, with a clarity the corpus has not previously had.

The stack

Set the positions out from the top, because the nesting is the argument.

At the apex, the Resident-General, holder of all the powers of the Republic in Morocco, who proposed everything and signed everything a second time. Beneath him, but formally above him, the Sultan, who signed everything first and proposed nothing — the source of every dahir's legitimacy and the holder of none of its power. Beneath both, the French *contrôle*: the regional and local control officers, the *bureaux des renseignements*, the administrators who ran the machine day to day. Parallel to them, and reaching where they could not, the Moroccan officialdom the protectorate governed through — the pashas of the cities and the caïds of the tribes, the men who collected the tertib, judged the *justice makhzen*, and kept the countryside.

And towering over that officialdom, a handful of great lords whose power predated the French and whom the French found it far cheaper to employ than to break: the grand caïds of the south, the Glaoui, the Mtouggi, the Goundafi, and above all Thami El Glaoui, pasha of Marrakech from 1912 to his death in 1956, whom the sources by the 1930s call the third power in Morocco after the Sultan and the Resident.

Each of these positions was held by a man whose interest lay in keeping it. And here is the mechanism the framework

names: to keep his position, each had to defend the position above and below him, because they held each other up. The caïd who wanted to keep collecting the tertib needed the pasha who appointed him, the *contrôle* that backed him, and the Sultan whose seal made his authority lawful. The pasha needed the Resident. The Resident needed the Sultan's signature to make the whole thing legal. El Glaoui needed the French to hold Marrakech against the Sultan's growing appeal, and the French needed El Glaoui to hold the south at a price no French garrison could match. No one in the stack had to believe in the arrangement. Each had only to defend his own place — and in defending it, defend the men who held the places touching his, and so, by default, the whole.

Why they did not have to like each other

The framework's sharpest claim is that this coordination requires no affection and survives real antagonism, and Morocco is its proof, because the antagonisms in this stack were severe and the coordination held anyway for forty years.

El Glaoui did not love the French; he used them, as they used him. The relationship was, in the phrase one account fixes on, for mutual benefit — decisive support to Lyautey in exchange for the stabilisation of a power the Glaoui had built before the French arrived and would extend under them. The Sultan did not love the Resident who countersigned his every act and could depose him, as Abd al-Hafid had been deposed in 1912 and would be again. The caïds did not love the *contrôle* officers who watched them. The urban notables who took French education and French posts did not, in the main, love the settlers who took the land. This was not a band of brothers. It was a set of men in adjacent positions, each of whom found that his own interest was best served by not pulling down the structure that held his place — which is

exactly the condition the framework says a durable order requires, and exactly the reason it called the mechanism *default* rather than loyalty. Loyalty can be withdrawn. Default has to be actively overcome, against one's own interest, and most men most of the time will not do it.

The tension was real and it was continuous. What the arrangement did was make the tension non-load-bearing. Two men could despise each other across the boundary of their positions and still, each morning, do the thing that reproduced the order, because each morning the thing that reproduced the order was also the thing that secured his own place. The framework's word for what the cynic sees when he looks at this and imagines a conspiracy is the right one: what looks like a cabal is the convergence of separate ledgers that happen to read the same way.

It was not black and white

The framework insists, and this study must hold, that reading the elite through position is not the same as calling them villains, and that some arrangements within the stack were better made than others. Morocco requires this qualification more than most cases, because its collaborating elite has been flattened by later memory into a single word — treason — and the flattening is a failure of analysis, not a moral achievement.

Consider the range. The urban nationalists of Module 4 and Module 7 — Balafrej, al-Fassi, Ouazzani, Lyazidi — were themselves elite, French-formed, positioned, and they used their positions to demand that the protectorate keep the treaty it had signed: fiscal equality, the labour code, the return to indirect rule. That is a position-holder defending an arrangement he wanted made better, from inside. Consider the caïd who collected the tertib and also, within the room the system left him, protected his tribe's collective land from the

settlement perimeters — the record of Module 3 shows the administration itself sometimes doing this against colon appetite. Consider El Glaoui, whom the older histories painted as a black character and whom recent scholarship has begun to weigh more subtly, noting that his alliances and his politics were the calculations of a man steering his own survival and his region's through a half-century, not the cartoon of a traitor. None of this excuses the extraction, the exile of nationalists, or the deposition to come. But the framework's discipline is exact here: the position-holder defends the arrangement whether sincere or cynical, and the outcome is the same, so the analyst reads the position and lets the heart alone — which means neither hating the man nor absolving the structure. Legibility is not pardon, and it is not condemnation either. It is measurement.

What made this particular stack durable, in the framework's terms, was that its positions were genuinely well aligned — each man's interest really did run with the whole for four decades, because the arrangement had been built, deliberately, to make defection cost more than compliance at every level. That is not a moral fact about the men. It is an engineering fact about the order. Orders that last tend to have their positions aligned like this; orders whose positions fall out of alignment do not last. The rest of this module is the story of the alignment failing at the very top.

The default in one document: February 1953

Everything the framework predicts is visible in a single episode, and it is worth telling precisely, because it shows the default holding and breaking in the same act.

By 1950 the Sultan, Mohammed ben Youssef, had aligned himself with the nationalists — receiving the Istiqlal, withholding his seal from decrees he opposed, using the one

power the arrangement had left in Moroccan hands, the power of legitimacy, against the arrangement itself. This was intolerable to two sets of position-holders at once. It was intolerable to the French, whose entire machine ran on his signature. And it was intolerable to El Glaoui and the great caïds, whose power was regional and feudal and whose subjects were beginning, under the nationalists' influence, to regard that power as obsolete — for a Sultan who spoke for the nation threatened to make the grand caïd, who spoke only for his tribe, into a relic.

So the ledgers converged, exactly as the framework says they do under threat. In February 1953 El Glaoui assembled the coordination: a petition calling for the Sultan's removal, signed — the figures the sources give — by around three hundred caïds and twenty-three fellow pashas. This is the convergence that looks like a cabal and is not; it is three hundred and twenty-three separate position-holders, each of whose place was threatened by the same nationalist Sultan, each signing to defend his own, and the sum reading as a conspiracy because the threat was common. El Glaoui did not have to persuade three hundred caïds to betray Morocco. He had only to show three hundred caïds that a nationalist Sultan endangered three hundred caïdal positions, which was true.

On 20 August 1953 the French Resident had Mohammed ben Youssef seized and deported — first to Corsica, then to Madagascar — and installed an elderly and pliable kinsman, Ben Arafa, in his place. The stack had reached up and removed the man at its own apex. The default had worked perfectly: every position-holder, defending his place, had converged on the removal of the threat to all their places.

The act that cut the ground from under the actors

And in the same motion, the arrangement destroyed itself — not through any external blow, but because the coordination had struck at the one position the whole stack stood on, and the men who struck did not understand what they were standing on.

The entire order, from the Resident down to the caïd, was legitimate only through the Sultan. That was the discovery of Module 1 and Module 5: France ruled cheaply because every act bore the seal of the Commander of the Faithful, and the ordinary Moroccan obeyed because obedience to that office was owed to God. Depose the man, and you do not simply change the signature. You demonstrate, to every Muslim in the country, that the office is not sacred but disposable — that the Commander of the Faithful can be picked up by unbelievers and carried off to an island, and a substitute stamped in his place. The seal that had made French rule lawful in Moroccan eyes became, overnight, the seal of a puppet installed by Christians over the deposed descendant of the Prophet.

El Glaoui's own son gave the exact diagnosis afterward, and it is the framework's point in a sentence: the great mistake of his father and the associated pashas and caïds was that, unlike Mohammed V, they simply failed to realise that by 1950 Moroccan society had evolved to a stage where their kind of authority was no longer acceptable to their subjects. The grand caïd had read the country as it had been in 1907, when he had helped depose a sultan to popular indifference. He had not noticed that the nationalists of Modules 4 and 7 had, in the intervening decades, made the Sultan into something new — the person of the nation — using precisely the mosque network and the free schools that France had left in Moroccan hands. He defended his position by the logic that had always

worked, and the logic had gone stale under him without his seeing it.

The deposed Sultan became, in exile, exactly what the deposition had accidentally crowned him: the living symbol of the nation, his face reported seen in the moon, his return the single demand around which a diffuse discontent hardened into a unified movement. The convergence of the position-holders, which the framework says assembles under threat and dissolves when the threat recedes, had this time done something it usually cannot — it had converted the threat into a martyr, and the martyr into a rallying point that no further convergence could dissolve.

Reading the default against the framework

Four refinements, and the sharpest attention of this study belongs to the third.

The first concerns the visibility of the mechanism. The framework developed the default largely through the modern liberal-democratic case, where the nesting of positions is abstract — defend your wealth, you defend property, you defend the constitution — and no one can point to the links. Morocco supplies the same mechanism in concrete, named offices: caïd held by pasha held by Resident, all made lawful by Sultan, each man's tenure literally dependent on the tenure of the men above and below. The refinement is methodological: a colonial hierarchy of explicit offices is the default rendered visible, a working model of the abstract mechanism, and the corpus should use such cases to demonstrate to sceptics what the privileged-position-of-business argument asserts but cannot show — that the structure reproduces itself through nested self-interest with no one intending the whole.

The second concerns antagonism. The Moroccan stack proves the framework's claim that the default survives mutual

dislike, because this stack was riddled with it — Sultan against Resident, caïd against *contrôle*, notable against settler, El Glaoui against everyone including at moments the French — and coordinated anyway for forty years. The refinement: the durability of an order is not measured by the harmony of its elite but by the alignment of their positions, and these are different variables. An order whose elite love each other but whose positions have fallen out of alignment is fragile; an order whose elite despise each other but whose positions remain locked together is robust. Affection is noise. Alignment is signal. Read the alignment.

The third is the one this case exists to add, and it is a genuine extension of the framework, not merely an application. The default has a blind spot, and the blind spot is lethal precisely to the men best served by the default. Because each position-holder defends only his own place, and defends the whole *only as a by-product*, no one in the stack is charged with defending the load-bearing member as such — the belief the entire structure rests on. Each man treats that belief as a constant, a given, part of the furniture, because from inside his own position it always has been. So when the convergence fires under threat, it optimises for the sum of the separate positions and is structurally blind to the shared foundation. In Morocco the shared foundation was the sacredness of the Sultan’s office, and the converging position-holders spent it to defend their places — cashing in the one asset that made all their places possible, because no single ledger had that asset entered on it. The refinement for the framework: the default reproduces an order effortlessly under normal conditions but cannot protect its own foundation under threat, because the foundation is the one thing that is everyone’s support and no one’s position. An order held together purely by nested self-interest is therefore exposed to a specific catastrophe — that its own beneficiaries, converging rationally to defend

themselves, will destroy the thing they all depend on, precisely because it is common to all of them and the property of none. The machine that runs itself cannot, by the same token, defend itself, when defence requires someone to value the whole above his part.

The fourth follows from the third and points to the collapse module. The lever that moves a settled order, the framework says, is the re-pricing of positions. Morocco shows a rarer and faster mechanism: not the gradual re-pricing of positions from outside, but the sudden revelation that a position everyone had priced as permanent — the Sultan's, and behind it every position that depended on it — had been re-priced by the elite's own hand. After August 1953 the caïd's position was no longer worth what it had been, not because anyone had raised the cost of holding it, but because the legitimacy that made it worth holding had been publicly shown to be forfeit. The elite had re-priced their own positions to zero by spending the thing that valued them. Module 10 will trace what a country does when its rulers have done the revolutionaries' work for them.

A note on sources. This module quotes no primary text, and the reason is worth stating: the load-bearing documents — El Glaoui's petition of February 1953, the dahirs of deposition and installation, the *contrôle* correspondence — I have not been able to consult in facsimile, and the collection's discipline forbids me to reconstruct their wording. Where the argument needs a figure, I give it as the secondary sources give it and flag the softness. The claim that around three hundred caïds and twenty-three pashas signed the 1953 petition is reported in these round numbers by several encyclopaedic and reference accounts descending from a common source, and should be treated as an order of magnitude and verified against the archival petition before it is repeated as exact; the

direction — a large convergence of caïdal and pashalik position-holders — is not in doubt, but the precise count is a single-sourced figure wearing the appearance of precision.

The narrative of El Glaoui's career and the 1953 deposition is drawn from standard reference and scholarly accounts and paraphrased throughout: his tenure as pasha of Marrakech 1912–1956; his standing by the 1930s as the third power after Sultan and Resident; the alliance with Lyautey characterised as mutual benefit; the rupture with Mohammed ben Youssef from 1950–51; the February 1953 petition; the deposition and exile of the Sultan on 20 August 1953 to Corsica and then Madagascar; the installation of Ben Arafa; and El Glaoui's recantation and submission in 1955 followed by his death in January 1956 with much of his wealth confiscated. Susan Gilson Miller's history of modern Morocco is the principal modern authority relied on; the revisionist weighing of El Glaoui's reputation follows recent scholarship, including the work summarised in the Israeli research-community portal entry, which explicitly notes the movement from "black character" to a more complex assessment. The diagnosis attributed to El Glaoui's son Abdessadeq — that the fatal error was failing to see that by 1950 Moroccan society no longer accepted their kind of authority — is quoted in sense (not verbatim) from reference accounts citing him, and is important enough to the module's central refinement that it should be traced to Abdessadeq's own published words before it is relied on further; I have paraphrased rather than quoted it precisely because I could not confirm the original wording.

The report that the exiled Sultan's face was said to be seen in the moon is given as popular memory, widely attested in the independence-era literature and treated here as a datum about belief rather than a claim about the sky. All framework language — the default, the nested positions, convergence-not-conspiracy, position-not-sincerity, the re-pricing of positions —

is from *By Default* and the field manual, and the third refinement (that the default cannot defend its own foundation, because the foundation is everyone's support and no one's position) is this module's proposed contribution back to that paper.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 9 · PLURALITY OR FORECLOSURE

IN THEORY THE POWERS OF THE SULTAN WERE UNRESTRAINED

Module 9 · Plurality or Foreclosure — an order in which the three monopolies were held so completely in one hand that even the settlers who ran the economy were given no assembly of their own, the one caste that held real counterweights next door here held almost none, and the single contestable channel left in the whole realm was the one France had rented to rule with — the sacred authority of a sovereign who could withdraw it

The master question, and why Morocco answers it strangely

This is the module the field manual marks, with Module 8, for the sharpest attention, because it holds the variable on which liberty actually turns. The question, stripped down, is capture against contestability at the scale of the whole realm: are violence, wealth and trusted information held in one coalition's hand, or genuinely separated into hands that can check one another? Plurality is the name for the second condition. The manual instructs the analyst to ask not merely whether an order is plural but *plural where* and *foreclosed where* — because an order can be contestable at its core and foreclosed at its edge.

Algeria answered that instruction by splitting the realm into two castes on one soil: a genuinely free order for the

European, a wholly foreclosed one for the Muslim, and — the finding that made the case sharp — the settler's liberty was the very instrument of the Muslim's foreclosure, because the free settler press and the elected settler assemblies were used, above all, to veto every metropolitan attempt to open the order to the Muslim.

Morocco answers the same instruction differently, and the difference is the whole module. Here the foreclosure did not stop at the caste line. It ran up past it. The Muslim majority was foreclosed, as expected — but so, at the level that mattered, was the European settler, who in Algeria held the counterweights and in Morocco was handed almost none. The three monopolies in Morocco were gathered into a single hand more completely than in any other case this collection has run, because the protectorate form allowed the apex to withhold representation from *everyone* on the ground that the country was already governed by its own sovereign. And that near-total capture had one crack in it, in an unexpected place — and the crack was the very thing the order had rented to make itself cheap.

The order with no assembly

Begin with the fact that is easiest to miss because it is an absence. Morocco under the protectorate had no legislature. None — not a foreclosed one for the Muslim and a free one for the settler, as in Algeria, but none at all, for anyone, for the whole life of the protectorate. The old Moroccan consultative body, the Majlis, was dissolved in 1913 under the Treaty of Fez. In its place stood the Resident-General, holder of all the powers of the Republic, who proposed the dahirs, and the Sultan, who signed them. Britannica's summary of the constitutional record is exact and worth setting down flat: in the constitutional field there had been virtually no

development, and though the government was in practice under French supervision, in theory the powers of the Sultan were unrestrained.

Read that sentence through the three monopolies. The monopoly on violence was French — the Army of Africa, the goums, the Legion of Modules 1. The monopoly on wealth was French-directed — the settlement, the registry, the mines, the tax code of Modules 2 and 6, with the great caïds and urban families holding their share strictly at the apex's pleasure. And the monopoly on trusted information ran through the Sultan's seal and the Sultan's sermon, held by the Makhzen but operated, through the countersignature, by France. All three legs of the tripod stood in or under a single hand, and no institution existed through which any of the three could be checked by a body the apex did not control. There was no elected council with a budget, no independent legislature, no court that could find against the Residency on a matter of state, no assembly of any kind with the power to say no. The signature of capture that the manual names — the same hand holding violence and wealth and the trusted channel together, every rival silenced or bought — is present in Morocco in almost laboratory purity.

The caste that held counterweights next door — and not here

The strangest part of the Moroccan settlement is what it did to the settler, and it is strange precisely because Algeria set the expectation.

In Algeria the European was the free man of a plural order: a raucous press, elected mayors and *conseils généraux*, the *Délégations financières* that gave settlers control of the colony's budget from 1898, deputies and senators in the

French Parliament, and the *parti colonial* lobby powerful enough to break a governor. Those were real counterweights, and the settlers proved their reality by using them to foreclose the Muslim.

In Morocco the European had almost none of this. There was a settler press, and it was loud — *La Vigie Marocaine*, *L'Écho du Maroc*, the papers of the Mas group — and it functioned, as the settler press did everywhere, as a lobby, pressing Paris and pressing the Residency. From 1919 there were regional Chambers of Agriculture and Commerce, elected by the French settlers, and these were the vehicle through which the colon interest was expressed. But that was the ceiling. There was no Moroccan parliament for the settlers to sit in, no elected territorial assembly with legislative power, no colonial budget under settler control, no Moroccan deputies in Paris, because Morocco was not France and sent no deputies. The settler could vote for his chamber of commerce. He could not vote for a body that governed the country. When the settlers pressed, from the 1920s, for the political rights their cousins held in Algeria — for a real assembly, for representation with teeth — they were refused, and refused by the same doctrine that governed everything else: Morocco was a sovereign state under its own ruler, and to erect a settler legislature over it would have been to annex it in fact and abandon the protectorate fiction the whole enterprise depended on.

So the settler in Morocco was, in the framework's terms, richer than the Algerian colon and freer in nothing that touched sovereignty. He ran the economy and held no share of the state. He had a newspaper and a chamber of commerce and no vote that reached the country's government. This is a genuine and, for the framework, an important variant: the caste that in the neighbouring case held the plural order's counterweights was, in this case, denied them — not by

accident, but because the protectorate form required the apex to withhold self-government from the Europeans in order to be able to withhold it, on the same principle, from everyone.

Why the apex foreclosed its own settlers

The reason is the deepest structural point in the module, and it follows directly from the default of Module 8.

An apex that grants its settlers a real assembly creates a second centre — a body with a budget, a press, a lobby and a vote, which can and, in Algeria, demonstrably did defy the metropole. Lyautey and his successors had watched that happen next door. The Algerian settler assemblies had made the colony ungovernable from Paris on the question that mattered most, the Muslim's status, by vetoing every reform the metropole proposed. A protectorate built to be governed cheaply from a single Residency could not afford a colon assembly that would do to Rabat what the *Délégations financières* did to Algiers. So the apex kept the settlers propertied and powerless — rich enough to develop the country, unrepresented enough never to become a rival centre.

The consequence is a case in which capture was more complete than in the harsher-looking Algerian one, and the paradox is only apparent. Algeria looks more brutal because it had a visible foreclosed caste and a special penal code; but Algeria was, at the level of the state, *more plural*, because the settler counterweights were real and could and did check Paris. Morocco was gentler on its surface and more captured underneath, because it had ground the counterweights out of both castes and left the three monopolies standing in a single hand with nothing at all to answer them. The manual's warning applies exactly: an order can be plural at its core and foreclosed at its edge — and here the edge had swallowed the core. The lesson the framework should take is that the

gentleness of an order and the concentration of its monopolies are independent variables, and can run in opposite directions. A softer surface concealed a harder capture.

The one crack

And yet the capture was not total, and the place where it cracked is the finding this module contributes, because the crack was in the load-bearing leg, and it had been put there by the apex itself.

Recall what France had done to rule cheaply. It had rented the monopoly on trusted information — not built its own, but leased the existing one, the sacred authority of the Commander of the Faithful, and run its commands through his seal and his sermon. Modules 3, 4, 5 and 7 traced the consequences: France published its own doctrine only to Frenchmen, withheld formation from Moroccans, left the mosque network alone, and thereby left, running through the centre of a near-totally captured order, a single trusted channel it did not own and could not silence without destroying the thing that made its rule cheap.

That channel was the crack in the capture. Every other rival pipeline in Morocco could be handled by the other two monopolies exactly as the framework says: the nationalist press was licensed out of existence by the nationality clause and censored into white spaces; rival wealth was taxed, watched and dependent; rival violence was crushed across twenty-two years. The tripod stood and braced itself in the ordinary way. But the one channel the tripod could not absorb was the one the tripod was leaning on — the Sultan’s own legitimacy, which France had made load-bearing for its own rule and therefore could not silence, buy or clone, because silencing it, buying it or cloning it would collapse the leg the whole structure stood on.

This is why the contestability in Morocco, when it finally appeared, appeared *at the apex* rather than at the base — the reverse of every plural order the framework has examined. In a normal plural order, contestability lives at the edges: a free press, an opposition party, an independent court, checking the centre from outside. In Morocco there were no such edges; they had all been ground away. The only place a check could come from was the one interior position France had left unowned — the Sultan's — and the only person who could operate it was the Sultan himself. The order had foreclosed every exterior channel and left exactly one interior one open, in the hand of the one man it had bound itself by treaty to preserve.

The apex uses its own crack: 1947 and after

The record shows the Sultan discovering, and then using, precisely this.

Mohammed ben Youssef, the boy who had signed the Berber Dahir in 1930 and watched the country answer it through the mosques, learned the lesson the mosques taught. From the mid-1940s he began to operate the one uncaptured channel. In the Manifesto of Independence of January 1944 the nationalists asked him to lead; on 10 April 1947, in a speech at Tangier, he publicly affirmed Morocco's bonds to the Arab East and its aspiration to sovereignty, pointedly omitting the customary tribute to the protectorate; in a memorandum of 11 October 1950 he pressed Paris directly. He began to withhold his seal from dahirs he opposed — using the countersignature machinery of Module 8 in reverse, refusing the signature that made French acts lawful. He was, in the exact language of the three monopolies, exercising the one leg of the tripod that France had rented rather than owned, and discovering that a rented leg can be reclaimed by its owner.

France's response reveals how completely it understood the stakes, because France did the one thing that could not be recovered from: in August 1953 it removed the man, deposed the Commander of the Faithful, and installed the puppet Ben Arafa. Module 8 read that act as the elite converging to defend their positions and, in doing so, spending the foundation. Read through the monopolies, it is the same event from the other face: the apex, unable to silence the one uncaptured channel by ordinary means, tried to silence it by replacing the man who operated it — and thereby destroyed the trust the channel carried, which was the only thing that had made the channel worth capturing. You cannot clone the Commander of the Faithful. The stamped substitute carried the form of the seal and none of the trust, and the trust was the asset. The load-bearing leg, which France had leaned on for forty years without owning, broke in France's hand at the moment France finally grabbed it.

The belated assemblies, and what they confess

There is a coda that confirms the whole reading by its timing.

Only in 1947, thirty-five years into the protectorate and under the pressure of the nationalist manifesto, did the Residency under Erik Labonne create consultative chambers with Moroccan members, elected in 1947 and 1951 — and even these were, in the record's own judgement, a weak response of the protectorate system to the nationalist demands of 1944. The Istiqlal took three seats in 1947 and boycotted 1951. The gesture toward plurality came only when the order was already failing, was consultative rather than legislative, and was recognised on all sides as a manoeuvre rather than a reform.

The timing is the confession. For thirty-five years the order had needed no assembly, because the three monopolies sat

unchallenged in one hand and the single uncaptured channel had not yet been turned against it. The moment that channel was turned — the moment the Sultan began to operate his own legitimacy against the Residency — the apex suddenly discovered a use for consultative chambers, which is to say for the appearance of plurality. An order reaches for the forms of contestability exactly when it has lost the substance, and Morocco's belated, toothless, boycotted chambers are the framework's proposition rendered as a date.

Reading plurality against the framework

Four refinements, and the third is the one that earns this module its place beside Module 8.

The first concerns the relation between the gentleness of an order and the concentration of its monopolies. The framework, and the Algerian case, might invite the assumption that a harsher order is a more captured one. Morocco refutes it. Morocco was gentler than Algeria on the surface — no *indigénat*, no wholesale land clearance, a preserved sovereign, a conserved medina — and more completely captured underneath, because it had denied the counterweights of a plural order to both castes, including the settler caste that held them next door. The refinement: surface gentleness and monopoly-concentration are independent variables, and an order that treats its subjects more mildly may be holding the three monopolies more tightly, not less, because mildness can be the affordable posture of an apex that faces no internal check. Do not read the concentration of power off the cruelty of its exercise. Read it off the number of hands.

The second concerns the settler as a diagnostic. In the plural colonial order the settler is the holder of the counterweights; in the captured one he is not. Morocco shows an apex deliberately foreclosing its own settlers to prevent

them becoming a rival centre, which means the presence or absence of settler self-government is a direct read on how much the apex fears a second hand on the monopolies. The refinement: the political rights an order grants its own privileged caste measure the apex's tolerance for internal rivalry more precisely than the rights it denies its subject caste, because denying the subject caste is expected and cheap, while denying the privileged caste is costly and therefore informative. An apex that will not enfranchise even its own settlers is an apex determined to hold all three monopolies alone.

The third is the central finding, and it is a genuine addition to the three-monopolies synthesis. That synthesis holds that the load-bearing leg — trusted information — is nonetheless the best-defended, because the other two legs stand ready to silence, buy or clone any rival pipeline. Morocco supplies the exception the synthesis did not foresee: a case in which the apex does not *own* the load-bearing leg but *rents* it, and in which the rented leg therefore becomes the one channel the other two cannot defend, because the instruments of defence — silence it, buy it, clone it — would each destroy the trust that made it worth renting. The refinement: when an order economises by leasing its trusted-information monopoly from a prior order rather than building its own, it acquires a leg it cannot protect by the usual means, and thereby writes a single point of contestability into the middle of an otherwise total capture. The cheapness and the vulnerability are, once again, the same feature — but stated now at the level of the whole realm, this is the deepest form of the finding: an order that rents its keystone cannot defend its keystone, and every other completeness of its capture only concentrates the eventual failure onto that one un-owned point. The tripod was total except for the one leg it stood on.

The fourth follows and points to the collapse. Because the only uncaptured channel was interior — the Sultan's own — the contestation of this order came not from a plural society checking the state from outside, but from a single position inside the apex being turned against the rest. Morocco therefore did not democratise its way toward change and was never going to; it had no plural edges to do the work. It changed when the one un-owned interior leg was reclaimed by its owner and then broken by the apex's panic. Module 10 will trace what follows when an order with no exterior contestability at all has its single interior check converted, by the apex's own hand, from a countersignature into a martyr.

A note on sources. This module quotes one line of primary-adjacent text — Britannica's statement that in the constitutional field there had been virtually no development and that in theory the powers of the Sultan were unrestrained — which is a modern reference work and is therefore paraphrased in sense rather than quoted verbatim beyond that clause; the underlying constitutional fact, that the protectorate created no legislature and dissolved the Majlis in 1913 under the Treaty of Fez, is drawn from the Moroccan parliamentary-history literature and is not in dispute. The Algerian comparison — the settler press, the elected *conseils généraux*, the *Délégations financières* controlling the colony's budget from 1898, the parliamentary representation and the *parti colonial* — is carried over from this collection's Algeria study (Module 9) and its cited sources; the specific composition of the *Délégations financières* (forty-eight Europeans against twenty-one Muslim delegates representing 3.6 million people) is from the European University Institute thesis on Algerian access to citizenship and is reproduced here only to establish the contrast, not as a claim about Morocco.

The Moroccan institutional record is drawn from standard reference and scholarly sources and paraphrased throughout: the dissolution of the Majlis in 1913; the absence of any territorial legislature for the protectorate's whole life; the settler Chambers of Agriculture and Commerce from 1919 as the ceiling of colon political expression; the settler press of the Mas group and its lobbying function; the consultative chambers created under Erik Labonne, elected in 1947 and 1951, with Istiqlal taking three seats in 1947 and boycotting 1951; and the judgement that these were a weak response to the 1944 independence manifesto. The nationalist and royal chronology — the Manifesto of Independence of January 1944, the Tangier speech of 10 April 1947, the memorandum of 11 October 1950, the withholding of the seal, and the deposition of August 1953 — follows the sources given in Modules 7 and 8. The claim that the settlers pressed for Algerian-style political rights and were refused on protectorate-doctrine grounds is the module's own synthesis from the institutional record rather than a directly sourced statement of a single settler demand, and it should be strengthened with a specific colon petition or debate before it is relied on as more than a structural inference; the underlying fact that no such rights were granted is certain, but the explicit framing of a settler demand-and-refusal reaches me only as the shape the record implies.

All framework language — capture and contestability, the three monopolies and the load-bearing leg, plural-where and foreclosed-where, the signatures of capture and contestability — is from *The Three Monopolies* and the field manual. The third refinement (that an order which rents rather than owns its trusted-information monopoly acquires a keystone it cannot defend, because silencing, buying or cloning it would each destroy the trust that made it worth renting) is this module's proposed contribution back to that synthesis, and it should be

read together with Module 8’s companion finding that the default cannot defend a foundation that is everyone’s support and no one’s position; the two are the same vulnerability seen from the elite-coordination and the whole-realm angles respectively.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 10 · CHANGE & COLLAPSE

A VIABLE COLLABORATOR

Module 10 · Change and Collapse — an order that fell not because the ruled beat the floor but because its own elite fractured against the one position that held it, then found the floor too expensive to defend once a rival war opened next door, and was driven at last to reinstate the very sovereign it had deposed — because it had destroyed every collaborator but him, and needed one

The question, and the wrong answer

Morocco became independent in 1956, and the story it tells about itself — the story every order tells — is that the people rose and won. The crowds that filled the streets when Mohammed ben Youssef returned in November 1955 were real, their joy was real, and the armed resistance that fought the protectorate's posts was real. But the framework's discipline is to ask a colder question: who actually commanded the organised force that changed the order, and what re-priced their calculation of whether to hold it? And the answer in Morocco is not the crowd. It is the hierarchy above the crowd, moving through the four cracks the framework names — fracture, exhaustion, conquest, overbreeding — of which Morocco ran on the first two, in sequence, with a twist the corpus has not previously recorded.

The common man in Morocco was, as every prior module established, settled — his compliance rented through the

Sultan's seal, priced by his own community, held in place by a religion the protectorate had borrowed rather than broken. Peasants, herders, artisans do not command organised force, and they did not change this order. What changed it was chaos in the tier above them, and the account of that chaos is this module.

The first crack: the elite fractured against its own foundation

The fracture was Module 8's event, and it must be named here in the vocabulary of collapse, because it is the crack from which everything else ran.

In August 1953 the collaborating elite — El Glaoui, the great caïds, the twenty-three pashas, converging with the French and with the theologian al-Kittani — deposed the Sultan and installed Ben Arafa. This was elite fracture in the framework's exact sense: one faction of the apex arming itself against the position that held the whole, and doing so from *inside*, with the Resident's power and the caïds' followers, not through any rising from below. The crowd did not pry this door open. The apex split, and the split ran straight through the load-bearing member.

What makes Morocco's fracture distinctive is that the faction that broke the order was not a reforming faction admitting the people, as in the classic fracture cases where one elite wing arms the commons against the other. It was a *reactionary* faction destroying the order's own foundation in the act of defending its positions. The framework's fracture crack usually opens the settlement outward — the English parliamentary gentry arming the commons, the American planters and merchants arming the militia. Morocco's fracture did the opposite: it did not widen the settlement, it detonated

the keystone. And because the keystone was the sacred legitimacy the whole cheap order rested on, the fracture did not hand the crowd through a door — it manufactured, out of the deposed Sultan, the single unifying symbol the diffuse discontent had until then lacked.

From the deposition the resistance dates its escalation precisely. On 11 September 1953 a man named Allal ben Abdallah tried to kill Ben Arafa. On 24 December 1953 a bomb in the central market at Casablanca killed and wounded scores of Europeans. In 1954 the resistance struck at El Glaoui himself in the Koutoubia mosque in February and at the Resident-General Guillaume in May. The urban terror and the counter-terror of the settler *Présence Française* escalated together through 1954 and 1955. The fracture had converted a settled country into a contested one, and it had done so, exactly as the framework says of every real change, from above — the crowd supplied the fuel, the deposed apex supplied the spark, and no one below the level of the caïds had authored any of it.

The second crack: the floor became too expensive to hold

A fracture alone does not always bring down an order; a determined apex can re-close it. What made the Moroccan fracture terminal was the second crack arriving on top of it — exhaustion — and the exhaustion came not from Morocco but from the rest of the French empire cracking at the same moment.

The dates are the argument. France lost Indochina in 1954; Dien Bien Phu fell in May of that year. The Algerian war began on 1 November 1954. And Morocco's own armed resistance, the Armée de Libération, launched its first operations on 2 October 1955 — in the mountains north of Taza, near the Algerian frontier, in country where, as the resistance noted

with satisfaction, neither French aircraft nor French tanks could easily operate.

Read that geography through the cost column. France was now facing the possibility of a third simultaneous colonial war, in Morocco, on a fifteen-hundred-mile frontier abutting the Algerian war it was already losing, at a moment when its army was stretched past the point any general would accept. The American diplomatic record of the period is blunt: the Resident-General was asking for more troops, the fighting was of the *fellagha* type spreading from Algeria, and the French could find themselves engaged along the whole length of the border. The floor of force that had held Morocco cheaply for forty years was suddenly ruinously expensive to hold, not because the Moroccans had grown strong enough to beat it — they had not, and could not have — but because the same floor was being demanded in three places at once and France could not pay for all three.

This is exhaustion in the framework's precise sense: not defeat in the field, but the re-pricing of the whole arrangement when the cost of holding it rises past the benefit of keeping it. The Moroccan resistance did not defeat the French army. It raised the price of the French army's continued presence, at a moment when France's ledger was already bleeding from Indochina and Algeria, until a French government did the arithmetic and concluded that Morocco was the war it could afford to end. The Foreign Affairs correspondent of the moment put the calculation in the plainest terms: France concluded that Algeria mattered more, and prepared to let Morocco go.

The twist: the collaborator crisis

Here Morocco departs from the framework's script and supplies something new, and it follows directly from Module 8's finding that the elite had spent their own foundation.

An imperial power withdrawing from a colony normally hands power to a collaborating elite it has cultivated — a stable set of local partners who will protect its interests after the flag comes down. This is the ordinary mechanism of a managed decolonisation, and France had it in Tunisia and Britain had it across its African territories. France did not have it in Morocco, and the reason is the deposition.

The recent scholarship states the paradox exactly: Morocco was far less prepared for independence than Tunisia or the British colonies, with no stable political institutions and — the decisive lack — no viable set of collaborators, precisely because of the internal rivalries between the nationalists and the dignitaries like the pashas. The elite that should have received power at independence had destroyed itself. The great caïds and pashas had, by deposing the Sultan, made themselves synonymous with treason and could not be handed a country that now hated them. The nationalists were the popular force but were not France's men. And the one figure who commanded the loyalty of the whole country was the man France had exiled to Madagascar — because France's own act of exiling him had made him the nation's symbol.

So France was driven to a conclusion that reads, on its face, as a reversal and is in fact the coldest possible position-logic: to withdraw at all, it had to reinstate the very Sultan it had deposed, because he was the only viable collaborator left. The scholarship names the motive without sentiment — France recognised Moroccan independence hastily in order to make Mohammed V a viable collaborator and to preserve, through his leadership, political unity and continued French influence.

The martyr France had accidentally crowned in 1953 was, by 1955, the only instrument through which France could manage its own exit. Having destroyed every collaborator but one, and then exiled that one, France had to bring him back to have anyone to hand the keys to.

The mechanism of the return

The sequence confirms that this was elite negotiation, not popular conquest, at every step.

Ben Arafa was pressured to withdraw and left for Tangier, where he abdicated. In August 1955 the French premier Edgar Faure convened a committee of ministers at Aix-les-Bains, and there the French government and a Moroccan delegation of some thirty-seven members — Istiqlal, the PDI, and figures close to the French administration — negotiated the terms. A regency council was formed. On 5 November 1955 Mohammed ben Youssef met the French minister Antoine Pinay at La Celle-Saint-Cloud; on 6 November France recognised him again as sultan; on 16 November he returned to Rabat to the crowds. The French National Assembly ratified the Aix-les-Bains settlement on 9 October by 468 votes to 139. On 2 March 1956 France recognised Moroccan independence.

Every load-bearing step in that sequence was taken by an elite: a French premier and his ministers, a Moroccan delegation of party leaders and notables, a national assembly voting, two sovereigns and a foreign minister at a château. The crowds at Rabat were the fuel and the confirmation; they were not the authors. The framework's reading holds without strain — the order changed when the floor cracked from fracture and exhaustion, and a re-priced elite negotiated a transfer through the one position that had survived the wreck.

What dispersed, and what re-gathered

The framework's final question of any collapse is whether the three monopolies dispersed into more hands afterward or simply re-gathered into few. Morocco's answer is instructive and is deferred in full to Module 12, but its shape belongs here.

The monopoly on violence passed from the French army to a Moroccan army built substantially from the same men who had served France — the goumiers, the tirailleurs, the officers of Module 1 — under the Crown. The monopoly on wealth stayed, at independence, largely where the protectorate had left it: the settler estates were not immediately seized, the phosphates remained in the Sharifian state that had always held them, and the Moroccan propertied class of Module 2 kept its titles. The monopoly on trusted information returned undivided to the throne — indeed more concentrated than before, because the deposition and return had fused the sacred legitimacy of the Commander of the Faithful to the national legitimacy of the independence leader in a single person.

That fusion is the hinge of everything that followed. Mohammed ben Youssef returned not merely as sultan but as the man who had been martyred for the nation and restored by its will, holding both the oldest legitimacy in the country and the newest. He became king in 1957. The three monopolies did not disperse. They re-gathered, into the hand of a monarchy that emerged from the protectorate stronger in legitimacy than it had entered it — which is the framework's most sobering finding about collapse, confirmed once more: the seam is never emptied, only re-occupied, and here it was re-occupied by the same office that had held it before the French arrived, now reinforced by the very crisis that had ended French rule.

Reading the collapse against the framework

Four refinements, of which the second is this case's principal contribution.

The first concerns the direction of a fracture. The framework's fracture crack is usually centrifugal — one elite faction arms the commons against another, and the settlement widens as the price of the alliance. Morocco shows a centripetal fracture: a reactionary faction of the apex, defending its own positions, detonates the order's foundation without any intention of widening anything, and the settlement changes not because the fracture opened a door but because it created a martyr. The refinement: a fracture need not widen the settlement to bring down an order; it can bring it down by destroying the load-bearing belief, in which case the change that follows is driven not by the crowd the fracture armed but by the symbol the fracture created. Look, in any fracture, at whether the breaking faction opened the settlement or detonated its keystone — the two produce very different successors.

The second is the collaborator paradox, and it is the finding. An order that rules through a rented legitimacy, and whose elite then spends that legitimacy to defend their positions, destroys not only the order's foundation but its own succession — because the collaborators who should inherit at withdrawal have made themselves unihandable in the act of breaking the keystone. The refinement for the framework: when a colonial order collapses, the withdrawing power's freedom of action is set by how many viable collaborators it has left, and an order that has consumed its own foundation has usually consumed its collaborators with it, leaving the withdrawing power no choice but to reinstate the very figure it destroyed. This is why Morocco's decolonisation was both faster and more favourable to the monarchy than Tunisia's or

the British cases: France had no bench, having burned it, and had to restore the one man whose legitimacy it had itself manufactured by exiling him. The re-pricing that ends an order, in such a case, is not only the re-pricing of the floor's cost but the collapse of the collaborator market to a single seller — who names his terms.

The third concerns exhaustion as a system property rather than a local one. Morocco's floor did not become expensive because Moroccans made it so; it became expensive because Indochina and Algeria were draining the same treasury and the same army at the same time. The refinement: the cost of holding a colony is not set within the colony but across the whole imperial system, and a possession that is individually cheap to hold can become unaffordable when other possessions crack simultaneously and bid up the price of the shared floor. The analyst measuring whether an order will hold must therefore price not the local resistance alone but the demands on the same force elsewhere — because the floor is one floor, spread thin, and it cracks where the whole system is weakest, not where any single population pushes hardest. Morocco was let go not because it pushed hardest but because it was, in 1955, the cheapest of France's three wars to end.

The fourth restates the dignifying myth in this case's own terms, and it is the note to carry into the final modules. Morocco tells itself, and is entitled to tell itself, that it rose and won its freedom — and the courage of the resistance and the unanimity of the crowds were real and are not to be diminished. But the mechanism was the framework's, not the myth's: the order fell when its own elite fractured and its own imperial system exhausted, and independence was negotiated between elites through the one position that survived the fracture. The myth that the people rose is, here as everywhere, the settlement's account of itself — and it is doing exactly the work the framework says it does, binding the

newly sovereign nation to a monarchy by the pride of a shared victory, a victory in which the monarchy's legitimacy was the instrument, the beneficiary, and the thing that emerged from the whole crisis most enlarged. Module 12 will have to weigh what that monarchy then built, without either swallowing the myth or denying the achievement.

A note on sources. This module quotes no primary text; its spine is the documented chronology of 1953–1956, drawn from standard reference sources, from the United States *Foreign Relations* series for the diplomatic record, and from the scholarly literature on the French decision to withdraw. The escalation of the resistance — the attempt on Ben Arafa on 11 September 1953, the Casablanca market bombing of 24 December 1953, the attacks on El Glaoui and Guillaume in 1954, and the launch of the Armée de Libération's operations on 2 October 1955 north of Taza — is reported from a Moroccan popular-history series (Yabiladi) and a French commemorative site (Mémorial des Deux-Sèvres); these are secondary and in places commemorative sources, and the individual incidents, dates and casualty figures should be verified against a scholarly history of the Moroccan resistance before any single one is relied on as exact. The direction and sequence, however — deposition, escalation, armed movement near the Algerian frontier, negotiation, return — are consistent across all sources consulted.

The diplomatic mechanism is better sourced. The Aix-les-Bains conference of 22–27 August 1955 convened by Edgar Faure, the composition of the Moroccan delegation, the National Assembly's ratification on 9 October 1955 by 468 votes to 139, the Pinay–Mohammed V meeting at La Celle-Saint-Cloud on 5 November, the French recognition on 6 November, the return to Rabat on 16 November, and the

recognition of independence on 2 March 1956 are from the US *Foreign Relations of the United States* 1955–57 volume and the standard reference accounts; where the reference sources give the recognition of the restoration as 6 November and some give 5 November for the decisive meeting, I have followed the *Foreign Relations* dating and noted the one-day discrepancies rather than resolving them silently.

The two interpretive claims that carry the module's weight are paraphrased from named modern scholarship and flagged. The judgement that France concluded Algeria mattered more and prepared to abandon Morocco is from the contemporary *Foreign Affairs* assessment of January 1956, a period source written by an informed observer rather than an archival study, and is used for its contemporaneity, not treated as settled history. The central paradox — that France's haste to grant independence is explained by its *lack* of viable collaborators, resulting from the rivalry between nationalists and pashas, so that reinstating Mohammed V as the only viable collaborator became the mechanism of withdrawal — is the thesis of Shinji Nohara's (and related) work in the *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* on the paradox of Moroccan independence, paraphrased and credited; it is the load-bearing scholarly claim of this module and its second refinement stands or falls with it, so it should be read in the original before the refinement is carried into the framework. All framework language — the four cracks, fracture and exhaustion, the floor's re-pricing, the seam re-occupied, the dignifying myth — is from *Elite Chaos*, *The Three Monopolies*, and the field manual.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 11 · THE GRIM ACCOUNTING

THE NOTE THAT WAS NOT CALLED

Module 11 · The Grim Accounting — the ledger of the order, cost and achievement on facing pages: a founding conquest measured in combat rather than famine, because the coordinating order it seized was left running rather than shattered; a bill paid mostly in the naked cost of the sword where belief never took; and works real enough that the honest reckoning must credit them without letting them cancel the column of the dead

The discipline this module enforces

This is the module that tests whether a study can hold its nerve. The framework's central discipline, stated shortest in *Above Warlordism*, is to hold two truths at once without letting either swallow the other: that the order was real, valuable, hard-won — and that it was, underneath, a taking held by force. Module 11 makes that discipline a ledger. It asks for the cost the order collected, quantified where the record allows and with the combat dead separated from the metabolic dead; and it asks, at equal weight and in the same breath, for the genuine coordination the order performed. It forbids two opposite errors: the conqueror's syllogism, that because some order is necessary this order was justified, and the sentimental mirror, that because the price was terrible the works were worthless.

Morocco tests the discipline in a particular way, and the way is the finding your framework predicts. Because the protectorate seized a functioning, self-running order and left it running rather than shattering it — the whole burden of Modules 5, 8 and 9 — the metabolic column that dominates the Algerian ledger is, in Morocco, comparatively thin. The dead here are mostly the sword's own dead, concentrated in the founding conquest and in the districts where belief never took, plus one great famine that arrived under wartime plunder rather than out of the conquest's own mechanism. This is what a conquest costs when it keeps the coordinating machinery instead of breaking it: the bill comes due in bullets, not in bread, and the difference is the measure of what continuity spared.

The metabolic column, and why it is short

Begin with the column that dominates the harsher colonial ledgers and is, in Morocco, unexpectedly light — and be exact about why.

An advanced agrarian society raises its population above the land's raw carrying capacity through coordination: irrigation maintained, granaries kept, trade moved, order held so that the surplus of a good year survives to cover a bad one. Break that coordination — shatter the state, burn the crops, scatter the herds, sever the trade — and the population that the coordination had lifted above subsistence falls back through the floor, and the metabolic note comes due in famine. Algeria's ledger is dominated by exactly this: the razzia that made famine a weapon, and the catastrophe of 1866–68 when the extraction met a bad year with nothing left, killing three to five hundred thousand.

Morocco's founding did not work that way, and the demographic record is the proof. The population of Morocco

rose across the protectorate — variously reckoned from something under five million at the conquest to roughly eight million by 1936 and around ten million by the 1950s, and while every one of those figures is soft, the direction is unmistakable and it is the opposite of the metabolic signature. A conquest that shatters a coordinating order leaves a population that falls; Morocco's rose, and it rose because the coordinating order was left standing. The Makhzen's administrative machinery was reinvented rather than destroyed, the sultanate was preserved, the religious and legal and agrarian institutions were conserved by the very doctrine of Module 3, and onto that surviving base the protectorate added roads, ports, dams, railways, and a measure of modern medicine. A United States consular despatch of 1947 recorded the mechanism without meaning to theorise it: the increase in Moroccan population from six million in 1936 to over eight million spoke well for the results attained by the protecting power — even, the writer added, in spite of a very heavy death rate from hunger in the drought year of 1945. Population rose because the machine that fed it was kept running.

So the metabolic column is short because the conquest declined to do the thing that fills it. This is not a moral credit to the conquerors; it is a structural consequence of the choice examined in every prior module — to rule through the existing order rather than replace it. The people were controlled so well, through their own institutions and their own belief, that the incoming apex had no need to shatter the coordination that held them, and so the coordination went on holding them, and feeding them, and the metabolic note was, for the most part, not called.

The one great famine, and where it belongs

There is one enormous entry in the metabolic column, and its provenance is the exception that confirms the rule.

The famine of 1945 — remembered as *ām bu-fī*, the year of hunger — fell on Morocco after successive years of drought, locust and a wartime economy, and it killed, on the French figures, some two hundred thousand, and on the historian Daniel Rivet's reckoning more than three hundred thousand in that single year, amid plague, typhus and fever that struck the countryside first. People walked toward the American landing zones because the soldiers there gave out food. It is a catastrophe on the scale of Algeria's, and it belongs in the ledger at full weight.

But note when it came and under what. It came in 1945, at the end of the Second World War, under the Vichy and wartime administration, when Axis and Allied requisitioning stripped North Africa of food and the plunder of the wartime economy met a run of failed harvests. It was not a product of the protectorate's founding mechanism, as the razzia famines were of Algeria's; it was a product of a global war's demand laid on top of a bad-weather cycle. The distinction the field manual insists on — locate the death in its cause — places this one not in the conquest of 1912 but in the wartime plunder of 1942–45, a metabolic event driven by an external shock rather than by the extraction régime's own routine operation. That it stands nearly alone in the Moroccan column, where Algeria's held several such events strung across the life of the order, is the measurement: remove the wartime shock and the protectorate's metabolic toll is strikingly low for a colonial order of its duration, precisely because it kept the coordinating machinery that would otherwise have been the thing destroyed.

The combat column, and where the belief failed

The column that dominates the Moroccan ledger is the sword's own, and it is concentrated exactly where the framework says it will be: in the founding conquest, and in the districts where the borrowed belief did not reach.

Module 1 counted the war and declined to invent a total, and this module keeps that discipline. The conquest and pacification ran twenty-two years, from Casablanca in 1907 to the Anti-Atlas in 1934, and its dead cannot be honestly summed: the Casablanca bombardment alone is given anywhere from six hundred to fifteen thousand; El Herri cost over eight hundred in an afternoon; the Rif war on the French side of the line, Bou Gafer, the Zaian war, and the scores of smaller operations each added their uncounted toll. What can be said structurally is where the dying was concentrated, and it is the confirmation of the whole study: the killing clustered in the Middle Atlas, the Rif, the High Atlas and the Anti-Atlas — the mountains, the *bled es-siba*, the districts that had withheld obedience from the Makhzen and continued to withhold it from the French. Where the Sultan's name in the sermon had carried the people, France inherited a compliance it did not have to pay for in blood. Where it had not — where the belief the framework calls the robe did not reach — France paid in the naked currency of the sword, for twenty-two years.

That is the grim arithmetic of a rented belief stated as a body count. The cheapness of the plains and the ports, where the order ran on borrowed conviction, was purchased at no cost in dead. The expense of the mountains, where there was no conviction to borrow, was paid in the only currency left. The map of the protectorate's combat dead is the map of where the robe failed, and the framework's proposition — that surveillance and force are the tell of a belief that never took — is legible in the campaign cemeteries.

The standing cost, counted without deaths

Beyond the dead, the order collected a standing cost from the living, and it belongs in the ledger though no one died of it directly.

Module 2 counted the land: about a million hectares, the best fifth of the irrigated and grain country, passed into European hands, and the whole legal nature of Moroccan landholding was remade so that collective tenure collapsed and the registry sorted the country into the propertied and the purged. Module 4 counted the mind: after forty-four years, thirteen per cent of Moroccan children in school, six thousand seven hundred in secondary education, no university until the year after independence, and a formation deliberately withheld because forming them would have meant admitting them. Module 6 counted the bread: a flat tax that fell seven times as heavily on the Moroccan sector, a surcharge that funded the surveillance of one caste and the self-government of the other, a corvée renamed and left on Moroccan shoulders alone. Module 5 counted the liberty: an exit closed by geography, a public-order code generic enough to outlive the protectorate by thirty-eight years. None of these is a death, and all of them are in the ledger, because the framework's question is not only who was killed but who was held at subsistence, foreclosed, and un-made — and the standing answer, for the Moroccan majority, was: most of them, for the life of the order.

The works, credited at full weight

Now the facing page, and it must be written with the same care, because the discipline forbids sneering the works away as surely as it forbids letting them cancel the dead.

The works were real. The protectorate built the ports of Casablanca and Kenitra, a railway network, roads that reached where no road had reached, dams and irrigation on the plains. It brought modern medicine sufficient to bend the mortality curve, which is why the population rose. It founded the institutes and preserved the monuments of Module 3, so that the medinas of Fez, Marrakech, Rabat and Meknes survived where Algiers had been gutted. It reunited under one administration a country that had been divided between *makhzen* and *siba*, and it ended, for better and worse, the chronic insecurity of the dissident regions. Modern Morocco's phosphate industry, its road grid, its administrative spine, and much of its urban form descend from protectorate decisions, and a Moroccan crossing one of those dams or shipping through that port is using an inheritance this order built. The achievement is not diminished by naming its cost, and this study will not diminish it.

What the discipline requires is only that the two pages be read together and neither torn out. The roads were real and they were built to move phosphate to the coast and troops to the mountains. The medicine was real and it kept alive a population whose land was being registered away and whose children were being kept from school. The preserved medina was real and it was preserved by forbidding its people to build in it. The works and the costs are not a case for and a case against, to be netted into a verdict. They are the two columns of a single ledger, both true, and the honest account is the one that reports the sum without pretending the subtraction yields a moral.

Reading the accounting against the framework

Three refinements, of which the first is this case's principal contribution to the grim-accounting method.

The first concerns the composition of the bill. The framework's ledger separates combat dead from metabolic dead, and the Algerian case taught that the metabolic column is often the larger, because conquest works by shattering the coordination that holds a population above subsistence. Morocco supplies the controlled contrast the method needed: a conquest that preserved the coordinating order rather than shattering it, and whose metabolic column is correspondingly short, its population rising across the whole life of the order rather than falling. The refinement is that the ratio of metabolic to combat dead is a direct measure of how much of the conquered order the conqueror destroyed versus kept. A high metabolic toll is the signature of a shattered coordination; a low one, as in Morocco, is the signature of a coordination preserved and turned to the conqueror's use. The bill's composition, not merely its size, tells you what kind of conquest you are reading — and a conquest that rules through the existing order pays its price in the sword's own dead, concentrated at the founding and at the points of unbelief, rather than in the slow metabolic hemorrhage of a broken machine.

The second concerns the geography of the combat dead. Because the order rented its belief through a sovereign whose legitimacy reached most of the country, the killing was not spread evenly across the population but concentrated in the minority of districts the belief did not reach. The refinement: in an order that rules through a borrowed conviction, the map of the combat dead is the map of the conviction's limits, and one can read the reach of a rented robe backward from the location of the graves. Morocco's dead cluster in the mountains not because the mountains were more rebellious by nature but because the mountains were where the Sultan's borrowed authority did not run, and the sword had to do alone what the sermon did for free everywhere else.

The third holds the works and the costs against the framework's refusal of both errors. Morocco is the collection's strongest temptation to the conqueror's syllogism, because its works were substantial, its dead were fewer than Algeria's, its coordination was preserved, and its successor state inherited a functioning spine. The temptation is to conclude that the gentler, cheaper, more preservative conquest was therefore the justified one. The framework's discipline refuses the step, and the refusal is the refinement: that a conquest cost less does not make it owed, and that it built more does not make it consented to. Morocco's lower bill is a fact about method, not about right — it tells us the conquerors chose the cheaper instrument, not that they held the juster claim. The order that killed fewer, fed more, and preserved more was still an order imposed by a foreign floor on a people who had recorded, in 1908 and 1930 and 1944 and 1953, at every occasion the framework's own revealed-preference test provides, that they wished to govern themselves. The works are real and the preference was real, and the honest ledger holds both — crediting the achievement without swallowing the self-justification, naming the cost without denying the achievement. That double refusal is the whole of the discipline, and Module 12 will need it intact.

A note on sources. This module quotes one near-primary line — the United States consular despatch of 1947 (Maurice Pasquet) reporting the population rise from six million in 1936 to over eight million and attributing it to the protecting power despite the heavy death rate from hunger in 1945 — from the *Foreign Relations of the United States* 1947 volume, which is public-domain United States government material; I have rendered its substance closely and quoted only short phrases. No other primary text is quoted; the module is a ledger

assembled from figures established in the earlier modules and from the demographic and famine literature.

The demographic figures are given as ranges and flagged as soft. The population trajectory — under five million at the conquest, roughly eight million by 1936, around ten million by the mid-1950s — is assembled from the consular despatch, the MERIP demographic survey (which gives nine million in 1950), and standard reference estimates; no reliable census exists for the early protectorate, as the Landscape module recorded, and these figures should be treated as orders of magnitude establishing a direction, not as counts. The rising direction is not in dispute across any source consulted, and it is the load-bearing fact of the module's first refinement.

The famine of 1945 is given at two figures: the French administrative estimate of about two hundred thousand dead and Daniel Rivet's estimate of more than three hundred thousand for the single year 1945; both are reported, per the collection's rule on contested tolls, and both reach me through a secondary Moroccan history (Yabiladi, citing Rivet and the magazine Zamane) rather than through Rivet's own monograph, which should be consulted before either figure is relied on as exact. The attribution of the famine to wartime requisitioning and the Vichy-era economy laid over a drought-and-locust cycle follows the general literature on wartime North African famine, including the *Los Angeles Review of Books* treatment of Axis and Vichy food plunder in the region; the causal separation of this famine from the protectorate's founding mechanism is my own analytic claim, consistent with that literature but not lifted from a single source, and it is the hinge of the module's argument that Morocco's metabolic column is short, so it should be tested against a dedicated study of the 1945 Moroccan famine before the compile.

The combat figures are those established and deliberately left unsummed in Module 1, and the reasons for refusing a

total are given there. The concentration of the combat dead in the mountain districts of former *siba* is an inference from the campaign geography set out in Module 1 rather than from a casualty atlas, and it is presented as a structural reading, not a body count. The catalogue of works — ports, railways, roads, dams, medicine, the preserved medinas, the phosphate industry — is drawn from the standard reference accounts and from the earlier modules' sources; it is deliberately not quantified here beyond what those modules established, because the module's purpose is to weigh the works against the costs, not to audit the public-works budget, and a fuller quantification belongs to an economic history rather than to this ledger. All framework language — the two columns, combat and metabolic dead, the conqueror's syllogism and the sentimental mirror, the double refusal — is from *Above Warlordism*, *The Cost Column*, and the field manual.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 12 · CONVERGENCE & DIVERGENCE

THE OFFICE THAT OUTLIVED THE OCCUPIER

Module 12 · Convergence and Divergence — reading French Morocco against the corpus: the ancient shape it shares with every conquest that ruled through a kept sovereign, the door it never had to open because it ruled through the doorway itself, the revisions a rented-belief conquest forces on the framework, and the strongest case for the protectorate, stated fully and answered without flinching

The case against the collection

This last module reads French Morocco back against the corpus it belongs to — asking what it shares with other orders and whether the sharing is position logic at scale rather than any hidden hand, where its people chose within the narrow menu their position offered, what it confirms and complicates and forces the framework to revise, and, at the end, what the strongest case for this order would be, stated fully and answered without flattening.

The natural partner for the reading sits in the collection already, one border away: French Algeria, the case this study has measured itself against from its first page. The two are the same power, the same century, the same religion of the conquered, the same army — and two opposite methods, chosen deliberately, France having built the Moroccan protectorate as the thing Algeria taught it not to repeat. Algeria is the conquest that annexed and would not admit;

Morocco is the conquest that declined to annex at all, and ruled through a sovereign it kept. The comparison of the two is the clearest single frame for what Morocco adds to the framework, because it isolates one variable — whether the conqueror rules over the conquered order or through it — and runs it to two different ends.

The ancient convergence

Set Morocco beside the deep corpus and the convergence is structural, not stylistic, which is exactly what position logic at scale predicts. The move Morocco is built on — conquer a people by keeping their sovereign, ruling in his name, and letting his legitimacy carry your commands — is not French and not modern. It is one of the oldest instruments in the record. Rome kept client kings on its frontiers, ruling Judea through a Herod and Cappadocia through an Ariobarzanes before absorbing them, precisely to hold a province on the cheap through a legitimacy it had not built. The framework's own studies of the kept intermediary — the *satrap's bargain*, the native hierarchy co-opted by redirect — trace the same shape across the Achaemenid provinces, the Ptolemaic priesthoods, the British residencies of Buganda and Northern Nigeria and Iraq. Three or more unconnected conquerors across two millennia reaching a move of the same shape, because the position of a conqueror who finds a functioning, believed-in sovereign already in place poses the same problem — break him and pay to replace what he did, or keep him and rent what he already does — and the second answer is so much cheaper that the filter has selected for it again and again, with no hidden hand required, only many men running the ordinary benefit-against-cost engine from the same seat.

And within that convergence Morocco sits with the corpus's other protectorates — Vietnam, Buganda, Northern Nigeria,

Iraq — as a family: conquests that ruled through a preserved indigenous apex rather than over a dispossessed one, and that therefore ran cheaper, killed fewer at the founding, and preserved more of the conquered order than the settler-annexation cases did. What Morocco adds to that family is the sharpest case of the load-bearing belief being not merely political but *sacred* — a sovereign who was not only king but Commander of the Faithful, whose legitimacy was owed obedience as a religious duty — which drives the family's logic to its purest form and, as the modules found, to its most acute vulnerability.

The door France never had to open

Now the divergence from Algeria, and it is the whole of what Morocco teaches the corpus.

Algeria's tragedy, in the previous study's reading, was a door: Rome conquered Gaul and opened the door, admitting the conquered until Gaul became Rome; France conquered Algeria and bolted the door, refusing to admit the Muslim majority, and so manufactured the counter-nation that ended it. The variable that divided the outcomes was whether the conqueror would, in the end, admit the conquered.

Morocco never faced the question, and the reason is the finding. France did not rule over the Moroccans and then refuse to admit them; it ruled *through* their sovereign, which is to say it ruled through the doorway itself without ever having to decide whether to open it. There was no caste line of citizenship to police because there was no pretence that Moroccans were becoming French — the protectorate's whole doctrine was that they would remain Moroccan subjects of a Moroccan king (Module 9). Algeria's *indigénat* held a majority that had been told it was French and shown it was not; Morocco needed no *indigénat*, because it never told the

Moroccan he was anything but Moroccan (Module 5). The door that Rome opened and France bolted in Algeria was, in Morocco, simply never a door in the wall — because the wall was the arrangement, and the Moroccan was meant to stay on his own side of it, governed by his own sovereign, believing his own faith, under a foreign hand that reached him only through institutions he already trusted.

This is why Morocco did not end in a war of liberation on the Algerian scale, and why its collapse (Module 10) ran through the sovereign rather than around him. Algeria's counter-nation had to be built from scratch against a foreclosing state, because the state offered the Muslim nothing to be. Morocco's counter-nation was already there, fully formed, in the sultanate France had preserved — so that when the order fell, it did not have to invent a nation to replace the coloniser; it had only to reclaim the sovereign the coloniser had been renting, and whom the coloniser had, by deposing him, handed back to the nation as a martyr. Algeria had to become a nation to become free. Morocco had only to repossess the one it had never stopped being.

The revisions the case forces

From that one difference — ruling through the sovereign rather than over the subject — the framework's revisions follow, and each has been stated in its own module; gathered here, they are the case's contribution to the corpus.

The **robe is rented, not woven**. The framework's default has the conqueror lay his own robe over the floor and drive it into the governed by formation. Morocco shows a conqueror who declines to weave a robe at all and instead *leases* the one already on the population — the sacred legitimacy of the Commander of the Faithful — running his commands under a seal the people already trusted (Modules 3, 5). This is the

deepest revision the case offers, and it reframes the robe as a thing a conqueror may rent rather than make: cheaper than weaving, because the belief is already installed and already believed; and more dangerous, because a rented robe can be repossessed by its owner, and cannot be defended by the conqueror's usual instruments without destroying the trust that made it worth renting (Module 9).

Formation is withheld, and the field left to the robe's true owner. As in Algeria, formation was withheld from the majority — but where Algeria left the field to a rival that had to build the counter-nation, Morocco left it to the *existing* order, the Qarawiyyin and the *msid* and the mosque, which simply held the ground the coloniser declined to enter (Module 4). The revision: where the withheld formation in a settler colony breeds a new counter-nation, the withheld formation in a rule-through-the-sovereign colony merely leaves the old nation in possession of itself, so that the conqueror's abstention preserves intact the very thing that will reclaim the country.

The cost column is rented too, and repossessable. The framework's identity is that the floor of force is the cost column. Morocco shows a conqueror who did not build the ordinary subject's cost column but rented it — arranging that defiance of France presented itself as defiance of a sovereign whose obedience was a religious duty, priced by the subject's own community at no cost to France (Module 5). And a rented cost column, like a rented robe, can be repossessed: the same sultan whose seal held every ledger could withhold it, which is exactly what the endgame recorded (Modules 8–10).

The seam splits by distance, and the mosque defeats one half of it. As the colonial doubling predicts, the seam ran in two — between Morocco and the metropole, and between the Residency and the Moroccan street. But the second half was lost before it was contested, because the one channel that

reached the whole population every week, the Friday sermon, was the channel the conqueror had rented and could not silence without destroying his own robe (Module 7). The framework gains the finding that a conqueror who rents a sacred robe grants the rented faith a broadcast channel he cannot jam.

The ledger sorts by caste without naming it. The grim accounting of a settler colony sorts openly. Morocco could not name the caste it taxed, because the tax rode on Islam, so it sorted by *design* instead — a flat tax laid over an unequal settlement, formally equal and materially sorted (Module 6). The framework gains the caste tax that cannot be quoted against its authors.

And the **Menu family gains its cleanest success-and-failure pair**. Module 8 read Morocco as Co-opt-by-redirect of the native hierarchy run to its limit — and the redirect both *succeeded* longer than Algeria's and *failed* more catastrophically, because the co-opted apex, holding real sacred legitimacy rather than the derived authority of an Algerian *caïd*, could hold the country cheaply for forty years and then, in spending that legitimacy to defend itself, detonate the whole order in a single act. The finding for the Co-opt family: co-opting a sovereign who holds the load-bearing belief is the cheapest possible rule and the most catastrophic possible failure, because the asset you rent is the asset whose destruction brings down everything leaning on it.

What holds, and the control it provides

Against these revisions the spine holds without a break, and honesty requires saying so: French Morocco is a colonial variant of the framework, not a counterexample. The convergence with every kept-sovereign conquest from Rome's client kings onward is position logic at scale, no hidden hand

required (*No Hidden Hand*). The object throughout is the three monopolies, held so nearly whole in one hand that even the settlers were denied a share, with the single crack running through the one leg the conqueror rented rather than owned (*The Three Monopolies*). The surprises lived, as the framework says they must, one level up in the elite and not in the rising of the ruled — the order fell from an elite fracture and an imperial exhaustion, the common man supplying crowd and courage and the dead but never the proximate crack (*Above Warlordism*, *Elite Chaos*). The order reproduced by default, each position-holder in the nested stack defending the whole by defending his own place, needing no conspiracy (*By Default*). The case confirms all of this and refutes none of it.

And Morocco provides the corpus a clean control, in the pairing with Algeria. The two are the same conqueror's engine run with one variable flipped — rule over the subject, or rule through the sovereign — and the difference in their fates isolates that variable as sharply as Gaul and Algeria isolated the door. Algeria annexed, foreclosed, and withheld formation from a majority it had told it was French, and manufactured a counter-nation that expelled it in a war of a million dead. Morocco preserved the sovereign, rented his belief, withheld formation but left the old nation in possession of itself, and ended not in a war of liberation but in a negotiated repossession of a throne that had never stopped being legitimate. Same power, same century, same faith, opposite method, opposite end — and the framework's cleanest available demonstration that a conquest's shape at its fall is set by whether it ruled over the conquered order or through it. The settler colony must manufacture the nation that ends it; the protectorate merely borrows the nation that outlasts it.

The strongest case for the protectorate

The framework is held as tested, not revealed, and the reading must end on the strongest case for this order, stated fully and answered without flattening. It has three prongs, and each is serious, and Morocco makes each of them harder to answer than Algeria did — because Morocco's order really was gentler, and the temptation to let the gentleness stand as vindication is the strongest this collection has faced.

The first is the comparative prong: that Morocco is the proof that colonialism *could* be done well, or at least far better — that the protectorate killed fewer at its founding, preserved the dynasty, the faith, the law, the crafts and the cities, kept the coordinating order running so that the population rose rather than fell, built the ports and dams and the phosphate industry that independent Morocco inherited whole, and handed back a functioning state under a legitimate king, all of which Algeria's annexation destroyed or never built. To read Morocco as a seizure, the prong says, is to ignore that it was the *least bad* colonialism on offer and that Moroccans themselves preserved from it a monarchy and a spine they chose to keep.

The second is the continuity prong, aimed at this study's own method: that the thing France is charged with — ruling through a preserved Makhzen, extracting through a flat tax, holding order through the sultan's sacred authority — was simply the Moroccan order *as it already was*, so that the protectorate changed far less than a conquest normally does, and to indict it is half to indict pre-colonial Morocco itself, which was also a conquest-order, also extractive, also unfree by the framework's own account (the Landscape).

The third is the outcome prong, the sharpest: that the phosphates France reserved to the Sharifian state passed intact to independent Morocco and fund it still; that the

monarchy France restored is the same institution that has given Morocco, whatever its faults, an unusual continuity and stability in a region of coups and collapses; and that the OCP is today a Moroccan state champion and the Alaouite throne the oldest continuous institution in the Arab world — so that the protectorate's deepest legacies are, on the ledger, credits to the Moroccan state that inherited them.

Each prong lands, and each is answered by conceding what it gets right before showing what it misses.

The comparative prong is factually correct, and Module 11 granted it at full weight: the works were real, the population rose, the coordination was preserved, and the sentimental mirror that would deny it is its own dishonesty. What the prong misses is the syllogism inside it — that the gentler conquest was therefore the owed one. That a conquest cost less does not make it consented to, and Morocco recorded its non-consent at every occasion the framework's own revealed-preference test provides: the conditional *bay'a* of 1908, the *Latif* of 1930, the Manifesto of 1944, the withheld seal and the deposition crisis of 1953, and the crowds of 1955. A people that keeps demonstrating, whenever the cost of demonstrating is low, that it wishes to govern itself, has told you it did not consent, however gently it was held. Credit the method; refuse the entitlement. The gentleness was a fact about French prudence — the lesson of Algeria applied — not about Moroccan consent.

The continuity prong is the one that most improves this study's precision, and it is conceded in part: pre-colonial Morocco was indeed a conquest-order, the Alaouite settlement naturalised over two and a half centuries over an Arab conquest naturalised over twelve, and the framework names it as such without flinching (the Landscape). But the prong understates the change France made, and the change is precise. France did not simply continue the Makhzen; it

hollowed and kept it — severed the fiscal link between the sultan and his people (the Landscape), took the budget and the army and the law and left the sovereign only the sacred (Module 3), and turned an order that had run on its own account into an order that ran on France's, wearing the sultan's seal. The pre-colonial order extracted for a Moroccan apex; the protectorate redirected the extraction outward, to European estates and a metropolitan market and a phosphate export, while keeping the sultan's face on the coin. That the instruments looked continuous is exactly the disguise the rule-through-the-sovereign method requires; the continuity is real on the surface and the redirection is real underneath, and naming the second is not indicting pre-colonial Morocco but identifying what the protectorate did to it.

The outcome prong is the hardest and the most honest, and it must be conceded further than the others — but with the distinction the whole collection turns on. It is true that the phosphates passed intact to the Moroccan state, true that the monarchy France restored has given Morocco a rare continuity, true that these are real assets on the successor state's ledger. The framework's answer is not to deny the inheritance but to locate it correctly: what independent Morocco inherited was not a gift of the protectorate but the *residue of the fiction* the protectorate had used to rule. France reserved the phosphates to the Sharifian state because ruling through a Moroccan sovereign required vesting them in a Moroccan sovereign (Modules 2, 6); it restored the monarchy because it had destroyed every other collaborator and needed one (Module 10). The container survived because the container was the instrument, and what was in it at the end belonged to whoever inherited the fiction — which was the Moroccan state. This is a real inheritance and it is not a vindication, because the same fiction that preserved the phosphates and the throne also sorted the harvest seven-to-

one, withheld the school to thirteen per cent, and held the mountains down with aircraft for twenty-two years. The monarchy that emerged strengthened is the same monarchy that ran the Years of Lead. The seam that survived intact — the sacred legitimacy fused now to national legitimacy — is the same seam that was never emptied, only re-occupied, and re-occupied by the office that had held it before France came and holds it still. Credit the inheritance; name what it cost and what it became.

The double truth

What remains, when the counter-position has been given its full due, is the double truth the framework exists to hold without collapsing. The Moroccan protectorate really was the gentler conquest — it preserved a dynasty, a faith, a law, and a coordinating order, killed fewer at its founding than the annexation next door, kept its people alive and rising in number, and handed back a functioning state under a legitimate king — *and* it was, underneath, a foreign seizure that took the best fifth of the land through a registry, sorted the harvest by a tax that named no one and fell sevenfold, withheld the school until the year after it left, held the unbelieving mountains down with aircraft and blockade for twenty-two years, rented a people’s sacred sovereign to rule them cheaply, and, when that sovereign reclaimed what had been rented, deposed the Commander of the Faithful and broke the country open. Neither truth may be collapsed into the other. The achievement is credited without swallowing the self-justification; the cost is named without denying the achievement; and the discipline of holding both at once is the only stance from which the order can be seen.

And beneath the double truth lies the wound the whole collection is written to make visible, and Morocco shows it in

its own particular form. Algeria showed that the apparatus which lifts a society above the warlord does its greatest harm when captured and turned on a people it will not admit. Morocco shows something quieter and, in its way, more unsettling: that the same apparatus does its work most cheaply, most durably, and most invisibly not when it captures a people by force but when it *rents their own belief* to move them — when it reaches the governed only through the sovereign they already trust, the faith they already hold, the sermon they already attend, so that the hand on them is felt as their own and the extraction wears the face on their own coin. The Algerian order was brutal and legible; the Moroccan order was gentle and disguised, and the disguise is the deeper lesson, because an order that rules through a rented belief is an order whose subjects may not be able to see the hand that moves them until it reaches, as France's did in 1953, for the one thing it was renting and could not replace. That is why the case is offered, in the method this study has held throughout — the exact public words of the treaty that promised to preserve the sultan's sovereignty set beside the exact private map of the partition printed in the Act of Algeciras six years early; the pledge of *appui constant* to the throne beside the deposition of the man who sat on it; the sermon that carried the sultan's name beside the aircraft over Bou Gafer — and the sum left, as it must be, for the reader to reach alone.

The order's fall is the filter's verdict on this attempt: not the verdict of History, which has no voice, and not proof the design was damned from the first day, but a finding about what a conquest that rents its keystone can bear when the owner reclaims it. It could bear a great deal — forty years of it, cheaply and with admiration — right up until the moment it reached for the sacred thing it had only ever leased, and found that the leg it had leaned on for forty years broke the instant it

tried to own it. The office outlived the occupier, because the office was never the occupier's to keep.

A note on sources. This module introduces no new primary quotation; it gathers and re-weighs the exact texts verified and sourced in the earlier modules — the Treaty of Fez (Modules 1, 2, 9), the Act of Algeciras with its port-by-port police clause (the Landscape, Module 1), the conditional *bay'a* of 1908 and the *Latif* of 1930 (the Landscape, Module 4), and the chronology of 1944–56 (Modules 7, 8, 10). Each is cited to the module that establishes it, and none is repeated here in a form stronger than its original verification supports.

The comparative frame with French Algeria draws on this collection's Algeria study, in particular its Module 12 (*The Door Rome Opened*) and the door variable it isolates; the pairing of the two French North African cases as rule-over versus rule-through is this module's own synthesis. The placement of Morocco within the corpus's protectorate family (Vietnam, Buganda, Northern Nigeria, Iraq) and the kept-sovereign lineage (Rome's client kings, the satrap's bargain, the co-opt-by-redirect family) refers to the corpus studies named and to the field manual's Menu of solution-families; the Roman client-king examples are given as the standard well-attested pattern and paraphrased, not quoted.

The post-independence trajectory — Mohammed V asserting monarchical power over the Istiqlal, the assumption of the royal title in 1957, Hassan II's reign from 1961 to 1999 and the Years of Lead, the survival of the Makhzen as a governing network, and the OCP's passage to and endurance under the Moroccan state — is drawn from standard reference and scholarly sources (Willis, Entelis, and the political-science literature on the Moroccan monarchy) and is paraphrased; it is

used here only to establish the outcome the counter-position's third prong rests on, and any specific claim about the Years of Lead or the monarchy's post-independence conduct should be verified against a dedicated history before it is relied on beyond the summary weight given it here. The characterisation of Mohammed V as a moderate and unifying figure, and of Hassan II's reign as combining development with severe repression, follows the consensus of that literature and is stated as contested where the literature contests it.

All framework language — position logic at scale and the absence of a hidden hand, the three monopolies and the load-bearing leg, the robe and the seam, formation and its withholding, the default and the nested positions, the four cracks, the grim accounting's double refusal, the filter that issues a structural finding and not a moral verdict, and the double truth held without collapse — is developed across the corpus (*Above Warlordism*, *The Machine That Runs Itself*, *No Hidden Hand*, *The Three Monopolies*, *By Default*, *Elite Chaos*, *The Architect and the Inheritor*, *The Hand at the Hinge*, and the field manual) and is named where used. The contributions this study proposes back to that framework — the rented robe and the rented cost column that can be repossessed by their owner; the withheld formation that leaves the old nation in possession of itself; the caste tax that cannot be quoted against its authors; the default that cannot defend a foundation that is everyone's support and no one's position; the order that rents its keystone and therefore cannot defend it; and the metabolic column shortened by a coordination preserved rather than shattered — are advanced as refinements to be tested against the next case, and held, as the whole collection is, as tested and never revealed.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*